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论何物存在(英文)

发布时间:2021-11-06 08:28
  本文首先澄清了蒯因的本体论承诺不能回答逻辑理论的本体论承诺的问题。然后分析了Kit Fine(2009)对量化理论的批评。尽管本文同意"本体论承诺"本身并没有解释日常承诺与理论承诺的距离,但是不同意本体论承诺的哲学分析是平常的或者是非哲学的。本文还讨论了Fine(2009)与叶峰(2010)所阐述的两种实在论,并且认为他们的结论下得草率。通过比较弗雷格和蒯因的本体论理论,本文分析了蒯因的本体论承诺的起源以及弗雷格对本体论的量化解释的评论。 

【文章来源】:逻辑学研究. 2018,11(03)CSSCI

【文章页数】:16 页

【文章目录】:
1 Introduction
2 Three Counterexamples in Logic
    2.1 Pure Logic and Its Model Theoretical Interpretation with Empty Domain
    2.2 First-order Arithmetic as a Counterexample
    2.3 Th (n) As a Third Counterexample
3 Quantificational Account of Ontology
    3.1 Kit Fine’s Criticism on the Quantification Account of Ontology
    3.2 Potential Difficulties in the Quantificational Account
4 Fictionism in Mathematics
5 Frege’s Realism
    5.1 Thoughts are Objective
    5.2 Quine vs.Frege
6 Conclusion



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