我国食品安全监管中的委托—代理问题及其法律对策研究

发布时间：2018-01-22 02:58

本文关键词： 食品安全监管体制委托-代理　出处：《西南政法大学》2014年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：本文论题：食品安全监管权是政府作为社会管理者所担负的职权之一。从信息经济学的视角看，我国各级食品安全监管部门不过是全体社会公众的食品安全监管权利代理人，他们与作为委托人的社会公众之间存在着委托-代理关系。在信息经济学文献中，常常将博弈中拥有信息的参与人称为“代理人”，不拥有信息的参与人称为“委托人”。在食品安全监管关系中，政府担任代理人角色，相应地，社会公众则是委托人，这一关系是隐藏行动道德风险模型，委托人所能观测到的只是结果，而不能直接观测到代理人的行动本身和自然状态本身。这一模型中，社会公众基于对食品安全监管者的信任让渡了监管权利，但是这一让渡只是一种法律上的拟制，现实中存在代理人虚位的现象，理论上委托人与代理人也往往存在目标函数的差异。代理人（政府的监管部门）可能因存在自利动机而不充分且善良履行其代理义务，滥用监管权力，而扭曲食品安全监管效果，这一代理关系的非市场化使委托人的食品安全监管权利被不当的行使而损害委托人利益。同时，在食品安全监管体系中存在多重代理、代理链条过长的情况，各级别、各部门代理人之间目标和行为取向可能均存在差异，统一性的缺乏导致委托人的目标不能实现，地区与部门之间缺乏沟通与合作，存在难以逾越的信息鸿沟，信息资源也无法互通有无。本文研究思路：本文遵循规范-实证-比较-对策的研究思路，首先介绍委托-代理理论并通过分析食品安全监管中的委托-代理关系，寻求食品安全监管制度的理论基础；其次，分析我国现的行食品安全监管法律制度体系，发现制度问题并分析原因；再次，简介国外先进的食品安全监管经验；最后，提出制度完善建议。具体思路如图：有别于往常从公共管理角度去分析食品安全监管制度，，本文主要观点是作为食品安全监管者的政府是社会公众食品安全监管权利的代理人，在行使食品安全监管权时可能发生委托-代理问题，出现问题的原因主要有委托人虚位、代理链条延长、信息不对称、代理关系非市场化等，在借鉴西方发达国家监管体制的基础上，针对食品安全监管中的委托-代理问题尝试提出食品安全监管制度完善的新思路。
[Abstract]:The topic of this paper: food safety supervision right is one of the powers of government as a social management responsibility. From the perspective of information economics, China's food safety supervision departments at all levels, but the public food safety supervision rights and their agents, as between the public trustee exists the principal-agent relationship in information economics. In the literature, often will have the information game participation called "agent" does not have the participation of information called "client". In the food safety supervision in relation to the government as the agent role, accordingly, the public is the principal, this relationship is a hidden action moral hazard model, only the principal people can be observed, and cannot directly observe the agent's actions and the state of nature itself. In this model, the public based on food safety regulators The transfer of trust supervision rights, but this is just a transfer of legal fiction, there are agents of virtual phenomenon in reality, differences between the theory of principal and agent are the objective function. The agent (government regulators) may be due to the presence of self moving without full machine and good performance of its obligations the abuse of regulatory power, distorted, food safety regulatory effect, the agency relationship of the non market to food safety supervision right of the principal is improper exercise and harm the principal's interests. At the same time, the existence of multiple agents in the food safety supervision system, the long chain of circumstances, each level between each Department agent the goal and behavior orientation may have differences, the lack of unity in the principal goal can not be achieved, the lack of communication and cooperation between regions and departments, there are more difficult than the information gap Information resources can not be exchanged.
The research idea of this paper: This paper follows the specification - Empirical Studies - Comparison of countermeasures, first introduces the principal-agent theory and through the analysis of food safety supervision in the principal - agent relationship, the theoretical basis for the food safety supervision system; secondly, analyze the legal system of food safety supervision system of our country, and find the system problem analysis of causes; again, introduction of foreign advanced food safety supervision experience; finally, puts forward some improvement suggestions system. Specific ideas such as map:
Different from usual from the perspective of public management to analyze the food safety supervision system, the main points of this paper are as food safety regulator of the government is the public food safety supervision rights of the agent in the exercise of food safety supervision when possible principal-agent problem, because the problem with the principal agent chain extension, virtual information the relationship between non market asymmetry, etc., on the basis of the supervision system in western developed countries, the principal food safety supervision agency problems try to put forward new ideas on improving food safety supervision system.

【学位授予单位】：西南政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：D923.6

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