股东派生诉讼在公司清算程序中的可适用性研究

发布时间：2018-04-22 08:40

本文选题：公司清算 + 股东派生诉讼　；参考：《华东政法大学》2010年硕士论文

【摘要】： 现代社会中,公司无疑是重要的民事主体。与自然人一样,公司作为民事权利主体同样具有一定的生命周期:公司成立,表明公司生命的开始;公司终止,表明公司生命的终结。公司终止需要经过一系列的行为和程序,即公司的解散和清算程序。公司解散后必然经过清算程序。清算阶段的公司,一切经营活动停止,只能进行与清算有关的事务。此时公司完全处于清算组的控制下,清算组对内处理各种事务,对外代表公司进行各种民事活动和诉讼活动,其地位类似于公司正常经营过程中的董事,拥有广泛的职权。如果发生清算组成员损害公司、债权人或股东的利益的行为,则应由清算组采取行动予以制止。但在两种情形下,这种内控制度无法发挥作用。一是公司受控于清算组,清算组对其成员的违法行为采取放任态度;二是清算组成员集体侵害公司利益时,根本不可能要求清算组采取什么行动。根据公司法的规定及法理,债权人和公司可以对实施不当行为的清算组成员直接提起诉讼,追究清算组成员的责任,这在法律上没有任何障碍。但基于公司法公司人格独立的原理,股东要求清算组成员承担赔偿责任可能并不现实。因此,《公司法司法解释(二)》大胆借鉴股东代表诉讼制度,规定符合一定条件的股东可以代表公司向实施违法行为的清算组成员追究民事赔偿责任。本文就以此为中心展开讨论。论文共分三章,第一章主要通过对清算组地位、权力、义务等问题的阐述,分析了清算组成员损害赔偿责任的法理依据,并从《公司法》中对清算组成员损害赔偿责任的追究机制的可行性出发具体分析该责任追究机制的局限性。在此基础上,文章论证了《公司法司法解释(二)》引入新制度——股东代表诉讼作为清算组成员不当实施清算行为的责任追究机制的必要性和可行性。第二章在对股东派生诉讼功能分析的基础上,指出该制度对清算阶段的借鉴意义;在对我国股东派生诉讼制度介绍的基础上,分析了该条规定的股东派生诉讼制度的缺陷所在,提出在清算程序中重建该制度的基本思路。第三章则以民法请求权基础的法律分析方法和思考方式,对目前我国股东派生诉讼在公司非破产清算阶段的可行性和规则设计作了具体分析。通过上述分析,本文最后得出结论:股东派生诉讼在不同的国家、不同的历史发展阶段具有不同的价值目标。司法解释引入该制度作为对清算组权力的制衡机制,并且绕过公司法人格独立的传统规则,把追究清算组成员民事赔偿责任的权利赋予符合一定条件的公司股东,使得清算组责任追究的权利主体由原来的债权人和公司,增加到债权人、公司和股东,这对于督促清算组依法履行职权,保证清算工作的顺利进行,引导公司有秩序地退出市场,建立健康有序的市场退出机制都有一定的积极意义。
[Abstract]:In modern society, the company is undoubtedly an important civil subject. As a natural person, a company, as a subject of civil rights, also has a certain life cycle: the incorporation of the company indicates the beginning of the company's life, and the termination of the company's life means the end of the company's life. The termination of a company requires a series of actions and procedures, that is, dissolution and liquidation of the company. After dissolution, the company must go through liquidation procedures. The liquidation phase of the company, all business activities, can only carry out liquidation related affairs. At this time, the company is completely under the control of the liquidation group, which handles all kinds of internal affairs and carries out various civil and litigation activities on behalf of the company. Its status is similar to that of the directors in the normal operation of the company, and it has extensive powers and powers. In the event that the members of the liquidation group harm the interests of the company, creditors or shareholders, action shall be taken by the liquidation group to stop it. However, in two cases, this internal control system can not play a role. One is that the company is controlled by the liquidation group, and the liquidation group takes a laissez-faire attitude towards the illegal behavior of its members; the other is that when the members of the liquidation group collectively infringe upon the interests of the company, it is simply impossible to ask the liquidation group to take any action. According to the provisions and principles of the Company Law, creditors and companies can directly sue the members of the liquidation team who have committed misconduct, and investigate the liability of the members of the liquidation team. There is no legal obstacle to this. However, based on the principle of corporate personality independence, it may not be realistic for shareholders to ask liquidation group members to bear compensation liability. Therefore, the judicial interpretation of the Company Law (2) boldly uses the shareholder representative litigation system for reference, and stipulates that shareholders who meet certain conditions may, on behalf of the company, investigate the civil liability for compensation from the members of the liquidation group who carry out illegal acts. This paper focuses on the discussion. The thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter analyzes the legal basis of the liability for damages of the members of the liquidation group through the elaboration of the status, power and obligation of the liquidation group. The limitation of the liability investigation mechanism is analyzed in detail from the feasibility of the investigation mechanism of the liability for damages of the members of the liquidation group in Company Law. On this basis, the article demonstrates the necessity and feasibility of introducing a new system, shareholder representative litigation, as a mechanism to investigate the liability of the members of liquidation group for the improper implementation of liquidation behavior. On the basis of analyzing the function of shareholder derivative litigation, the second chapter points out the reference meaning of this system to the liquidation stage, and analyzes the defects of the shareholder derivative action system in this article on the basis of introducing the shareholder derivative litigation system in China. The basic idea of rebuilding the system in liquidation procedure is put forward. The third chapter analyzes the feasibility and rule design of shareholder derivative litigation in the stage of non-bankruptcy liquidation in our country by means of the legal analysis method and thinking method of civil law claim basis. Through the above analysis, this paper draws a conclusion that shareholder derivative litigation has different value objectives in different countries and different historical development stages. The judicial interpretation introduces this system as a check and balance mechanism to the powers of the liquidation group, and bypasses the traditional rules of the personality independence of the company law, and assigns the civil liability rights of the members of the liquidation group to the shareholders who meet certain conditions. So that the subject of the liquidation group's liability investigation will be increased from the original creditors and companies to creditors, companies and shareholders. This will urge the liquidation group to perform its functions and powers according to law and ensure the smooth progress of the liquidation work. It is of positive significance to guide the company to withdraw from the market in an orderly manner and to establish a healthy and orderly market withdrawal mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：华东政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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