我国累积投票制立法之不足及其完善

发布时间：2018-06-27 19:25

本文选题：累积投票制 + 公司治理　；参考：《西南政法大学》2010年硕士论文

【摘要】： 累积投票制度至今已有一百多年的历史,作为一种保护中小股东利益的表决权制度,其功能效果以及立法模式随着立法技术的进步以及社会经济的发展不断演进与完善。中国也在2005年修订《公司法》时,规定了累积投票制。由于累积投票制进入我国的时间不长,所以我国累积投票制在立法和实践中难免存在一些不足。本文在详细分析累积投票制度立法不足的基础上,从法学角度对这一制度生存的基础与发展的条件进行了研究,并提出了相关建议,期望能够通过相关法律制度的完善,对此制度加以完善和弥补,使这一制度发挥出保护中小股东利益的作用。全文分为三个部分: 第一部分是我国累积投票制度立法分析。其一是累积投票制在我国的立法沿革,按时间顺序展现了累积投票制度在我国的发展,为下文的论述做准备。其二是现行公司法中累积投票制的立法不足,主要是《公司法》第106条与第104条的矛盾,这种冲突导致累积投票制度的实施在无细则的情况下,可能无法发挥其积极作用;另外,累积投票产生的董事监事可能没达到股东大会过半数的表决权,从而使该次选举无效,这也是现阶段立法的不足。第二部分是累积投票制在我国实践中的应用分析。首先,分析了影响我国实施累积投票制的因素。我国股份公司中的股权现状影响累积投票制度发挥作用,具体是国有股一股独大,各类型股东持股比例相差悬殊,不利于该制度发挥作用;另一方面,缺少累积投票制度发挥作用的前置程序与后期保障程序,中小股东因为分散,在无前置程序存在前提下,累积投票制度往往没开始就已经结束。现阶段也存在一些抵销该制度的做法,保障程序的存在可以防止这种现象的发生。其次,分析了累积投票制度在实践中的错误应用,有累积反对票针对通过累积投票制度选举产生的董事监事,还有就是通过等额选举,在候选人名单上把大股东的候选人放入名单,从而把代表中小股东利益的人选排除。第三部分是本文的重点,提出了完善我国累积投票制的建议。其一,准备阶段的建议:进行股权的多元化改革,为累积投票制度发挥作用创造适宜环境;消除相关法律冲突,使法条中的原则性规定彼此不冲突;完善董事监事提名程序,使此项制度在前期顺利引入公司表决。其二,实施阶段的建议:董(监)事的合并选举使累积投票权制度最大限度发挥作用。对于累积投票制度的立法模式上,建议对不同类型公司采用不同立法模式,细化现行《公司法》原则性的规定。其三,后期保障机制的建议:对一些现阶段存在的抵消累积投票制度的做法,如累积反对票等行为,坚决予以打击。
[Abstract]:The cumulative voting system has a history of more than one hundred years. As a voting system to protect the interests of minority shareholders, its function and legislative mode are evolving and perfecting with the progress of legislative technology and the development of social economy. China also provided for a cumulative voting system when the Company Law was amended in 2005. Since the cumulative voting system has not been in our country for a long time, it is inevitable that there are some shortcomings in the legislation and practice of the cumulative voting system in our country. Based on the detailed analysis of the insufficient legislation of the cumulative voting system, this paper makes a study on the basis of the existence and development of this system from the perspective of law, and puts forward some relevant suggestions, which are expected to be perfected through the relevant legal system. Perfect and make up for this system, make this system play a role of protecting the interests of minority shareholders. The thesis is divided into three parts: the first part is the legislative analysis of China's cumulative voting system. The first is the legislative evolution of the cumulative voting system in China, which shows the development of the cumulative voting system in China in chronological order, and prepares for the following discussion. The other is the insufficient legislation of the cumulative voting system in the current company law, mainly because of the contradiction between Article 106 and Article 104 of the Company Law, which results in the implementation of the cumulative voting system in the absence of detailed rules, which may not play its positive role; In addition, the accumulative voting of directors and supervisors may not achieve more than half of the voting rights of the shareholders' general meeting, thus invalidating the election, which is also a lack of legislation at this stage. The second part is the application analysis of cumulative voting system in our country. Firstly, the factors influencing the implementation of cumulative voting system in China are analyzed. The present situation of the stock right in the stock company of our country affects the function of the cumulative voting system. In particular, the state-owned shares are dominant in one share, and the proportion of each type of shareholders is very different, which is not conducive to the exertion of the system; on the other hand, In the absence of the pre-procedure and the post-guarantee procedure of the cumulative voting system, because of the dispersion of the minority shareholders, the cumulative voting system is often over without the existence of the pre-procedure. At the present stage, there are some ways to counteract the system, which can be prevented by the existence of safeguard procedure. Secondly, it analyzes the erroneous application of the cumulative voting system in practice. There are cumulative negative votes against directors and supervisors elected through the cumulative voting system, and also through equal elections. To exclude candidates representing minority shareholders from the list of candidates for major shareholders. The third part is the focus of this paper, put forward suggestions to improve the cumulative voting system in China. First, the proposals of the preparatory stage: to carry out the reform of equity diversification to create a suitable environment for the cumulative voting system to play its role; to eliminate the relevant conflicts of laws, so that the provisions of the principle in the articles of law do not conflict with each other; and to perfect the nomination procedures for directors and supervisors. So that the system in the early introduction of the company vote. Second, the implementation stage of the proposal: Tung (Superintendent) election to maximize the cumulative voting rights system. With regard to the legislative model of the cumulative voting system, it is suggested that different legislative models be adopted for different types of companies to refine the existing provisions of the principles of Company Law. Third, the suggestion of the later stage safeguard mechanism: some existing practices of counteracting cumulative voting system at present, such as cumulative negative vote, will be dealt with resolutely.
【学位授予单位】：西南政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2010
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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