高管股权激励、风险承担与企业绩效

发布时间：2018-03-14 21:10

本文选题：高管薪酬　切入点：股权激励　出处：《郑州航空工业管理学院》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：在我国市场竞争日益激烈的今天,企业高级管理者对市场发展动向的把握会直接影响企业未来的发展方向。高管对于市场环境的把握,主要体现为高管对市场中的风险的态度。如果高管对风险持积极应对态度,企业有可能会利用这种机遇实现企业效益的提高。但如果高管对风险持规避态度,那么企业有可能会失去获得利益的机会,从而影响企业发展。这也使得如何激励高管进行风险承担行为,成为近几年来理论研究与实践中都关注的热点问题。在对高管进行激励的方式选择上,对高管实施股权激励被认为是较为有效的激励机制。而在高管股权激励的研究中,以探讨股权激励与企业绩效之间相关性的文献居多,却很少有文献从企业风险承担的角度探讨如何对高管进行股权激励以提高企业绩效。因此,从理论上研究高管股权激励、风险承担与企业绩效三者之间关系,并深入分析风险承担在三者之间的作用路径就显得十分必要。本文在对国内外相关文献进行梳理与归纳的基础上,以委托代理理论为本文分析的起点,并结合激励理论的作用机制,提出了关于高管股权激励、企业风险承担与企业绩效三者之间关系的理论假设;接着,以我国沪深A股上市公司2010—2014年的数据为样本,通过数据筛选,共得到5035个样本数据。使用实证分析方法,检验了高管股权激励、企业风险承担与企业绩效两两之间的关系,并重点探讨了风险承担在两者中的作用。通过分析后发现:高管得到股权激励后,公司绩效会得到提升;对高管实施股权激励后,企业的风险承担水平会提高;企业风险水平的增加,会提升企业的经营绩效;风险承担通过高管股权激励—企业风险承担—企业绩效‖的路径对企业绩效产生影响,风险承担在高管股权激励与企业绩效之间发挥部分中介作用。之后的稳健性检验测试也验证了上述结论的可靠性。最后,本文提出了完善我国上市企业薪酬管理制度、高管股权激励机制和公司内部治理制度的建议。
[Abstract]:With the increasingly fierce market competition in our country, the grasp of the market development trend by the senior managers will directly affect the future development direction of the enterprises. If the executives have a positive attitude to risk, they may use this opportunity to improve their efficiency. But if the executives have an evasive attitude toward risk, Then the enterprise may lose the opportunity to gain benefits, thus affecting the development of the enterprise. This also makes it possible to motivate senior executives to engage in risk-taking behavior. In recent years, it has become a hot issue in theory research and practice. In the way of incentive, equity incentive is considered to be a more effective incentive mechanism. In the research of executive equity incentive, Most of the literatures discuss the correlation between equity incentive and enterprise performance, but few discuss how to improve the performance of the enterprise from the perspective of enterprise risk taking. Therefore, the theoretical study of executive equity incentive. It is necessary to analyze the relationship between risk-taking and enterprise performance, and to analyze the action path of risk-taking among them. Taking the principal-agent theory as the starting point of this paper and combining the mechanism of incentive theory, this paper puts forward the theoretical hypothesis about the relationship among executive equity incentive, enterprise risk-taking and enterprise performance. Taking the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2014 as samples, a total of 5035 sample data are obtained through data screening. The empirical analysis is used to test the relationship between executive equity incentive, corporate risk-taking and corporate performance. Through the analysis, it is found that the corporate performance will be improved after the executives get equity incentive, and the risk-bearing level of the enterprise will be improved after the implementation of equity incentive to the senior executives. The increase of the level of enterprise risk will improve the performance of the enterprise, and the risk-taking will affect the performance of the enterprise through the path of executive equity incentive, enterprise risk-taking and enterprise performance. Risk-taking plays a part of intermediary role between executive equity incentive and corporate performance. The reliability of the above conclusions is also verified by the robustness test. Finally, this paper proposes to improve the salary management system of listed enterprises in China. Executive equity incentive mechanism and corporate internal governance system recommendations.
【学位授予单位】：郑州航空工业管理学院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51;F272.92

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