多任务特许经营情景下的信息甄别研究

发布时间：2018-06-14 13:41

本文选题：特许经营 + 委托代理　；参考：《复旦大学》2012年硕士论文

【摘要】：特许经营模式以其低投入、低风险、快速扩张等优势赢得了全球各行业企业的青睐,也受到了学术界的广泛关注。在常见的特许经营关系中,加盟商除了产品销售之外,往往面临着多项任务,如广告宣传、售后服务等等,然而,这种多任务特性却尚未得到深入讨论。本文从委托代理理论角度出发,对特许经营模式进行分析。近几十年来,委托代理问题一直都是十分热门的研究方向。大量的文献对其理论与应用进行了广泛的探讨。而特许经营模式正是一种典型的委托代理关系。在诸多对委托代理模型的拓展研究中,多任务委托代理问题是主要的拓展方向之这也成为本文研究多任务特许经营问题的主要理论依据。同时,在多任务情境下,加盟商需要执行的各项任务当中,部分任务(如售后服务)的努力水平是难以被观测、度量以及核实的,从而成为加盟商的私有信息。这种信息的不对称性也是委托代理关系的基本特征,对于信息甄别与激励机制的讨论也就成为该类问题的核心议题。因此,基于委托代理理论,本文将多任务委托代理问题与信息甄别问题同时引入特许经营情景之中,考虑逆向选择与道德风险两方面内容。本文将加盟商面临的多项任务提炼为销售性与维护性两个方面,并且假设加盟商在维护性任务上的努力水平为其私有信息,无法核实,进而讨论了特许商的最优甄别与激励机制。通过严格的数学推导和理论分析,本文分析了特许商的最优甄别式菜单合同应该如何设计以及应该满足何种条件,指出最终的合同为分段式的。同时本文也讨论了加盟商所面临的主观风险将会对最终的合同款项产生哪些影响。
[Abstract]:Because of its advantages of low investment, low risk and rapid expansion, franchise has won the favor of enterprises in various industries around the world, and has also been widely concerned by the academic community. In common franchising relationships, franchisees often face many tasks besides product sales, such as advertising, after-sales service and so on. However, this multi-task characteristic has not been discussed in depth. From the perspective of principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the franchise mode. In recent decades, the principal-agent problem has been a very hot research direction. A large number of literature on its theory and application were widely discussed. The franchise mode is a typical principal-agent relationship. In many researches on the expansion of the principal-agent model, the multi-task principal-agent problem is the main extension direction, which has become the main theoretical basis for the study of multi-task franchising in this paper. At the same time, in the multi-task situation, the level of effort of some tasks (such as after-sales service) is difficult to be observed, measured and verified, so it becomes the private information of the franchisee. The asymmetry of information is also the basic characteristic of principal-agent relationship, and the discussion of information discrimination and incentive mechanism has become the core issue of this kind of problem. Therefore, based on the principal-agent theory, this paper introduces the multi-task principal-agent problem and the information screening problem into the franchising situation at the same time, considering the adverse selection and moral hazard. In this paper, many tasks faced by franchisees are refined into two aspects: sales and maintainability, and it is assumed that the level of effort of franchisees in maintenance tasks is their private information, which cannot be verified. Furthermore, the optimal screening and incentive mechanism of franchisor is discussed. Through strict mathematical derivation and theoretical analysis, this paper analyzes how the franchisor's optimal screening menu contract should be designed and what conditions should be met, and points out that the final contract is segmented. At the same time, this paper also discusses how the subjective risks faced by franchisees will affect the final contract payment.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：F717.6;F224

【参考文献】