选举领导者和任命领导者对人们合作及收益的影响
发布时间：2019-01-27 16:36
【摘要】：研究目的:在公共物品游戏的实验情境下,系统探究不同的领导者产生方式对组织合作水平和收益水平的影响以及领导者奖惩行为倾向的影响;进一步引入领导者补偿这一重要因素,探究物质激励对不同领导者的行为和领导者所在组织的合作情况是否存在影响。研究方法:研究使用公共物品游戏的博弈范式对领导者行为及组织合作情况进行探索,共分为四部分。研究一:探究不同领导者产生方式对组织合作的影响,包括选举-无补偿和任命-无补偿处理组,观察和比较选举与任命领导者所在组织的合作、收益以及领导者奖惩行为倾向的差异;研究二:探究在有领导者补偿的情境下,不同领导者产生方式对组织合作的影响,包括选举-补偿和任命-补偿处理组,观察和比较领导者所在组织的合作、收益以及领导者奖惩行为倾向的差异;研究三:在研究一、二的基础上探究领导者补偿分别对选举和任命领导者的奖惩行为及对组织合作的影响;研究四:采用问卷调查探讨领导者以及组织成员的态度和主观感受。研究结果:(1)选举-无补偿组和任命-无补偿组中组织的合作水平、收益水平以及领导者的奖惩行为倾向均不存在显著差异;选举-补偿组和任命-补偿组中组织的合作水平、收益水平以及领导者的奖惩行为倾向也不存在显著差异。(2)任命-补偿组与任命-无补偿组中组织合作水平和收益水平均不存在显著差异;选举-补偿组和选举-无补偿组在组织合作水平方面无显著差异,但补偿组的收益水平显著高于无补偿组的收益水平。(3)选举-补偿组与选举-无补偿组相比,领导者奖惩行为的次数分布、惩罚行为的平均力度以及在团队管理方面的行为总力度都有显著提高;而任命-补偿组与任命-无补偿组相比,领导者只有惩罚行为的平均力度有显著改变。(4)在所有处理组中,领导者和一般组织成员对奖励引起正面情绪的题目评分均高于一般水平,领导者对于更喜欢使用奖励对组织进行管理的项目得分也均高于一般水平,且处理组间不存在显著差异。(5)在领导者集体利益的主观问卷中,选举产生的领导者评分均高于任命产生的领导者,且选举-补偿组中领导者的评分显著高于任命-补偿组领导者的评分。研究结论:(1)决定人们之间合作水平和收益的因素是规范制度,而不是领导者的产生方式。(2)选举产生和任命产生的领导者都具有相比较惩罚更偏好奖励的特点,因为奖励更能够鼓励人们的合作,这种行为特点可能是人类社会行为进化的结果。(3)采用选举方式产生领导者可以激发他们的成就动机,使其更愿意与组织实现互惠,从而更好地实现人们之间的合作。(4)他人的认可对于选举产生的领导者的行为有更好规范作用,相比较而言,任命产生的领导者没有这种行为规范。
[Abstract]:The purpose of this study is to systematically explore the influence of different leaders' ways on the level of cooperation and income of organizations and the tendency of leaders to reward and punish in the context of public goods games. Furthermore, the important factor of leader compensation is introduced to explore whether the material incentive has influence on the behavior of different leaders and the cooperation of the organization in which the leader belongs. Methods: the study uses the game paradigm of public goods game to explore the leader's behavior and organizational cooperation, which is divided into four parts. Study I: explore the impact of different ways of producing leaders on organizational cooperation, including election-no-compensation and appointed-no-compensation processing groups, and observe and compare the cooperation between the election and the organization in which the leader is appointed. The difference of the benefit and the behavior tendency of leader's reward and punishment; Study 2: explore the impact of different ways of producing leaders on organizational cooperation in the context of leadership compensation, including election-compensation and appointed-compensation processing groups, and observe and compare the cooperation of the organizations in which the leaders belong. The difference of the benefit and the behavior tendency of leader's reward and punishment; Research three: on the basis of study 1 and 2, the paper explores the effect of leader compensation on the behavior of rewards and punishments and organizational cooperation in the election and appointment of leaders, and studies 4: using questionnaires to explore the attitude and subjective feelings of leaders and members of the organization. The results are as follows: (1) there is no significant difference in the level of cooperation, the level of income and the behavior tendency of the leaders in the election-no-compensation group and the appointed-no-compensation group; The level of cooperation between the organizations in the election-compensation group and the nomination-compensation group, There is no significant difference in the income level and the behavior tendency of the leader. (2) there is no significant difference in the organizational cooperation level and the income level between the appointed-compensation group and the appointed-no-compensation group; There was no significant difference in the level of organizational cooperation between election-compensation group and election-no-compensation group, but the income level of compensation group was significantly higher than that of non-compensation group. (3) compared with election-compensation group, election-compensation group was higher than election-no-compensation group. The frequency distribution of leader's behavior of reward and punishment, the average intensity of punishment behavior and the total strength of behavior in team management were significantly improved. However, compared with the appointed-compensation group, the leaders only had significant changes in the average intensity of punishment behavior. (4) in all the treatment groups, Both the leaders and the average organization members scored higher than the average on the positive emotion caused by the rewards, and the leaders scored higher than the average for the items that preferred the use of rewards to manage the organization. There was no significant difference between the treatment groups. (5) in the subjective questionnaire of the collective interests of leaders, the scores of elected leaders were higher than those of appointed leaders. The leaders in the election-compensation group were significantly higher than those in the appointed-compensation group. The conclusions are as follows: (1) the factors that determine the level and benefits of cooperation among people are the normative system, not the way leaders are formed. (2) both elected and appointed leaders have the characteristics of preference for rewards over punishment. Because incentives are more likely to encourage people to cooperate, such behavior traits may be the result of the evolution of human social behaviour. (3) the use of election to produce leaders inspires their motivation for achievement and makes them more willing to reciprocate with the organization. In order to achieve better cooperation between people. (4) the approval of others has a better normative effect on the behavior of elected leaders, compared with the appointed leaders do not have such a code of conduct.
【学位授予单位】：浙江理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：B842
本文编号：2416462
[Abstract]:The purpose of this study is to systematically explore the influence of different leaders' ways on the level of cooperation and income of organizations and the tendency of leaders to reward and punish in the context of public goods games. Furthermore, the important factor of leader compensation is introduced to explore whether the material incentive has influence on the behavior of different leaders and the cooperation of the organization in which the leader belongs. Methods: the study uses the game paradigm of public goods game to explore the leader's behavior and organizational cooperation, which is divided into four parts. Study I: explore the impact of different ways of producing leaders on organizational cooperation, including election-no-compensation and appointed-no-compensation processing groups, and observe and compare the cooperation between the election and the organization in which the leader is appointed. The difference of the benefit and the behavior tendency of leader's reward and punishment; Study 2: explore the impact of different ways of producing leaders on organizational cooperation in the context of leadership compensation, including election-compensation and appointed-compensation processing groups, and observe and compare the cooperation of the organizations in which the leaders belong. The difference of the benefit and the behavior tendency of leader's reward and punishment; Research three: on the basis of study 1 and 2, the paper explores the effect of leader compensation on the behavior of rewards and punishments and organizational cooperation in the election and appointment of leaders, and studies 4: using questionnaires to explore the attitude and subjective feelings of leaders and members of the organization. The results are as follows: (1) there is no significant difference in the level of cooperation, the level of income and the behavior tendency of the leaders in the election-no-compensation group and the appointed-no-compensation group; The level of cooperation between the organizations in the election-compensation group and the nomination-compensation group, There is no significant difference in the income level and the behavior tendency of the leader. (2) there is no significant difference in the organizational cooperation level and the income level between the appointed-compensation group and the appointed-no-compensation group; There was no significant difference in the level of organizational cooperation between election-compensation group and election-no-compensation group, but the income level of compensation group was significantly higher than that of non-compensation group. (3) compared with election-compensation group, election-compensation group was higher than election-no-compensation group. The frequency distribution of leader's behavior of reward and punishment, the average intensity of punishment behavior and the total strength of behavior in team management were significantly improved. However, compared with the appointed-compensation group, the leaders only had significant changes in the average intensity of punishment behavior. (4) in all the treatment groups, Both the leaders and the average organization members scored higher than the average on the positive emotion caused by the rewards, and the leaders scored higher than the average for the items that preferred the use of rewards to manage the organization. There was no significant difference between the treatment groups. (5) in the subjective questionnaire of the collective interests of leaders, the scores of elected leaders were higher than those of appointed leaders. The leaders in the election-compensation group were significantly higher than those in the appointed-compensation group. The conclusions are as follows: (1) the factors that determine the level and benefits of cooperation among people are the normative system, not the way leaders are formed. (2) both elected and appointed leaders have the characteristics of preference for rewards over punishment. Because incentives are more likely to encourage people to cooperate, such behavior traits may be the result of the evolution of human social behaviour. (3) the use of election to produce leaders inspires their motivation for achievement and makes them more willing to reciprocate with the organization. In order to achieve better cooperation between people. (4) the approval of others has a better normative effect on the behavior of elected leaders, compared with the appointed leaders do not have such a code of conduct.
【学位授予单位】：浙江理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：B842
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