下属的“揣摩逢迎”与领导的“决策偏误”——一个制度体系模型及其均衡分析

发布时间：2018-03-13 16:09

  本文选题：威权体制　切入点：揣摩逢迎　出处：《南开管理评论》2013年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文以贝叶斯决策理论为基础,构建了一个制度体系模型来模拟威权体制的决策过程,并通过求解均衡条件方法分析威权体制内"下属揣摩逢迎领导意图现象"的原因、危害及应对措施。分析结果表明,对上负责的制度设计是导致"下属揣摩逢迎领导意图现象"的根本原因;"下属揣摩逢迎领导意图现象"会造成两种类型的领导决策偏误,即"Ⅰ型决策偏误"和"Ⅱ型决策偏误"。进一步的研究表明,单向透明的信息传递机制和领导自身的"勤政"努力对于缓解因"揣摩逢迎偏误"而引发的"决策偏误"都有正向作用。但是,如果要从根本上解决因"揣摩逢迎偏误"而引发的"决策偏误",则需要改变威权体制内下属业绩评价及职业命运由领导主观决定的制度安排,并引入客观的评价标准。
[Abstract]:On the basis of Bayesian decision theory, this paper constructs a system model to simulate the decision-making process of authoritarian system, and analyzes the reasons of "subordinate conferring leadership intention phenomenon" in authoritarian system by solving equilibrium conditions. The analysis results show that responsible system design is the root cause of "subordinates' understanding of leadership intention" and that "subordinates' understanding of leadership intention" will lead to two types of leaders' decision bias. That is, "Type I decision bias" and "Type 鈪，

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