政治关联、股权集中度与银行绩效——基于我国上市银行业的实证研究

发布时间：2018-06-11 23:47

本文选题：政治关联 + 股权集中度　；参考：《武汉金融》2017年12期

【摘要】：本文利用2006-2013年的数据分析我国上市银行董事长、总经理各自的政治关联以及银行股权集中度对银行业绩的影响。实证结果表明:上市银行董事长和总经理的政治关联对银行业绩的影响各不相同,董事长的政治关联显著提高银行的绩效,而总经理的政治关联则与之相反;上市银行的业绩随着股权集中度的上升而逐步提高,同时,股权集中度在一定程度上抑制了政治关联所起的作用。将银行样本划分为"一股独大"和"股权制衡"两种类型后,上述结论仍然成立。
[Abstract]:Based on the data from 2006 to 2013, this paper analyzes the political connections of chairman and general manager of listed banks in China and the influence of bank equity concentration on bank performance. The empirical results show that the political connection of the chairman of the listed bank and the general manager have different effects on the bank performance. The political association of the chairman of the board of directors significantly improves the bank performance, while the political association of the general manager is the opposite. The performance of listed banks increases gradually with the increase of equity concentration, and at the same time, the degree of equity concentration restrains the function of political association to a certain extent. After the bank sample is divided into two types: "one share" and "equity balance", the above conclusion still holds.
【作者单位】：北京大学;江西公路开发总公司;
【基金】：教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目“我国商业养老保险制度体系与运行机制研究”(14JZD027)
【分类号】：D0;F832.3

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