政府信息服务合同外包激励机制研究——基于公众评价视角

发布时间：2018-04-09 03:04

本文选题：信息服务　切入点：合同外包　出处：《情报杂志》2017年08期

【摘要】：[目的/意义]合同外包被视为提高政府信息服务水平、节约服务成本的重要手段,而解决外包过程中由信息不对称而导致的服务商道德风险问题是保证信息服务水平的根本前提。[方法/过程]从公众评价作为主观绩效来影响服务商收益的角度出发,运用委托-代理理论构建了公众参与下的激励-监督模型,并对模型进行求解和结果分析。[结果/结论]引入公众评价后,政府对服务商的监督水平升高,收益共享系数降低,服务商努力水平变高;公众对信息服务水平的评价表现为一种内在的激励约束机制,可作为引导服务商提高信息服务水平的重要手段。
[Abstract]:[purpose / significance] contract outsourcing is regarded as an important means to improve the level of government information service and save the cost of service.To solve the problem of moral hazard caused by asymmetric information in outsourcing process is the basic premise to guarantee the level of information service.[method / process] from the point of view of public evaluation as subjective performance to influence the income of service providers, this paper constructs an incentive-supervision model under the participation of the public by using principal-agent theory, and solves the model and analyzes the results of the model.[results / conclusion] after the introduction of public evaluation, the level of government supervision on service providers increases, the coefficient of revenue sharing decreases, and the level of service providers' efforts becomes higher, and the public evaluation of information service level shows an intrinsic incentive and constraint mechanism.As an important means to guide service providers to improve the level of information services.
【作者单位】：重庆邮电大学;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金资助项目“新兴信息消费的环境评估及治理研究”(编号:15XGL024) 重庆市社会科学规划一般项目“重庆市新兴信息消费的环境评估及治理研究”(编号:2015YBGL111)研究成果之一
【分类号】：D630

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