休谟与康德:动机情感主义与理性主义之分及其当代辩护

发布时间：2018-03-09 21:31

本文选题：动机　切入点：情感主义　出处：《道德与文明》2015年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：道德心理学进路的动机研究在西方学界早已蔚为大观,休谟和康德分别开启了在该问题上的情感主义和理性主义传统。休谟和康德都可以承诺动机与道德判断之间的关联,但休谟认为道德判断本身不能直接提供行动的动机,动机必须依靠情感、欲望等行动者的心理机制,而康德则认为道德判断本身就能直接激发行动,实践理性自身足以成为行动的动机。休谟在心理机制的框架下安顿动机,而康德则在实践理性的框架下安顿动机,二者的差别直接开启了当代道德哲学关于动机问题探索的两条致思进路。当代学者一方面致力于对欲望、情感、理性等概念进行重新解释,一方面致力于对规范性理由和激发性理由展开激烈辩护,拉兹所提出的以"理由"为核心的综合解释框架更是为该问题的推进提供了全新的思路。
[Abstract]:The research on the motivation of the path of moral psychology has long been widely seen in the western academic circles. Hume and Kant have opened up the emotional and rationalistic traditions on this issue, respectively. Both Hume and Kant can promise the connection between motivation and moral judgment. But Hume thinks that moral judgment itself can not provide the motive of action directly, the motive must depend on the psychological mechanism of actors such as emotion and desire, while Kant thinks that moral judgment itself can directly stimulate action. Practical reason itself can become the motive of action. Hume settled in the frame of psychological mechanism, while Kant settled in the frame of practical reason. The difference between the two directly opens up two ways of thinking about motivation in contemporary moral philosophy. On the one hand, contemporary scholars are devoted to reinterpreting the concepts of desire, emotion, reason, etc. On the one hand, he devotes to defend the normative reason and the motivating reason intensely, and the comprehensive explanation frame with "reason" as the core proposed by Raz provides a new way of thinking for the promotion of the problem.
【作者单位】：中国人民大学哲学院;
【分类号】：B82-06

【共引文献】