多因素影响下的企业并购绩效与高管薪酬关系研究

发布时间：2018-06-27 14:27

本文选题：并购绩效 + 高管技能　；参考：《哈尔滨工业大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：众所周知,兼并重组相对企业来说是一项重要的战略层决策,是企业扩张壮大直接而有效的方式。然而从市场兼并重组的实际效果来看,并购重组在为企业带来资本扩张也带来了一定的风险。并购市场表面红火,但内部却存在着大量的异常资本配置。而公司高管作为兼并重组环节中主要的战略实施人,他们的行为会直接影响并购重组的绩效。基于以上原因,本文试图研究高管薪酬与并购绩效之间的关系。这对指导企业制订合适的薪酬激励政策意义较大。本文的主要研究方法包括实证分析,以2010-2016年间发生在美国上市公司间、并购交易价值超过10亿美金的并购事件作为样本,并对样本进行了主成分分析以及回归分析。实证研究内容主要包括三部分,在第一部分的研究中,通过主成分分析,研究了上述样本基于并购事件而发生的绩效的变化。研究发现,样本公司在并购前,公司绩效经历了一个先上升而后并购当年下降,最后并购后两年又趋于上升的过程;第二部分基于企业委托代理理论中的信息不对称与道德风险问题和效率工资理论中的效率问题,借助回归以及方差分析,研究了高管道德风险代表因素:高管权利与效率代表因素:高管技能对高管薪酬的影响,以及二者对薪酬的影响程度。研究发现高管技能与权利对于薪酬的获得都有着显著地正向地积极的影响;而且进一步研究表明高管技能相对于高管权利对薪酬有着更大的影响,所以美国上市企业中的委托代理问题并不是非常突出。紧接着又分析了公司绩效对高管薪酬的各组成部分的敏感性。发现薪金,奖金,股权激励计划三者之中,基于市场变化的股权激励计划对绩效的变化最为敏感。第三部分基于寻租理论,首先分析了高管寻租收益以及薪酬对并购绩效的影响,随后探究了薪酬与寻租收益的对绩效影响程度,发现寻租收益对于绩效的提高具有消极效应,而薪酬呈现积极效应,并且相对于寻租收益,薪酬是决定并购绩效的主要影响因素。所以针对企业绩效提高的理论建议,应以合适的薪酬激励为主,而在薪酬的具体设置中,应突出股权激励计划的地位。最后基于风险偏好理论,依据高管薪酬各组成部分占总薪酬比例的不同,将并购分为风险偏好型与厌恶型两类,进行一个总体绩效的比较。研究发现相比于风险厌恶型收购,偏好型收购的绩效表现更好,这与前人所得出的理论结果相悖,本文也对原因做了简单的介绍,但尚未证实。
[Abstract]:As we all know, merger and reorganization is an important strategic decision relative to enterprises, and it is a direct and effective way for enterprises to expand and expand. However, from the actual effect of market merger and reorganization, M & A brings some risks to the capital expansion of enterprises. M & A market surface fire, but there are a large number of internal abnormal capital allocation. As the main strategic implementers in the process of merger and reorganization, corporate executives' behavior will directly affect the performance of mergers and acquisitions. Based on the above reasons, this paper attempts to study the relationship between executive compensation and M & A performance. This instructs the enterprise to formulate the appropriate salary incentive policy significance. The main research methods of this paper include empirical analysis, taking the M & A events with a value of more than US $1 billion in the period 2010-2016 as a sample, and the principal component analysis and regression analysis of the samples. The empirical research includes three parts. In the first part of the study, the change of performance of the above samples based on M & A events is studied by principal component analysis. The study found that the performance of the sample company before M & A experienced a process of first rising, then declining in the year of M & A, and then increasing in the last two years after M & A. The second part is based on the information asymmetry and moral hazard in the principal-agent theory and the efficiency problem in the efficiency wage theory, with the help of regression and variance analysis. This paper studies the representative factors of executive moral hazard: executive rights and efficiency: the influence of executive skills on executive compensation and the degree of their influence on compensation. The study found that executive skills and rights had significantly positive and positive effects on the acquisition of compensation, and further studies showed that executive skills had a greater impact on compensation than executive rights. So the principal-agent problem in American listed enterprises is not very prominent. Then it analyzes the sensitivity of corporate performance to the components of executive compensation. It is found that among salary, bonus and equity incentive plan, equity incentive plan based on market change is most sensitive to the change of performance. The third part based on rent-seeking theory, first analyzes the effect of executive rent-seeking income and compensation on M & A performance, then explores the impact of compensation and rent-seeking income on performance, and finds that rent-seeking income has a negative effect on performance improvement. The compensation shows a positive effect, and relative to the rent-seeking income, salary is the main factor that determines the M & A performance. Therefore, the theoretical suggestions for the improvement of enterprise performance should be based on appropriate compensation incentives, while in the specific setting of compensation, the status of equity incentive plan should be highlighted. Finally, based on the theory of risk preference, according to the different proportion of executive compensation to total compensation, M & A is divided into two types: risk preference and aversion, and a comparison of overall performance is made. It is found that the performance of preference buy-out is better than that of risk-averse buy-out, which is contrary to the previous theoretical results. This paper also gives a brief introduction to the reasons, but it has not been proved.
【学位授予单位】：哈尔滨工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F271;F275

【参考文献】