考虑风险偏好与公平关切的设计施工总承包联合体优化收益分配
发布时间：2019-01-04 18:54
【摘要】：为了使设计施工联合体工程总承包项目中优化收益的分配更加公平合理,在设计方与施工方平等合作的基础上,引入风险偏好和公平关切理论,构建设计方与施工方的不完全信息博弈模型。通过对模型的求解,比较分析引入风险偏好和公平偏好前后,最优努力水平和最优收益分配比例的变化情况,得出风险偏好对双方最优努力程度没有影响,但是优化收益最优分配比例会随着各自风险偏好程度的增加而减少;而引入设计方公平关切后,设计方在自身效用最大化下付出的最优努力水平有所减少,优化收益最优分配比例有所增加,且优化收益最优分配比例随着设计方公平关切程度和外生因素的增大而增大。最后通过Matlab数值仿真模拟对结论进行数值验证,以确保结论的准确性。
[Abstract]:In order to make the optimal income distribution in the general contracting project of design and construction complex more equitable and reasonable, risk preference and fair concern theory are introduced on the basis of equal cooperation between the designer and the constructor. The game model of incomplete information between designer and constructor is constructed. By solving the model, this paper compares and analyzes the changes of the optimal level of effort and the proportion of optimal income distribution before and after the introduction of risk preference and fair preference, and draws the conclusion that risk preference has no effect on the optimal effort degree of both parties. However, the optimal proportion of income distribution will decrease with the increase of risk preference. After introducing the fair concern of the designer, the optimal effort level of the designer under the maximization of its own utility is reduced, and the proportion of the optimal distribution of the optimized income is increased. And the optimal proportion of optimal income distribution increases with the increase of the degree of concern and exogenous factors of the designer. Finally, the conclusion is verified by Matlab simulation to ensure the accuracy of the conclusion.
【作者单位】： 淮阴师范学院城市与环境学院;河海大学工程管理研究所;
【分类号】：TU71
，
本文编号：2400666
[Abstract]:In order to make the optimal income distribution in the general contracting project of design and construction complex more equitable and reasonable, risk preference and fair concern theory are introduced on the basis of equal cooperation between the designer and the constructor. The game model of incomplete information between designer and constructor is constructed. By solving the model, this paper compares and analyzes the changes of the optimal level of effort and the proportion of optimal income distribution before and after the introduction of risk preference and fair preference, and draws the conclusion that risk preference has no effect on the optimal effort degree of both parties. However, the optimal proportion of income distribution will decrease with the increase of risk preference. After introducing the fair concern of the designer, the optimal effort level of the designer under the maximization of its own utility is reduced, and the proportion of the optimal distribution of the optimized income is increased. And the optimal proportion of optimal income distribution increases with the increase of the degree of concern and exogenous factors of the designer. Finally, the conclusion is verified by Matlab simulation to ensure the accuracy of the conclusion.
【作者单位】： 淮阴师范学院城市与环境学院;河海大学工程管理研究所;
【分类号】：TU71
，
本文编号：2400666
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