林奇的功能主义真理论探析—兼论一种可能的功能主义理论

发布时间：2018-11-27 13:56

【摘要】：在当代分析哲学中,真理论研究呈现出如下三方面发展趋势:(一)实质性理论受到挑战,收缩论崛起;(二)一元论真理论受到冲击,多元论盛行;(三)心灵哲学影响日益壮大。作为上述潮流的集中回应,迈克尔·林奇(Michael Lynch)借鉴心灵哲学中的功能主义,针对多元真理论中的收缩论倾向,提出了功能主义真理论。林奇的理论无论对于真理收缩论还是多元论的发展都有着相当的启发作用,尤其是通过借鉴心灵哲学中功能主义的概念,我们可以构造出连接多元论和一元论的可能框架,这将有助于我们以全新视野来理解真的形而上学性质,从而更好地解决真的普遍语义和认知功能等哲学问题。为进一步探讨林奇理论的有效性和真的形而上学性质,在完成第一、二章的铺垫后,本文对功能主义真理论进行重新演绎和还原:在第三章中,通过定义了“命题”、“内容”、“真值条件”等一般哲学概念,我们先行地构造逻辑一致概念框架,并在该框架下对功能主义的核心概念如“真之功能”、“成真特征”等进行说明。在第四章中,借助逻辑演绎的方法,我们推演出林奇理论的相应原理,并进一步解释(诸如数学、物理、道德等)各论域命题的真。然后在第五章中,我们对比、分析不同理论关于命题真的解释路径。最后在第六章我们探讨功能主义真理论的形而上学基础,讨论真作为功能性质可能带来的本体论承诺以及其局限性。同时,本文也尝试提出基于词源学方法的解释路径,降低功能主义真理论的理论风险,试图提供一套更为相对有效的功能主义方法论。
[Abstract]:In contemporary analytical philosophy, the research of truth theory shows the following three developing trends: (1) the theory of substance is challenged and the theory of contraction rises; (2) the theory of truth of monism is attacked and pluralism is prevailing. (3) the influence of philosophy of mind is growing day by day. As a concentrated response to the above trends Michael Lynch (Michael Lynch) draws lessons from the functionalism in the philosophy of mind and puts forward the functionalist truth theory in allusion to the contractionary tendency of the pluralistic truth theory. Lynch's theory has a considerable enlightening effect on the development of truth contraction and pluralism, especially by drawing lessons from the concept of functionalism in philosophy of mind, we can construct a possible framework linking pluralism and monism. This will help us to understand the nature of true metaphysics from a new perspective and solve philosophical problems such as true universal semantics and cognitive functions. In order to further explore the validity and true metaphysical nature of Lynch's theory, after the completion of the first and second chapters, this paper rededucts and restores the functionalist theory of truth: in Chapter 3, by defining "proposition", "content", "truth value condition" and other general philosophical concepts, we construct the conceptual framework of logical consistency first, and explain the core concepts of functionalism, such as "function of truth", "true feature" and so on. In the fourth chapter, by means of logical deduction, we deduce the corresponding principles of Lynch's theory and further explain the truth of the propositions in various domains (such as mathematics, physics, morality, etc.). Then in the fifth chapter, we compare and analyze different theories about the true interpretation of propositions. Finally, in Chapter 6, we discuss the metaphysical basis of the functionalist theory of truth, and discuss the ontological commitment and its limitations which may be brought about by the nature of truth as a function. At the same time, this paper also tries to put forward the explanation path based on etymology, reduce the theoretical risk of functionalism truth theory, and try to provide a more effective methodology of functionalism.
【学位授予单位】：中山大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：B81-0

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