上市公司股权激励影响因素及激励效果研究
发布时间:2018-06-26 13:05
本文选题:企业绩效 + 股权激励 ; 参考:《重庆理工大学》2010年硕士论文
【摘要】:随着公司法、证券法的重大修改和《上市公司股权激励管理试行办法》等政策的陆续出台,上市公司股权激励问题逐渐成为理论研究的重点。本文采取了规范和实证相结合的研究方法,将研究集中于上市公司经营者股权激励之上,在对2009年71家上市公司101个股权激励方案数据进行处理的基础上,分析了上市公司股权激励的现状,验证了各个因素与上市公司股权激励之间的内在联系,并检验了上市公司股权激励的效果,得出了以下结论:①从上市公司股权激励的整体状况来看,行业分布较为广泛,但制造业上市公司的比例过半;非国有控制上市公司参与股权激励计划更为积极;进行股权激励计划的上市公司在整体业绩方面表现良好。从上市公司股权激励计划方案特点来看,股权激励的规模较大,但激励对象的受众面过窄;激励方式以股票期权为主;行权的业绩考核指标体系较为单一,行权的绩效考核指标较容易完成。②从理论分析可知,上市公司的经营绩效是影响上市公司股权激励的根本因素;同时,不同规模上市公司的股权激励方案有所不同;不同企业性质的上市公司对于股权激励方案选择的谨慎程度不同,非国有控制上市公司更容易进行股权激励;不同行业的上市公司在选择股权激励方案时会有所差异。③从实证研究可知,公司绩效与股权激励之间显著的正相关;非国有控制上市公司更容易进行股权激励;上市公司股权激励与企业规模虚拟变量负相关,但并不显著;上市公司股权激励的行业影响因素并不明显。④股权激励导致了以后年度的净资产收益率著下降,这说明激励效果令人堪忧;采用不同激励方式,激励效果均为负向,但差异不大。最后,根据以上研究的结果,给出了相应的政策建议。由此,丰富了企业绩效激励理论。
[Abstract]:Along with the company law, the major amendment of the securities law and the "trial measures of Stock incentive Management of listed companies", the issue of equity incentive of listed companies has gradually become the focus of theoretical research. This paper adopts the method of combining normative and empirical research, focuses on the equity incentive of managers of listed companies, and deals with 101 equity incentive schemes of 71 listed companies in 2009. This paper analyzes the current situation of equity incentive of listed companies, verifies the internal relationship between various factors and equity incentive of listed companies, and tests the effect of equity incentive of listed companies. The following conclusions are drawn: 1 from the overall situation of equity incentive of listed companies, the industry distribution is more extensive, but the proportion of manufacturing listed companies is more than half, the non-state-owned controlled listed companies participate in the equity incentive plan more actively. Listed companies that carry out equity incentive plans perform well in terms of overall performance. According to the characteristics of stock incentive plan of listed company, the scale of equity incentive is large, but the object of incentive is too narrow; the incentive mode is mainly stock option; the performance evaluation index system of exercise right is single. From the theoretical analysis, the operating performance of listed companies is the fundamental factor that affects the equity incentive of listed companies, at the same time, the equity incentive schemes of different scale listed companies are different. Different enterprises have different degrees of caution in the choice of equity incentive scheme, non-state-owned controlled listed companies are easier to carry out equity incentive; From the empirical study, we can see that there is a significant positive correlation between corporate performance and equity incentive, and non-state-owned controlled listed companies are easier to carry out equity incentive. The equity incentive of listed company is negatively correlated with fictitious variable of enterprise scale, but it is not significant; the industry influence factor of equity incentive of listed company is not obvious, and the equity incentive of listed company leads to the decline of net assets return rate in the following year. This shows that the incentive effect is worrisome, and the incentive effect is negative, but the difference is not significant. Finally, according to the above research results, the corresponding policy recommendations are given. Therefore, it enriches the theory of enterprise performance incentive.
【学位授予单位】:重庆理工大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2010
【分类号】:F272;F224
【引证文献】
相关期刊论文 前1条
1 冯群英;;上市公司货币薪酬与股权激励模式的比较研究[J];会计之友;2013年07期
相关硕士学位论文 前4条
1 张艳林;我国上市公司股权激励影响因素研究[D];燕山大学;2012年
2 苏广艳;控制权配置视角下上市公司股权激励偏好的财富效应研究[D];燕山大学;2012年
3 王冰;上市公司股权激励方案设计及实施问题研究[D];首都经济贸易大学;2013年
4 杨史培;中兴通讯股权激励方案的分析研究[D];吉林财经大学;2012年
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