中间权力网络与台湾的民主进程

发布时间：2018-08-28 16:47

【摘要】： 本论文以台湾的民主政治为研究对象,分析为什么台湾平顺的民主转型却无法带来有效的民主运作?为回答这个问题,本论文分析1949年以后台湾社会结构的变化,以及这种结构变化对于民主转型过程和后转型期民主运作的影响。 1945年台湾光复后,便进入了中国“国家建设”的大逻辑之中,在这个历史进程中,台湾在光复之初经历了“二二八”、土地改革和地方自治这三个重要的历史事件。“二二八”事件和土地改革使得传统台湾社会的中间结构——地主士绅阶级彻底瓦解。在地方自治中,一些热衷于地方选举的人士依靠传统的社会关系网络进行选票动员,国民党对这些地方精英采取既拉拢又限制的策略,由此形成地方派系。同时,在台湾经济发展过程中,民间资本日益壮大,并逐渐发展成为财团。由于国民党向下扎根的努力始终无法竟其功,使得地方派系和财团形成为台湾社会新的中间结构,其实力不断增大,并日益结合在一起,本论文将其称为“中间权力网络”。中间权力网络是国民党政权和民间社会之外的第三种权力结构,其与国民党政权以及与民间社会的互动机制主要是两个。第一个是经纪机制(broker),中间权力网络一方面是国民党政权动员民间社会的经纪,另一方面是民间社会保护自身利益的经纪,所以它在国民党政权和民间社会之间扮演一种“双重经纪”的角色,并从“双重经纪”中谋求自身利益最大化。第二个是“非正式政治”机制,即“关系”机制,中间权力网络无论是与国民党政权的互动,还是与“民间社会”的互动都不是制度性的,而是按照非制度性的直接人际互动模式来运作。 1980年代,台湾内外政经局势发生重大变化,迫使“党国体制”向宪政民主回归。台湾的民主转型实际上要完成两个艰巨任务,实现“双重转型”,首先是党国体制向民主体制转型,再者是国民党这一按照列宁主义改组的革命型政党向民主选举的大众型政党转型。台湾之所以顺利完成这两大任务,实现政治转型的“软着陆”,中间权力网络在其中发挥了关键性作用。一方面,中间权力网络凭借其“经纪”机制和“关系”机制,有效抑制和化解农民运动和工人运动,让中产阶级(中小企业主和白领阶层)成为台湾1980年代风起云涌的社会运动的领导力量。台湾的中产阶级主张改良而反对革命,这给国民党驾驭民主转型留下了时间和空间。另一方面中间权力网络帮助国民党持续赢得地方和“中央”层级的选举,降低了国民党与公权力相分离的阻力,实现从“公权力”向“社会”的移动,从而促成了台湾的平顺民主转型。同时,在这一移动过程中,国民党逐步从革命型政党转变为大众选举型政党。但是中问权力网络在台湾民主转型过程中不断坐大,并对后转型期的民主运作产生一系列负面影响。首先,中间权力网络主要是通过“经纪”机制和“关系”机制来进行选举动员,为了最大程度动员选票,就通过金钱甚至黑恶势力来巩固、强化和扩大其动员网络,让贿选买票现象日益普遍。其次,中间权力网络由于其“经纪”地位,必然要牺牲公权力的利益以谋取自己的利益,但是其与公权力的互动并不是制度性的,而是通过“私下交易”的方式,由此形成政商勾结和金权政治。第三,台湾社会存在“阶级动员”与“族群动员”这两种相互竞争的社会动员模式。为了缓解阶级动员,缓解民间社会对于金权政治的不满,中间权力网络直接推动了“族群动员”,让台湾的民主在一定程度上呈现为以省籍一族群动员为特征的民粹式民主。第四,通过中间权力网络的作用,台湾的金权政治和民粹主义结合在一起,一方面是诉诸省籍-族群的民粹动员,另一方面则是金权政治,由此台湾的公权力的治理能力大幅下降。所以,台湾在后转型期出现的民主困境,与其说是民主不成熟的现象,毋宁是中间权力网络的必然产物。台湾要走出民主困境,实现民主深化,必须加强公权力建设和公民社会建设。就前者而言,中间权力网络一方面通过“经纪”机制让公权力出现了“内卷化”发展的态势,另一方面通过“关系”机制侵蚀了民主政治的制度化建设。就后者而言,中间权力网络一方面不断强化其与民间社会的“感情”和“关系”,另一方面侵蚀民间社会朝向“合理化”组织的方向发展。虽然社会中不断形成各种社团组织,但是它们更多的是按照“经纪”机制和“关系”机制来运作的,而不是真正的公民社会团体。从这两个方面讲,中间权力网络将对台湾的民主深化形成抑制作用。而且由于台湾选举非常频繁,迫使政党必须不断进行基层动员,但是无论是国民党还是民进党,其基层组织非常薄弱,这就使得政党必须继续依靠中间权力网络进行基层动员,在未来一段时间内无法形成对中间权力网络的有效替换。从这一意义上讲,台湾的民主困境可能长期化,并可能形成低质民主体制。
[Abstract]:This paper takes Taiwan's democratic politics as the research object, and analyzes why the smooth democratic transition in Taiwan can not bring about effective democratic operation. To answer this question, this paper analyzes the changes of Taiwan's social structure after 1949, and the impact of this structural change on the democratic transition process and democratic operation in the post-transition period.
After Taiwan's restoration in 1945, it entered the general logic of China's "national construction". In this historical process, Taiwan experienced the three important historical events of "228", land reform and local autonomy at the beginning of the restoration. The gentry class was completely disintegrated. In local self-government, some people who were keen on local elections mobilized votes by relying on traditional social networks. The Kuomintang adopted a strategy of both drawing and restricting local elites, thus forming local factions. Meanwhile, in the process of Taiwan's economic development, private capital grew stronger and developed gradually. As the Kuomintang's efforts to take root downward have never been able to achieve its success, local factions and financial groups have become a new intermediate structure of Taiwan society. Their strength has been growing and increasingly integrated. This paper calls them the "intermediate power network".
Intermediate power network is the third power structure outside the Kuomintang regime and civil society, and its interaction with the Kuomintang regime and civil society is mainly two. The first one is broker. Intermediate power network is on the one hand the Kuomintang regime mobilizes the brokers of civil society, on the other hand the civil society protects itself. As a broker of personal interests, it acts as a "double broker" between the Kuomintang regime and civil society, and seeks to maximize its own interests from the "double broker." The second is the "informal political" mechanism, i.e. the "relationship" mechanism, and the intermediate power network, whether it is an interaction with the Kuomintang regime or with the "civil society." The interaction of society is not institutionalized, but operates according to the non-institutionalized direct interpersonal interaction model.
In the 1980s, Taiwan's domestic and foreign political and economic situation changed dramatically, forcing the "party-state system" to return to constitutional democracy. In fact, Taiwan's democratic transformation has to accomplish two arduous tasks, namely, the transformation of the party-state system into a democratic system, and the transformation of the Kuomintang, a revolutionary political party reorganized according to Leninism, to the people. Taiwan has successfully accomplished these two tasks and achieved a "soft landing" in the political transformation. On the one hand, the intermediate power network, with its "brokerage" mechanism and "relationship" mechanism, effectively suppresses and dissolves the peasant movement and the workers'movement, so as to make China a center. The middle class in Taiwan advocated reform and opposed revolution, which left time and space for the KMT to control the Democratic transition. On the other hand, the middle power network helped the KMT to continue to win local and "central" levels. The KMT's election reduced the resistance to the separation of the KMT from the public power and realized the movement from "public power" to "society", thus facilitating the smooth and democratic transition of Taiwan. Meanwhile, in the process of the movement, the KMT gradually changed from a revolutionary party to a popular election party.
However, the power network of China Interrogation continues to expand in the process of Taiwan's democratic transition, and has a series of negative effects on the Democratic operation in the post-transition period. First, the power network of China Interrogation is mainly mobilized through the "brokerage" mechanism and the "relationship" mechanism for elections. In order to mobilize votes to the greatest extent, the power network of China Interrogation will be mobilized through money or even the black and evil forces. Secondly, because of its "brokerage" status, the intermediate power network will inevitably sacrifice the interests of public power to seek its own interests, but its interaction with public power is not institutional, but through "private transactions", thus forming collusion and cooperation between government and business. Third, there are two competing social mobilization modes in Taiwan society: class mobilization and ethnic mobilization. In order to alleviate class mobilization and civil society's dissatisfaction with gold power politics, the intermediate power network directly promotes "ethnic mobilization" and makes Taiwan's democracy appear as provincial nationality to a certain extent. Fourthly, through the role of the intermediate power network, Taiwan's gold power politics and populism are combined. On the one hand, it resorts to Provincial-Ethnic populism mobilization, on the other hand, it is gold power politics, thus Taiwan's ability to govern public power has declined dramatically. The current democratic dilemma, rather than the phenomenon of immature democracy, is rather the inevitable outcome of the middle power network.
In order to get out of the dilemma of democracy and realize the deepening of democracy in Taiwan, we must strengthen the construction of public power and civil society. For the former, the intermediate power network, on the one hand, makes the development of public power "involution" through the "brokerage" mechanism, on the other hand, erodes the institutionalization of democratic politics through the "relationship" mechanism. On the one hand, the network of intermediate power constantly strengthens its "feelings" and "relations" with civil society, on the other hand, erodes the development of civil society towards "rationalization" organizations. In both respects, the intermediate power network will inhibit the deepening of democracy in Taiwan. Moreover, the frequent elections in Taiwan have forced the political parties to mobilize at the grass-roots level, but the grass-roots organizations of both the Kuomintang and the DPP are very weak, which makes it necessary for the political parties to continue. In this sense, Taiwan's democratic dilemma may be long-term and a low-quality democratic system may be formed.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D675.8

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