中央与地方环保税税权配置的问题研究

发布时间：2018-05-11 15:55

本文选题：环保税 + 税权配置　；参考：《首都经济贸易大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：面对严峻突出的雾霾、污水等环境污染问题,人们对“APEC蓝”、“阅兵蓝”常态化满怀期待。同反腐、社会公平、社会保障、收入分配等话题一道,环境治理也是老百姓最关心的问题。为了改善环境状况、加快转变经济发展方式,我国近年来出台了一系列环保政策,环保税是社会关注度较高的环境经济政策。环保税具有杠杆调节功能,建立健全环保税,不仅有利于明确个人、企业及政府的环境保护责任,还可以通过开征环保税以最大限度地减少人环境破坏、推动产业结构转型升级型并实现生态环境的改善。因此,环境税的研究工作既具有理论意义又具有现实意义,理应得到环保、税收等各界的重视。我国环保税法已于2016年通过立法,而环保税法未对环保税归属问题及税收收入使用问题进行明确规定,目前,也没有其他法律法规予以规定。因此,中央与地方在争取口后环保税税权尤其是征管权和收益分配权的配置中存在着利益博弈。本文在现实政策和科学数据的基础上,对中央与地方环保税税权配置问题进行分析,以博弈模型为分析工具,从理论上论证了环保税的归属问题,得出相关结论:认为在不违背上位法的条件下,中央应下放地方部分环保税立法权;环保税更适合作为地方税,由地方进行征收管理,将环保税征管权全权交由地方:延续排污费制度,环保税收入应专款专用,由地方执行环保税的税收收益分配权。本文认为这样有利于协调中央与地方的利益关系,避免恶性竞争,实现共赢的局面。本文将文献分析法、假设与推理相结合的方法运用到分析中央与地方在环保税税权配置中的博弈关系,希望有益于加快完善我国环保税制度及征管准备工作,为日后环保税扩围、改革提供有益的帮助。
[Abstract]:In the face of severe environmental pollution problems such as haze and sewage, people are looking forward to the normality of "APEC blue" and "parade blue". With anti-corruption, social equity, social security, income distribution and other topics, environmental governance is also the most concerned issues. In order to improve the environmental situation and accelerate the transformation of the mode of economic development, China has issued a series of environmental protection policies in recent years. Environmental protection tax has the function of leverage regulation. Establishing and perfecting environmental protection tax is not only helpful to clarify the responsibility of environmental protection of individuals, enterprises and governments, but also can minimize the damage to human environment by levying environmental tax. Promote the transformation and upgrading of industrial structure and achieve the improvement of ecological environment. Therefore, the research of environmental tax is of both theoretical and practical significance, and should be paid attention to by all walks of life, such as environmental protection and taxation. China's environmental tax law has passed legislation in 2016, and the environmental protection tax law has not clearly stipulated the issue of the attribution of environmental tax and the use of tax revenue. At present, there are no other laws and regulations to provide for it. Therefore, there is an interest game between the central government and the local government in the allocation of the right to tax, especially the right to collect and manage, and the right to distribute income. On the basis of realistic policy and scientific data, this paper analyzes the allocation of tax power between central and local environmental protection tax, and with the game model as an analysis tool, theoretically demonstrates the ownership of environmental protection tax. The conclusion is as follows: under the condition of not violating the upper law, the central government should devolve the legislative power of part of the local environmental protection tax, and the environmental tax is more suitable for the local tax, which should be collected and managed by the local government. The collection and management of environmental protection tax will be handed over to the local authorities: the system of sewage charges shall be extended, the revenue of environmental tax shall be earmarked for special use, and the distribution of tax revenue of environmental protection tax shall be carried out by the local authorities. This paper argues that this is conducive to coordinating the interests of central and local governments, avoiding vicious competition and realizing win-win situation. This paper applies the method of literature analysis, hypothesis and reasoning to analyze the game relationship between central and local governments in the allocation of environmental protection tax power, hoping that it will be helpful to accelerate the improvement of environmental tax system and the preparation for collection and management in China. For the future environmental tax expansion, reform to provide useful help.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F812.42

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