基于博弈论的出行者路径选择均衡研究

发布时间：2018-10-25 15:14

【摘要】：目前,城市交通拥堵问题越来越严峻,要缓解拥堵的交通路径情况,应合理的运用相关知识建立模型体系来进一步优化整个路径选择系统。为出行者路径选择提供更合理的建议,出行路径最优化是出行者的最终目标,也是交通系统的最佳选择。同时提高了路径的利用效率,使得出行者与管理者的收益值增大。研究合理的出行者路径选择模型和求解算法,可以节约出行成本、减少交通事故、提高交通效率,使出行者更为舒心,具有较高的理论价值和广阔的现实意义。现阶段,着力研究出行者出行的路径选择优化方案,成为提高出行者收益以及路径利用效率(即就是缓解城市交通拥堵现象)的必要途径。但是,在实际的路径选择过程中,由于出行者的选择受到各种因素的影响,路径的选择结果具有很大的不可预测性。因此,探求更合理更明了的路径选择模型,对于出行者路径的选择以及管理者诱导信息的发布有着很大的帮助。并且有利于缓解道路拥堵,提高路径利用效率和道路的整体运行状况。因此,在只考虑出行者的路径选择所获得的收益条件下,因为在出行过程中出行费用是大多数出行者首要考虑的问题,研究不完全信息静态条件下和不完全信息动态条件下的出行者路径选择均衡的问题,构建模型并设计算法,用来求解出行者的最优路径选择的均衡解,并给出具体的算例来验证所构建的模型与算法的有效性和可行性,具体内容如下:1.综述了最优路径选择的研究现状和研究目的,主要包括博弈论的研究现状与进展,并且论述了博弈的要素、博弈的分类、贝叶斯均衡以及精炼贝叶斯均衡的概念与定义。最后介绍了本文所要研究的问题。2.研究了在不完全信息静态条件下出行者的出行路径选择均衡问题,并给出不同策略下出行者的收益值,分析静态条件下诱导信息对出行者心理活动的影响,构建路径选择模型、设计算法求解纯策略与混合策略的纳什均衡,进而求解贝叶斯纳什均衡。3.研究了不完全信息动态条件下,在管理者发布的诱导信息基础之上出行者与出行者之间的动态博弈问题,在运用海萨尼转换和均衡的定义求解精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡的基础上,对求解出的不同策略下的收益值,运用贝叶斯先验概率进行设定,进而研究此过程的精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡。4.研究了基于精炼贝叶斯均衡条件下的出行者路径选择,与上两章不同的是博弈变为路径事故与出行者之间的博弈,并且对于此博弈的特征进行了研究。按照博弈的基本要求描述了路径事故与出行者之间的重要博弈要素,构造一种期望效用函数,其是以出行者的期望效用最大为目标,根据贝叶斯均衡法则求解精炼贝叶斯均衡,并构建路径选择策略的动态应对框架,通过博弈双方之间反复博弈并不断地修正应对策略,直至出行结束。最后通过算例证明出行者模型的正确性和有效性。
[Abstract]:At present, the problem of urban traffic congestion is becoming more and more serious. In order to alleviate the congestion of traffic path, we should make use of relevant knowledge to establish a model system to further optimize the whole path selection system. It is the ultimate goal of travelers and the best choice of transportation system. At the same time, the efficiency of path utilization is improved, and the profit value of traveler and manager is increased. The study of reasonable route choice model and algorithm can save travel cost, reduce traffic accidents, improve traffic efficiency and make travelers more comfortable. It has high theoretical value and wide practical significance. At the present stage, it is necessary to study the route selection optimization scheme for travelers, which is the necessary way to improve the revenue of travelers and the efficiency of route utilization (that is, to alleviate the phenomenon of urban traffic congestion). However, in the course of actual path selection, due to the influence of various factors on the traveler's choice, the result of path selection is very unpredictable. Therefore, exploring a more reasonable and clear path selection model is of great help to the route selection of travelers and the release of manager induced information. And it is helpful to alleviate the road congestion, improve the efficiency of path utilization and the overall operation of the road. Therefore, under the condition of only considering the benefits of the route choice of the traveler, because the travel cost is the primary consideration of most travelers during the travel process, In this paper, the problem of path selection equilibrium for travelers under the static condition of incomplete information and the dynamic condition of incomplete information is studied, and the model is constructed and the algorithm is designed to solve the equilibrium solution of the optimal path choice of the traveler. A concrete example is given to verify the validity and feasibility of the proposed model and algorithm. The main contents are as follows: 1. This paper summarizes the research status and purpose of optimal path selection, including the research status and progress of game theory, and discusses the elements of game, the classification of game, the concept and definition of Bayesian equilibrium and refined Bayesian equilibrium. Finally, it introduces the problems to be studied in this paper. 2. This paper studies the problem of path selection equilibrium for travelers under the condition of incomplete information, and gives the profit value of travelers under different strategies, analyzes the influence of induced information on the psychological activities of travelers under static conditions, and constructs a path choice model. The algorithm is designed to solve the Nash equilibrium of pure strategy and mixed strategy, and then to solve Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 3. In this paper, the dynamic game problem between the traveler and the traveler under the dynamic condition of incomplete information is studied on the basis of the induced information released by the manager. On the basis of solving the refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium by using the definition of Hysani transformation and equilibrium, this paper studies the dynamic game problem between the traveler and the traveler based on the induced information released by the manager. The Bayesian priori probability is used to set the return value under different strategies, and then the refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium is studied. 4. This paper studies the path selection of travelers under the condition of refined Bayesian equilibrium. The difference from the previous two chapters is the game between the route accident and the traveller, and the characteristics of the game are studied. According to the basic requirements of the game, this paper describes the important elements of the game between the path accident and the traveler, and constructs an expected utility function, which aims at the maximum expected utility of the traveler and solves the refined Bayesian equilibrium according to the Bayesian equilibrium rule. The dynamic coping framework of the path selection strategy is constructed, and the strategy is revised through repeated games between the two sides of the game until the end of the trip. Finally, an example is given to prove the correctness and validity of the traveller model.
【学位授予单位】：兰州交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：U491;O225

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