股东双重代表诉讼法制研究

发布时间：2018-04-15 15:49

本文选题：双重代表诉讼 + 股东派生诉讼　；参考：《中国科学技术大学》2010年硕士论文

【摘要】： 当控制公司利用被控制公司进行不法行为,使被控制公司的资产遭受损害时,被控制公司少数股东可以依据中国《公司法》第152条规定,对控制公司、控制公司的负责人及获利的其它被控制公司提起派生诉讼,追究不法行为人的损害赔偿责任。但控制公司自身既然对被控制公司持有相当数量的股份,最终还是由控制公司的全体股东来承受被控制公司的损失。然而,当被控制公司的股东怠于行使其诉权时,现行法并没有赋予利益受损的控制公司少数股东有效救济的手段,此类股东难以获得有效的权益保障。反观美国判例法及日本判例法上的相关判例,当关系公司发生掏空公司资产事实时,享有发动派生诉权的主体,除被控制公司少数股东外,也应该包含控制公司的少数股东,承认后者有权为被控制公司的利益而提起双重代表诉讼,积极参与公司的监督。基于比较法观点而言,中国现行公司法对于控制公司的少数股东的权利规范上,仍有检讨与完善的空间。股东双重代表诉讼的意义在于通过二次代位诉权的行使,赋予控制公司的少数股东权利为被控制公司的利益而提起代位诉讼,由于该制度衍生于股东派生诉讼制度,其部分性质与股东派生诉讼有相同之处,法理研讨及法律规范适用上仍然需要从一般股东派生诉讼制度开始。然而中国现行公司立法引进的股东派生诉讼制度,但为了强调防止少数股东滥讼,在持股比例及持股时间上有诸多限制,而且对诉讼担保,原告资格,公司地位等问题上没有规定或规定不明确,在实体法和程序法都有许多缺陷,造成司法实践中法院适用股东派生诉讼制度时的意见不统一。如果对该制度不进行检讨完善,引进双重代位诉讼制度则存在极大的困难。比较那些已经在实践上承认双重代表诉讼的国家而言,中国现行公司法的股东派生诉讼的被告适格主体范围较小,如果不对此进行修改,将会限制双重代表诉讼的适用范畴。目前,双重代表诉讼的理论基础部分还有待厘清之处,但这不应成为妨碍此理论进行深入研究,也不应成为引进该理论的障碍。为明确控股公司间利益受损时的损害赔偿及遏止不法行为,保护控制公司架构下控制公司的中小股东间接投资利益,在中国将来立法中引进双重代表诉讼是十分必要的。因此,本文尝试就现行股东派生诉讼制度中的不足之处提出若干立法上的修正建议并予以论证,供立法机关和司法部门参考,希望能健全中国控制公司的股东代位诉讼求偿法律机制,进一步完善中国公司治理,以期保护控制公司架构下的中小股东利益。
[Abstract]:When a controlling company makes use of the controlled company to commit an unlawful act and causes damage to the assets of the controlled company, the minority shareholders of the controlled company may, in accordance with Article 152 of the Company Law of China, control the company,The person in charge of the controlling company and other controlled companies making profits bring derivative action to investigate the liability of the wrongdoer for damages.However, since the controlling company itself holds a considerable amount of shares in the controlled company, it is ultimately the shareholders of the controlled company to bear the losses of the controlled company.However, when the shareholders of the controlled company are lazy to exercise their right of action, the current law does not give the minority shareholders of the controlled company with damaged interests an effective means of relief, which is difficult for such shareholders to obtain effective protection of their rights and interests.Looking back at the relevant cases in the case law of the United States and the case law of Japan, when the fact that the company concerned empties the assets of the company, the subject who enjoys the right of initiating derivative action should include the minority shareholders of the controlled company as well as the minority shareholders of the controlled company.Recognize the latter's right to initiate dual representation actions for the benefit of the controlled company and to participate actively in the supervision of the company.From the point of view of comparative law, there is still room for review and improvement on the regulation of the rights of minority shareholders in China's current company law.The significance of the double representative action of shareholders lies in that, through the exercise of the right of secondary subrogation, the minority shareholders of the controlling company are given the right to initiate subrogation for the benefit of the controlled company, because the system is derived from the system of shareholder derivative action.Some of its properties are similar to those of shareholders' derivative action, so the study of legal theory and the application of legal norms still need to start with the general shareholder derivative litigation system.However, the shareholder derivative litigation system introduced by the current company legislation in China, in order to emphasize the prevention of excessive litigation by minority shareholders, has many restrictions on the shareholding ratio and holding time, and the plaintiff's qualification for the litigation guarantee.There are many defects in substantive law and procedural law, which result in disunity of opinions when the court applies shareholder derivative litigation system in judicial practice.If the system is not reviewed and perfected, there are great difficulties in introducing double subrogation litigation system.Compared with those countries that have admitted dual representative litigation in practice, the scope of the defendant subject in shareholder derivative litigation in China's current company law is relatively small. If this is not amended, the scope of application of double representation litigation will be limited.At present, the theoretical basis of dual representative litigation still needs to be clarified, but this should not be an obstacle to the further study of this theory, nor should it be an obstacle to the introduction of the theory.It is necessary to introduce double representative litigation in future legislation in China in order to make clear the compensation for the damage caused by the interests of the holding companies and to stop the illegal behaviors and to protect the indirect investment interests of the minority shareholders of the controlling companies.Therefore, this paper attempts to put forward a number of legislative amendments to the deficiencies of the current shareholder derivative litigation system for the reference of the legislature and the judicial department.The author hopes to perfect the legal mechanism of shareholder subrogation litigation in China control company and further improve the Chinese corporate governance in order to protect the interests of minority shareholders under the control company structure.
【学位授予单位】：中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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