认知蕴含:一个非真值函项联结词
发布时间：2019-01-14 11:47
【摘要】：真值函项的蕴含面临着所谓的"蕴含悖论",它也是"乌鸦悖论"、"经验意义标准"难题、葛第尔问题等一系列认识论难题的逻辑根源。认知蕴含定义了一种非真值函项的蕴含关系。如果"如果p那么q"是一种认知蕴含,那么这个蕴含式是真的,当且仅当在p为真的条件下,q的概率是1。因此,认知蕴含表达一种特殊的条件概念。相应地,部分认知蕴含可以基于概率论建立起来。引入认知蕴含,可以消解上述认识论难题,普通认知条件句和虚拟条件句(反事实条件句)也能以同样的方式来处理,而不必求助于"可能世界"。
[Abstract]:The implication of truth function is faced with the so-called "paradox of implication", which is also the logical root of a series of epistemological problems, such as the "Raven Paradox", the "Standard of empirical meaning" and the Gerdil problem. Cognitive implication defines the implication of nontruth-valued functions. If "if p then Q" is a cognitive implication, then the implication is true, if and only if p is true, the probability of Q is 1. Therefore, cognitive implication expresses a special conditional concept. Accordingly, part of the cognitive implication can be established on the basis of probability theory. With the introduction of cognitive implication, the above epistemological problems can be solved, and the common cognitive conditional sentence and the virtual conditional sentence (counter-factual conditional sentence) can be dealt with in the same way, without resorting to the "possible world".
【作者单位】： 武汉大学哲学学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“自然主义哲学与唯物主义的当代形态研究”(14AZX011)
【分类号】：B842.1
，
本文编号：2408663
[Abstract]:The implication of truth function is faced with the so-called "paradox of implication", which is also the logical root of a series of epistemological problems, such as the "Raven Paradox", the "Standard of empirical meaning" and the Gerdil problem. Cognitive implication defines the implication of nontruth-valued functions. If "if p then Q" is a cognitive implication, then the implication is true, if and only if p is true, the probability of Q is 1. Therefore, cognitive implication expresses a special conditional concept. Accordingly, part of the cognitive implication can be established on the basis of probability theory. With the introduction of cognitive implication, the above epistemological problems can be solved, and the common cognitive conditional sentence and the virtual conditional sentence (counter-factual conditional sentence) can be dealt with in the same way, without resorting to the "possible world".
【作者单位】： 武汉大学哲学学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目“自然主义哲学与唯物主义的当代形态研究”(14AZX011)
【分类号】：B842.1
，
本文编号：2408663
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