公共政策执行中的激励与约束机制研究
发布时间:2018-09-13 15:49
【摘要】:公共政策执行是政策目标和政策实行效果之间的重要环节,社会保障政策是我国目前实施的惠及全体国民的一项重要的公共政策。贵州是我国经济欠发达省份,劳动力流出量大,贫困人口较多,贫困面广,程度深,其社会保障政策在执行过程中呈现出不同于其他省份的特点。本文从公共政策执行的角度分析了贵州省农村社会保障政策执行过程中的激励与约束机制问题。主要内容包括:从政策执行主体和客体分析了贵州农村社会保障政策执行效果;利用博弈论建立政府与政策执行者之间的博弈模型,以及政策执行者和政策执行对象之间的博弈模型,分析了激励与约束机制的作用;基于调研资料和具体案例分析了贵州农村社会保障政策执行中的激励与约束因素对政策执行主体和客体的影响,进而发现政策执行中存在的问题;最后,在此基础上,提出相关政策建议供决策部门参考。 本文对贵州农村社会保障政策的激励与约束机制的分析,得出如下主要结论:一是通过公共政策执行主客体之间的博弈分析,发现激励与约束机制是保障公共政策顺利执行的关键。二是贵州农村社会保障政策执行效果并不理想,其原因在于政策执行过程中现行的激励与约束机制没有达到预期的效果,即激励与约束机制不足。由此得到的启发是:在社会保障政策的制定过程中应充分考虑政策执行主体和客体的利益,调动主客体参与政策制定和政策执行的积极性,这不但有利于政策主客体深入了解相关政策,,减少政策执行过程中的摩擦,使得相关政策措施能够落实到位,达到预期的政策效果。
[Abstract]:The implementation of public policy is an important link between the policy objective and the effect of policy implementation. The social security policy is an important public policy that benefits all the people in our country at present. Guizhou is an underdeveloped province in China, with a large outflow of labor force, a large number of poor people, a wide range of poverty areas and a deep degree of poverty. Its social security policy is different from other provinces in the process of implementation. From the perspective of public policy implementation, this paper analyzes the incentive and restraint mechanism in the implementation of rural social security policy in Guizhou province. The main contents include: analyzing the effect of policy implementation from the subject and object of policy execution, establishing the game model between government and policy executor by using game theory. And the game model between the policy executor and the policy implementation object, and analyzes the function of incentive and constraint mechanism; Based on the investigation data and specific cases, this paper analyzes the influence of incentive and constraint factors on the subject and object of policy implementation in Guizhou rural social security policy, and then finds out the problems existing in the policy implementation. Put forward relevant policy suggestions for the reference of decision-making department. This paper analyzes the incentive and restraint mechanism of rural social security policy in Guizhou, and draws the following main conclusions: first, through the game analysis between the subject and object of public policy implementation, Discovery of incentive and restraint mechanism is the key to ensure the smooth implementation of public policy. The other is that the implementation effect of Guizhou rural social security policy is not ideal, the reason is that the current incentive and restraint mechanism in the process of policy implementation has not achieved the expected effect, that is, the incentive and restraint mechanism is insufficient. The inspiration is that in the process of making social security policy, the interests of the subject and object of policy implementation should be fully considered, and the initiative of subject and object to participate in policy formulation and policy implementation should be aroused. This is not only helpful for the subject and object of the policy to understand the relevant policies deeply, reduce the friction in the process of policy implementation, so that the relevant policy measures can be implemented in place to achieve the expected policy effect.
【学位授予单位】:贵州财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:D630
本文编号:2241624
[Abstract]:The implementation of public policy is an important link between the policy objective and the effect of policy implementation. The social security policy is an important public policy that benefits all the people in our country at present. Guizhou is an underdeveloped province in China, with a large outflow of labor force, a large number of poor people, a wide range of poverty areas and a deep degree of poverty. Its social security policy is different from other provinces in the process of implementation. From the perspective of public policy implementation, this paper analyzes the incentive and restraint mechanism in the implementation of rural social security policy in Guizhou province. The main contents include: analyzing the effect of policy implementation from the subject and object of policy execution, establishing the game model between government and policy executor by using game theory. And the game model between the policy executor and the policy implementation object, and analyzes the function of incentive and constraint mechanism; Based on the investigation data and specific cases, this paper analyzes the influence of incentive and constraint factors on the subject and object of policy implementation in Guizhou rural social security policy, and then finds out the problems existing in the policy implementation. Put forward relevant policy suggestions for the reference of decision-making department. This paper analyzes the incentive and restraint mechanism of rural social security policy in Guizhou, and draws the following main conclusions: first, through the game analysis between the subject and object of public policy implementation, Discovery of incentive and restraint mechanism is the key to ensure the smooth implementation of public policy. The other is that the implementation effect of Guizhou rural social security policy is not ideal, the reason is that the current incentive and restraint mechanism in the process of policy implementation has not achieved the expected effect, that is, the incentive and restraint mechanism is insufficient. The inspiration is that in the process of making social security policy, the interests of the subject and object of policy implementation should be fully considered, and the initiative of subject and object to participate in policy formulation and policy implementation should be aroused. This is not only helpful for the subject and object of the policy to understand the relevant policies deeply, reduce the friction in the process of policy implementation, so that the relevant policy measures can be implemented in place to achieve the expected policy effect.
【学位授予单位】:贵州财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2014
【分类号】:D630
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本文编号:2241624
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