行政抑或法治:中央与地方税权配置的路径选择——基于扩展性成本方法模型的讨论

发布时间：2018-09-06 07:39

【摘要】：长期以来,在中央与地方税权配置问题上,由中央单方面主导的行政化的分权方式一以贯之,使得中国税权的纵向配置长期缺乏一个稳定的规则,也带来了实践中的诸多问题,加大了制度运行的成本。本文从法经济学的研究视角出发,将扩展性成本方法模型用以分析中国税权的纵向配置。发现在税权配置法治化模式下,立法程序的正义性限制了中央的行政权力扩张,地方政府的偏好得到满足的可能性加大,与行政分权相比,将有效降低制度运行的总成本,并使之有机会达到最低。优化中央与地方的税权配置,终将回到起点公平这一原点,应遵循法治的路径前行。除法治原则外,还应秉持公共权力成本最小、财力与政府公共服务职责相匹配以及地方享有适度自主权原则。
[Abstract]:For a long time, on the issue of the allocation of tax power between the central and local governments, the way of administrative decentralization led by the central government has been consistent, which has made the vertical allocation of tax power in China lack a stable rule for a long time, and has also brought about many problems in practice. It increases the cost of operating the system. In this paper, the extended cost model is used to analyze the vertical distribution of tax power in China from the perspective of law and economics. It is found that in the mode of legalization of tax power allocation, the justice of legislative procedure limits the expansion of central administrative power, the possibility of local government's preference being satisfied is increased, and compared with administrative decentralization, the total cost of system operation will be reduced effectively. And give it a chance to reach the minimum. To optimize the distribution of tax power between central and local governments, we should follow the path of rule of law. Besides the principle of rule of law, the principle of minimum cost of public power, the matching of financial resources with government's public service duty and the principle of local proper autonomy should be adhered to.
【作者单位】：北京城市学院;
【分类号】：F812.42

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