《逻辑哲学论》中“可能性”的本体论分析

发布时间：2018-03-10 12:57

本文选题：《逻辑哲学论》　切入点：可能性　出处：《吉林大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：本文第一章指出:《逻辑哲学论》中的模态思想作为可能世界理论的前哲学基础,十分具有研究意义。其“可能性”概念是以可能世界、对象和事态等本体论概念为基础的。斯克姆斯、布拉德利、皮奇和李大强教授已经进行过“可能性”的本体论分析,本文准备沿用这一思路。第二章旨在论证本体论分析的可行性,着重批判伊西古罗、麦吉尼斯和戈德法布等“新维特根斯坦主义者”的非本体论解读。伊西古罗和麦吉尼斯认为在《逻辑哲学论》中已经存在“使用决定指称”的观点,因而“对象”并不构成本体;二人其实是混淆了“合乎逻辑的使用”和“语言的使用”。戈德法布认为其中的本体论描述是彻底的无意义,反对采取外在立场进行解读;然而,该书的写作就采取了外在立场(元语言立场),非外在立场的解读只能是保持沉默。第三章首先梳理了《逻辑哲学论》的本体论,突出与“可能性”密切相关的本体论概念——可能世界、对象和事态。在介绍可能世界的理论背景之后,深入分析莱布尼兹、维特根斯坦和阿姆斯特朗的组合主义思想,指出《逻辑哲学论》在可能世界理论、尤其是组合主义理论的发展史中承上启下的地位。最后,把“可能世界”概念落实到“对象”和“事态”的关系上,讨论布拉德利、皮奇和塞雷索的解读。第四章建立了一种全新的解读,以一个大表格概括《逻辑哲学论》中世界和语言的逻辑结构,在此基础上,深入批判布拉德利所谓“可能对象”的概念,以及莱因哈特“不可能的底行”的论证,指出二人忽视了两个意义上的“存在”——“在事况(世界)中存在”和“逻辑预设的存在”。最后,揭示可能性的四个层次:变项的可变性、事况和事实的可能性、逻辑形式和逻辑空间。四者从根本上说都是逻辑可能性。本文的结论指出:逻辑垄断了一切可能性,设定语言和世界的共同界限,逻辑本身则成为必然的。而晚期维特根斯坦则试图冲破逻辑必然性,从人工语言分析转向日常语言分析。
[Abstract]:In the first chapter of this paper, it is pointed out that the modal thought in "logical philosophy", as the pre-philosophical basis of the theory of the possible world, is of great significance in research, and its "possibility" concept is based on the possible world. Based on the ontological concepts of object and state of affairs, Professor Scrims, Bradley, Pitchi and Li Daqiang have already carried out an ontological analysis of "possibility". The second chapter is to prove the feasibility of ontological analysis and to criticize Isiguero. The non-ontological interpretation of "Neo-Wittgenstein" such as Mcguinness and Goldfarb. Isiguero and Mcguinness believe that there is already a "use of decision reference" view in logical philosophy. Thus, the "object" does not constitute the ontology; in fact, the two people confuse the "logical use" with the "use of language". Goldfarb considers the ontological description therein to be completely meaningless and opposes taking an external position to interpret it; however, The writing of the book takes an external position (meta linguistic position, non-external position interpretation can only remain silent. Chapter three first combs the ontology of logical philosophy, Highlighting the ontological concepts closely related to "possibility"-the possible world, objects, and events. After introducing the theoretical background of the possible world, an in-depth analysis of Leibniz, Wittgenstein and Armstrong's combinatorial ideas, This paper points out the position of logical philosophy in the history of the development of the theory of the possible world, especially the theory of combinationism. Finally, the concept of "possible world" is put into practice on the relationship between "object" and "state of affairs", and Bradley is discussed. Chapter 4th establishes a new interpretation, which summarizes the logical structure of the world and language in philosophy of Logic in a large table. On this basis, it deeply criticizes Bradley's concept of "possible object". As well as Reinhart's argumentation of "impossible bottom", it is pointed out that the two people ignore two meanings of "being"-"being in the world" and "the existence of logical presupposition". Finally, four levels of possibility are revealed: the variability of variables. This paper concludes that logic monopolizes all possibilities and sets the common boundary between language and the world. Logic itself becomes inevitable, while late Wittgenstein tries to break through the necessity of logic and turn from artificial language analysis to daily language analysis.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：B81-05

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