从葛梯尔反例看知识与真信念的关系
发布时间：2018-09-02 07:51
【摘要】：葛梯尔反例表明,传统的知识定义未能真正把握知识与真信念的关系。现有的葛梯尔反例的解决方案虽然各具特色,但也不能解决上述问题。我们对信念理由和真理理由做出了必要的区分,认为葛梯尔反例产生的根本原因在于信念理由和真理理由的分离。我们提出了知识的实践定义,在实践基础上把信念理由和真理理由统一起来,从而解决了知识与真信念的关系问题。
[Abstract]:Gettier's counter-example shows that the traditional definition of knowledge does not really grasp the relationship between knowledge and true belief. Although the existing solutions of Gertier counter-example have their own characteristics, they can not solve the above problems. We make a necessary distinction between the reason of belief and the reason of truth, and think that the fundamental cause of the counter case is the separation of the reason of belief and the reason of truth. We put forward the practical definition of knowledge, which unifies the reason of belief and the reason of truth on the basis of practice, so as to solve the problem of the relationship between knowledge and true belief.
【作者单位】： 中国人民大学哲学院
【分类号】：B812
本文编号：2218729
[Abstract]:Gettier's counter-example shows that the traditional definition of knowledge does not really grasp the relationship between knowledge and true belief. Although the existing solutions of Gertier counter-example have their own characteristics, they can not solve the above problems. We make a necessary distinction between the reason of belief and the reason of truth, and think that the fundamental cause of the counter case is the separation of the reason of belief and the reason of truth. We put forward the practical definition of knowledge, which unifies the reason of belief and the reason of truth on the basis of practice, so as to solve the problem of the relationship between knowledge and true belief.
【作者单位】： 中国人民大学哲学院
【分类号】：B812
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，本文编号：2218729
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