模态逻辑和本质主义
发布时间：2019-03-20 07:23
【摘要】： 文章首先对现代模态逻辑做了概述性的介绍,从而为后文的讨论搭建了一个技术性平台。随后,通过对三类主要的模态逻辑哲学问题的讨论,文章认为本质主义是模态逻辑哲学问题的关键所在。据此,文章从两个主要的方面讨论了模态逻辑中的本质主义问题,即可能世界学说和本质主义方案。 文章认为,极端实在论和极端唯名论的可能世界学说都是错误的,真正具有可行性的可能世界学说应是温和的实在论。由此,文章建构了一种新的温和模态实在论方案:可能世界是所有事物的共存方式,它是一种客观的存在,它的存在不依赖于人们的主观意识,它不是人为的规定。可能世界是依附于客观事物的存在,因而它的客观性来源于客观事物。作为一种客观的存在,可能世界是先于性质、关系等其它依附性存在的,它并不是事实或事态的某种构造或定义。由于概念上的在先性,对可能世界的说明就不会有循环的可能。另外,由于可能世界的这一特殊本体地位,新的温和模态实在论并不存在区分可能世界与不可能世界的问题。对于同一者不可分辨原则的失效问题,文章认为这是无中生有的,因为莱布尼兹律的使用是限制在可能世界内部的。而所谓不可分辨者同一原则和同一关系的传递性遭到破坏,乃是因为不区分本质属性和非本质属性。文章认为,温和模态实在论的完善需要以一个可行的本质主义方案来补充。 通过考察亚里士多德的本质主义思想,分析、借鉴其他一些哲学家对模态逻辑和本质主义关系的论述,文章提出了亚里士多德本质主义在模态逻辑中的形式表征,并指出模态逻辑是在下列意义上承诺了本质主义:模态逻辑认可了本质主义句子的有意义性。文章认为,自然种类确实有自己的本质,即它的成员共有的内部结构,支持克里普克、普特南的这一观点,并对它做了充分的辩护。而在个体本质上,文章针对生物体提出了一个崭新的方案——个体起源和遗传物质说。文章认为,虽然个体起源说满足成为个体本质的必要条件,但已有的相关论证是错误的。为此,文章设计了另一种策略来辩护它,即反证法。然而,文章同时指出,个体起源并不满足成为个体本质的充分条件,这是由于遗传密码的改变而导致不同生物个体的生成。通过对个体起源说做适当的修正补充,文章建构了“个体起源和遗传物质说”,以遗传物质来补充个体起源,就可以个体化生物个体。文章认为,遗传物质决定着生物个体外在性状的有无,以及它们的显著程度,而生物个体的外在性状正是内在遗传物质的表现形式,因而遗传物质是生物个体的本质属性。另外,通过分析本质和存在这两个哲学概念,文章论证了生物个体最初遗传物质的必然性。如此一来,文章指出,通过遗传物质来限定个体起源,就可以得到生物的个体本质。
[Abstract]:In this paper, a brief introduction of modern modal logic is given, and a technical platform is built for the later discussion. Then, through the discussion of three main types of philosophy of modal logic, this paper holds that essentialism is the key to the philosophy of modal logic. Based on this, this paper discusses the essentialism in modal logic from two main aspects, that is, the possible world theory and the essentialism scheme. The paper holds that the possible world theory of extreme realism and extreme nominalism is wrong, and the possible world theory of real feasibility should be moderate realism. Therefore, this paper constructs a new mild modal realism scheme: the possible world is the coexistence of all things, it is an objective existence, its existence does not depend on people's subjective consciousness, it is not man-made regulation. Perhaps the world is attached to the existence of objective things, so its objectivity comes from objective things. As an objective existence, it is possible that the world is prior to other dependent existence, such as nature, relation and so on. It is not a kind of structure or definition of fact or state of affairs. Because of the preeminence of the concept, there is no possibility of circulation in the explanation of the possible world. In addition, due to the special ontological status of the possible world, the new mild modal realism does not exist the problem of distinguishing the possible world from the impossible world. For the invalidation of the indistinguishable principle of the same person, this paper considers that this is false because the use of Leibniz's law is restricted to the possible world. The transmissibility of the same principle and the same relation of the indistinguishable person is destroyed because the essential attribute and the non-essential attribute are not distinguished. This paper argues that the perfection of mild modal realism needs to be supplemented by a feasible essentialism scheme. By examining Aristotle's thought of essentialism, analyzing and drawing lessons from other philosophers' discussion on the relationship between modal logic and essentialism, this paper puts forward the formal representation of Aristotle's essentialism in modal logic. It is pointed out that modal logic promises essentialism in the following sense: modal logic recognizes the meaning of essentialist sentences. This paper argues that natural species do have their own essence, that is, the internal structure shared by its members, which supports Kripk and Putnam's view, and fully justifies it. In the essence of individual, this paper puts forward a brand-new scheme for organism-the theory of individual origin and genetic material. This paper holds that although the theory of individual origin satisfies the essential condition of individual essence, the related arguments are wrong. Therefore, this paper designs another strategy to defend it, that is, counterproof. However, at the same time, it is pointed out that the origin of individuals is not satisfied with the sufficient conditions to become the essence of individuals, which is due to the change of genetic codes resulting in the formation of individuals in different organisms. By making appropriate corrections to the theory of individual origin, the article constructs the theory of individual origin and genetic material, in which genetic material is used to supplement the individual origin, and the individual can be individualized. In this paper, it is considered that genetic material determines whether or not the external traits of biological individuals and their saliency, and the external characters of biological individuals are just the manifestation of internal genetic material, so genetic material is the essential attribute of biological individuals. In addition, by analyzing the two philosophical concepts of essence and existence, this paper demonstrates the inevitability of the original genetic material of biological individuals. In this way, it is pointed out that by limiting the origin of individuals through genetic material, the individual nature of living things can be obtained.
【学位授予单位】：北京大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2004
【分类号】：B815
本文编号：2443988
[Abstract]:In this paper, a brief introduction of modern modal logic is given, and a technical platform is built for the later discussion. Then, through the discussion of three main types of philosophy of modal logic, this paper holds that essentialism is the key to the philosophy of modal logic. Based on this, this paper discusses the essentialism in modal logic from two main aspects, that is, the possible world theory and the essentialism scheme. The paper holds that the possible world theory of extreme realism and extreme nominalism is wrong, and the possible world theory of real feasibility should be moderate realism. Therefore, this paper constructs a new mild modal realism scheme: the possible world is the coexistence of all things, it is an objective existence, its existence does not depend on people's subjective consciousness, it is not man-made regulation. Perhaps the world is attached to the existence of objective things, so its objectivity comes from objective things. As an objective existence, it is possible that the world is prior to other dependent existence, such as nature, relation and so on. It is not a kind of structure or definition of fact or state of affairs. Because of the preeminence of the concept, there is no possibility of circulation in the explanation of the possible world. In addition, due to the special ontological status of the possible world, the new mild modal realism does not exist the problem of distinguishing the possible world from the impossible world. For the invalidation of the indistinguishable principle of the same person, this paper considers that this is false because the use of Leibniz's law is restricted to the possible world. The transmissibility of the same principle and the same relation of the indistinguishable person is destroyed because the essential attribute and the non-essential attribute are not distinguished. This paper argues that the perfection of mild modal realism needs to be supplemented by a feasible essentialism scheme. By examining Aristotle's thought of essentialism, analyzing and drawing lessons from other philosophers' discussion on the relationship between modal logic and essentialism, this paper puts forward the formal representation of Aristotle's essentialism in modal logic. It is pointed out that modal logic promises essentialism in the following sense: modal logic recognizes the meaning of essentialist sentences. This paper argues that natural species do have their own essence, that is, the internal structure shared by its members, which supports Kripk and Putnam's view, and fully justifies it. In the essence of individual, this paper puts forward a brand-new scheme for organism-the theory of individual origin and genetic material. This paper holds that although the theory of individual origin satisfies the essential condition of individual essence, the related arguments are wrong. Therefore, this paper designs another strategy to defend it, that is, counterproof. However, at the same time, it is pointed out that the origin of individuals is not satisfied with the sufficient conditions to become the essence of individuals, which is due to the change of genetic codes resulting in the formation of individuals in different organisms. By making appropriate corrections to the theory of individual origin, the article constructs the theory of individual origin and genetic material, in which genetic material is used to supplement the individual origin, and the individual can be individualized. In this paper, it is considered that genetic material determines whether or not the external traits of biological individuals and their saliency, and the external characters of biological individuals are just the manifestation of internal genetic material, so genetic material is the essential attribute of biological individuals. In addition, by analyzing the two philosophical concepts of essence and existence, this paper demonstrates the inevitability of the original genetic material of biological individuals. In this way, it is pointed out that by limiting the origin of individuals through genetic material, the individual nature of living things can be obtained.
【学位授予单位】：北京大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2004
【分类号】：B815
【引证文献】
相关期刊论文 前1条
1 张力锋;;模态与本质[J];哲学研究;2011年03期
相关博士学位论文 前2条
1 龙小平;可能世界中的名称和同一性[D];西南大学;2007年
2 何朝安;涵义的形而上学研究[D];复旦大学;2012年
相关硕士学位论文 前1条
1 鲁珊;生成语法框架下标句词的再研究[D];四川外语学院;2011年
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