从证明到意义的语义学路径及其问题

发布时间：2018-03-21 19:41

  本文选题：真之理论语义学　切入点：新证实主义　出处：《湖北大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2017年05期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：20世纪70年代,达米特与普拉维茨提出新证实主义的意义理论,主张基于语句的证明来分析语言的使用乃至意义,以此克服真之理论语义学的超越认知性问题。同时,为了摆脱旧证实主义的困境,他们还主张区分典范证明与间接证明以及只有前者才构成语句的意义。由于总是过分强调语言使用的一个方面而忽视另外一个方面,并赋予引入和消去规则中的一者以优先性,新证实主义者定义的典范证明概念不足以恰当地刻画语句的意义。这阻碍了新证实主义的意义理论发展成为与真之理论语义学相媲美的严格的形式语义学。
[Abstract]:In the 1970s, Damit and Pravitz put forward the meaning theory of neo-confirmationism, and advocated analyzing the use and meaning of language based on the proof of sentence, so as to overcome the transcendental cognitive problem of the semantics of truth theory. In order to get rid of the dilemma of the old confirmatism, they also advocated the distinction between exemplary proof and indirect proof, and only the former form the meaning of the sentence. And give priority to one of the rules of introduction and elimination, The concept of canonical proof defined by the new confirmationist is not sufficient to describe the meaning of the sentence, which hinders the development of the meaning theory of neo-confirmationism into a strict formal semantics comparable to that of the true theoretical semantics.
【作者单位】： 中南财经政法大学哲学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金青年资助项目:16CZX052
【分类号】：B81-095
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本文编号：1645268