政企合谋、环境规制与企业全要素生产率

发布时间：2018-10-05 09:56

【摘要】：本文利用中国工业企业数据库和地级市层面的企业治污投资数据构建了一个2003—2007年的面板,实证检验了环境规制对企业全要素生产率的影响以及政企合谋在背后的作用。实证结果表明,用企业治污投资占工业增加值比重衡量的环境规制强度每上升1%,企业当期的生产率下降约1%。当政企合谋可能性上升时,环境规制对企业生产率的边际影响在减弱,说明政企合谋带来的监管放松和处罚不力弱化了环境规制对合谋企业生产率的影响。本文的政策启示在于中央政府应加强环保领域统一执法,破解囚徒困境式的环境规制。同时,本文的发现为环保机构监测监察执法垂直管理制度改革提供了合理性依据。
[Abstract]:This paper constructs a panel from 2003 to 2007 using the database of China's industrial enterprises and the data of enterprises' pollution control investment at the prefectural level. It empirically tests the impact of environmental regulation on the total factor productivity of enterprises and the role of government and enterprise collusion in the background. The empirical results show that if the environmental regulation intensity measured by the proportion of enterprise pollution control investment to industrial added value increases by 1, the productivity of the enterprise in the current period will decrease by about 1. When the possibility of collusion between government and enterprise rises, the marginal influence of environmental regulation on enterprise productivity is weakening, which indicates that the deregulation and weak punishment of government and enterprise collusion weaken the influence of environmental regulation on the productivity of collusion enterprises. The policy enlightenment of this paper is that the central government should strengthen the unified law enforcement in the field of environmental protection and break through the environmental regulation of prisoners' dilemma. At the same time, the findings of this paper provide a reasonable basis for the reform of the vertical management system of monitoring, supervision and law enforcement of environmental protection agencies.
【作者单位】：上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院;
【分类号】：F425;X32

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