论名称的涵义和指称

发布时间：2018-03-24 04:12

本文选题：名称　切入点：涵义　出处：《自然辩证法研究》2009年01期

【摘要】：密尔所提"达特茅斯"问题并不能证明专名有所指而无涵义。弗雷格指出名称是通过涵义指称对象的,但他的理论存在许多不足。罗素在区分专名与摹状词的前提下认为有涵义的是摹状词,而他所讲的摹状词的涵义与人们通常讲的名称的涵义并不相同。塞尔讲的专名在指称性使用中涉及到的摹状词与人们通常讲的名称的涵义基本一致,但是把专名的涵义看做是使用者预设的,显得缺乏充足理由。克里普克认为摹状词所描述的对象的特性属于对象而不属于名称,这其实并不影响摹状词可以成为名称的涵义。对于同一名称指称不同对象的情况,关键是要看人们是通过什么途径将这些名称区别开来的。在专名的零指称问题上,多数人是把名称所指的对象等同于现实世界中存在的个体。实际上,看一个名称有无指称应该主要看这个名称的使用语境。
[Abstract]:In the "Dartmouth" problem and can not prove that the proper name is that without meaning. Frege pointed out that the name is the meaning of the referent, but there are many deficiencies in the premise of his theory. Russell distinguish between proper names and descriptions of that meaning is description, name meaning and the people he said of descriptions. Generally speaking the meaning is not the same. Description of names and people of Searl's name in the referential use involved in generally speaking the meaning of basically the same, but the meaning of proper names as default, is the lack of sufficient reason. Kripke believes that the characteristics of object descriptions described belongs to the object without in fact, this belongs to the name, does not affect the description can be the meaning of the name. The same name refers to different objects, the key is to look at people through what way will the name That distinction. In zero reference of proper name, most people is the object name refers to the equivalent to exist in the real world individual. In fact, a name is the name of the reference should be mainly to see the use of context.

【作者单位】：华南师范大学政治与行政学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学规划项目“指称问题研究”(08JA72040001) 教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“现代逻辑背景下的逻辑哲学研究”(07JJD720045)
【分类号】：B81-05

【共引文献】