聚合与立基:反事实条件句之前提语义学的辩护（英文）
发布时间：2019-07-19 12:05
【摘要】：前提语义学的基本想法是主张反事实条件句宣称我们可以从前件加上适当的前提推导出后件。Kratzer(1981,1989)发展了这样的想法,引进了前提集(premise sets)的概念,来表达我们加入前提的适当方式,主张条件句p□→q为真,若且惟若每个前提集皆可被扩张为逻辑上蕴含后件的前提集。而Kratzer的计划,便是要替前提集找到恰当的限制,可以使得反事实条件句的真值条件正确。Kratzer(1989)使用了聚合(lumping)的概念来刻画前提集的限制。这里的想法是,有些命题会聚合在一起,使得我们加入一个为前提,就会一起加入其余它所聚合的命题。而命题间的聚合关系,则是用情境语义学(situation semantics)中,在情境之间的部分与整体来定义。这样的处理,可以解决Kratzer早期理论遇到的一些问题,但仍会遇到如Kanazawa等人(2005)所提出的困难。而Kratzer本人也很快的放弃了这条进路,改而采用自然命题的概念来重构其前提语义学。在本文中,我将辩护Kratzer(1989)的聚合语义学。我主张将聚合的概念,用立基(grounding)的概念来理解,以取代Kratzer所使用的情境概念。根据我的定义,命题p聚合命题q,意谓着p立基在q上,因此当我们加入一个命题为前提时,就会一起加入它所立基的命题。我主张的这种做法,可以成功处理聚合语义学的案例,并避开其困难。
[Abstract]:The basic idea of presupposition semantics is to claim that we can deduce the latter from the former and the appropriate premise. Kratzer (1981, 1989) developed this idea, introduced the concept of premise set (premise sets) to express the appropriate way for us to join the premise, and advocated that the conditional sentence p-Q is true, if and only if each premise set can be extended to logically contain the latter premise set. Kratzer's plan is to find appropriate limitations for the predicate set, which can make the true value condition of the counterfactual conditional sentence correct. Kratzer (1989) uses the concept of aggregate (lumping) to depict the limitation of the predicate set. The idea here is that some propositions will come together, so that if we add one, we will join the rest of the propositions it aggregates. The aggregation relationship between propositions is defined by the part and whole of situational semantics in situational semantics (situation semantics). Such a treatment can solve some problems encountered in the early theory of Kratzer, but still encounter difficulties such as those proposed by Kanazawa et al. (2005). Kratzer himself quickly abandoned this approach and adopted the concept of natural proposition to reconstruct its premise semantics. In this article, I will defend the aggregate semantics of Kratzer (1989). I advocate that the concept of aggregation be understood with the concept of base (grounding) to replace the situational concept used by Kratzer. According to my definition, proposition p aggregates proposition Q, which means that p base is on Q, so when we add a proposition as the premise, we will add the proposition on which it is based together. This approach, which I advocate, can successfully deal with the case of aggregation semantics and avoid its difficulties.
【作者单位】： 台湾大学哲学系;
【分类号】：B812
本文编号：2516294
[Abstract]:The basic idea of presupposition semantics is to claim that we can deduce the latter from the former and the appropriate premise. Kratzer (1981, 1989) developed this idea, introduced the concept of premise set (premise sets) to express the appropriate way for us to join the premise, and advocated that the conditional sentence p-Q is true, if and only if each premise set can be extended to logically contain the latter premise set. Kratzer's plan is to find appropriate limitations for the predicate set, which can make the true value condition of the counterfactual conditional sentence correct. Kratzer (1989) uses the concept of aggregate (lumping) to depict the limitation of the predicate set. The idea here is that some propositions will come together, so that if we add one, we will join the rest of the propositions it aggregates. The aggregation relationship between propositions is defined by the part and whole of situational semantics in situational semantics (situation semantics). Such a treatment can solve some problems encountered in the early theory of Kratzer, but still encounter difficulties such as those proposed by Kanazawa et al. (2005). Kratzer himself quickly abandoned this approach and adopted the concept of natural proposition to reconstruct its premise semantics. In this article, I will defend the aggregate semantics of Kratzer (1989). I advocate that the concept of aggregation be understood with the concept of base (grounding) to replace the situational concept used by Kratzer. According to my definition, proposition p aggregates proposition Q, which means that p base is on Q, so when we add a proposition as the premise, we will add the proposition on which it is based together. This approach, which I advocate, can successfully deal with the case of aggregation semantics and avoid its difficulties.
【作者单位】： 台湾大学哲学系;
【分类号】：B812
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