政府信任、政治关联与私营企业的经营绩效

发布时间：2018-02-26 09:34

本文关键词： 政府信任政治关联委托代理经营绩效　出处：《山东大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：中国目前正处于重要的经济结构转型期,私营企业一方面受到经营压力的影响,渴望与官员建立政治关联以享受优越的企业竞争优势,获取更多的投资项目与赢取更高的社会声誉,从而形成政治关联的一派"效率假说";另一方面由于中央"反腐"力度的持续加强,建立政治关联的私营企业在享受着社会资源优势的同时也承受着较大的成本与寻租风险。这也是关于政治关联的"政治成本假说"与"寻租假说"的主要观点。中国特色社会主义的体制决定着经济体的特殊性,究竟何种理论适用于中国私营企业?另一方面,即使是没有政治关联的企业也必然与政府存在紧密关联,以市场为媒介,政府出台的政策或官员态度的改变会作用到市场,进而直接影响企业高管对政府的评价与企业的发展趋势,企业主对政府的主观评价会影响其经营决策的制定,从而改变了企业的经营绩效。但是企业的政府评价对企业经营绩效具体有何影响尚未有此研究。政府信任是被证实的可以作为政府评价的重要指标,本文也试图从政府信任的角度探究其对企业绩效的作用机制与实证分析。故本文尝试分别讨论私营企业主的政治关联与政府信任分别对私营企业经营绩效的影响。一方面,利用2015年中国家庭金融调查与研究中心的家庭数据,将私营企业主在创业之前是否任职于政府部门、其父母现阶段是否就职于政府部门以及其家庭其他成员是否有过在政府部门工作的背景作为判断企业政治关联的标准。另一方面,采用清单实验的方法计算客观的政府信任度。然后来探究政治关联和政府信任分别对私营企业经营绩效的影响。与以往研究不同的是对私营企业的经营绩效从偿债能力、税收优惠及盈利状况多个指标来考察,以此试图找出政治关联对私营企业经营绩效的相关研究存在差异的原因。本文主要研究结论如下:(1)"效率假说"、"政治成本假说"与"寻租假说"都具有合理性,因考察企业效益的角度不同与特定的制度环境差异而得出了不同的结论。(2)验证了 "效率假说",政治关联的企业能借助更有优势的社会资本来获得更多的借贷规模,故有利于融资便利。(3)验证了"政治成本假说",企业为维持既有政治关系、降低纳税风险而往往支付更多的税费,导致企业的实际税率与政治关联之间呈现正向关系。但是政治关联的企业申请认定与审批具有更多优势,因此更加显著地获得税收减免政策优惠。(4)验证了 "寻租假说",由于进行政治关联会有一定的"寻租成本",造成了更低的企业收益。(5)将"委托-代理"理论引入政府信任,认为政府信任是一种"信托式"的基于公众与政府之间的委托—代理关系。企业是委托人,政府则是代理人。而政府官员又作为"经济人"有自己的利益追求,较高的政府信任促使拥有资源与信息优势的政府官员更肆意行使"代理人主权",故而对企业绩效产生不利。
[Abstract]:At present, China is undergoing an important economic restructuring period. On the one hand, private enterprises are influenced by the pressure of operation and are eager to establish political connections with officials to enjoy superior competitive advantages of enterprises. Gain more investment projects and earn a higher social reputation, thus forming a "efficiency hypothesis" with political connections; on the other hand, because of the continued strengthening of the central "anti-corruption" effort, While enjoying the advantages of social resources, the private enterprises with political connections are also bearing the greater cost and rent-seeking risk, which is also the main view of the political cost hypothesis and the rent-seeking hypothesis. The system of socialism with Chinese characteristics determines the particularity of the economy. What theory is applicable to private enterprises in China? On the other hand, even enterprises that have no political connections must have close ties with the government. In the media of the market, government policies or changes in the attitude of officials will affect the market. Furthermore, it directly affects the evaluation of the government and the development trend of the enterprise by the enterprise executives, and the subjective evaluation of the government by the business owners will affect the making of their business decisions. However, the impact of government evaluation on business performance has not yet been studied. Government trust is proved to be an important indicator of government evaluation. This paper also attempts to explore the mechanism and empirical analysis of the government trust on the performance of the enterprise. Therefore, this paper attempts to discuss the political connection of private enterprise owners and the impact of government trust on the performance of private enterprise. On the one hand, the paper tries to discuss the influence of the political relationship of private enterprise owner and government trust on private enterprise performance. Using household data from the China Family Finance Survey and Research Center in 2015, will private business owners be employed in government departments before starting a business? Whether their parents are currently employed in government departments and whether other members of their families have a background in government departments as a criterion for judging corporate political connections. The objective degree of government trust is calculated by using the method of list experiment, and then the influence of political connection and government trust on the performance of private enterprise is explored. Tax preference and profit status are examined by several indicators. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: "efficiency hypothesis", "political cost hypothesis" and "rent-seeking hypothesis" are reasonable. Because of the difference between the angle of enterprise benefit and the specific institutional environment, different conclusion is drawn.) the hypothesis of "efficiency" is verified, and the politically connected enterprises can obtain more loan scale with the help of more advantageous social capital. Therefore, the "political cost hypothesis", which is beneficial to financing convenience, is verified. In order to maintain the existing political relationship and reduce the tax risk, enterprises often pay more taxes and fees. As a result, there is a positive relationship between the actual tax rate of the enterprise and the political connection. However, the application for recognition and approval of the politically connected enterprise has more advantages. Therefore, the "rent-seeking hypothesis" is verified by obtaining more significant tax relief policy preference. Because of the certain "rent-seeking cost" caused by political association, the "principal-agent" theory is introduced into the trust of the government. It is believed that government trust is a kind of "trust" based on the principal-agent relationship between the public and the government. The enterprise is the principal, the government is the agent, and the government officials have their own interests as "economic man". Higher government trust makes government officials with advantages of resources and information more wanton exercise of "agent sovereignty", so it is unfavorable to enterprise performance.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D630;F275

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