渠道博弈视角下粮食最低收购价政策的效果研究

发布时间：2018-07-07 08:19

  本文选题：粮食安全 + 渠道博弈　； 参考：《南京审计大学学报》2017年06期

【摘要】：中国是人口和粮食大国,促进粮食生产、保证粮食安全是国之大事。由于市场利益主体之间存在博弈行为,收购价格由农户与粮食收购企业共同决定。采用纳什议价模型表示议价过程,运用2006年至2014年的小麦价格数据,研究农户和企业在粮食收购过程中的议价问题,从而判断粮食最低收购价的政策效果。结果表明:政策确实能改变农民的议价能力,保护农民利益,但政策实施存在时滞;更重要的是,政策会导致农户议价能力从绝对劣势到绝对优势的突变,造成农户凭借最低收购价获得主导价格的能力,即政策扭曲了市场定价机制。最后,给出模型结果、实证结论和政策建议。
[Abstract]:China is a country with a large population and grain. It is a national priority to promote grain production and ensure food security. The purchase price is determined by farmers and grain purchasing enterprises because of the game behavior between the main bodies of market interests. The Nash bargaining model is used to represent the bargaining process, and the wheat price data from 2006 to 2014 are used to study the bargaining problem in the process of grain purchase by farmers and enterprises, so as to judge the policy effect of the lowest purchase price of grain. The results show that the policy can change the bargaining power of farmers and protect the interests of farmers, but there is a delay in the implementation of the policy, and more importantly, the policy will lead to the mutation of bargaining power of farmers from absolute inferiority to absolute superiority. The policy distorts the market pricing mechanism. Finally, the model results, empirical conclusions and policy recommendations are given.
【作者单位】： 南京审计大学政府审计学院;南京审计大学经济与贸易学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目(16BJY119)
【分类号】：F326.11
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本文编号：2104358