官员晋升激励、媒体监督与地方政府财政安全

发布时间：2018-11-20 15:52

【摘要】：地方政府官员晋升激励必然影响其决策和行为,进而可能影响地方政府的财政风险与安全。但这种影响能否通过其他机制来缓和呢?以2003—2010年间我国各省、自治区和直辖市政府为研究样本,探究地方政府官员晋升激励对地方财政安全的影响,并考察媒体监督机制能否缓和这种影响。结果表明,官员晋升激励与地方政府财政安全显著负相关,官员晋升激励越大,地方财政安全程度越低。而媒体监督机制对这种影响有调节作用,媒体监督可以缓和地方政府官员晋升激励对财政安全产生的不利影响。研究表明,中央政府应该优化官员晋升激励机制,避免官员晋升激励机制带来的不利影响。同时,应该有效发挥媒体监督等外部监督机制的作用,确保官员决策和行为符合中央政府的目标和意图。
[Abstract]:The promotion incentive of local government officials will inevitably influence their decision-making and behavior, and then may affect the financial risk and security of local government. But can this impact be mitigated by other mechanisms? Taking the governments of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government of China from 2003 to 2010 as research samples, this paper explores the impact of promotion incentives of local government officials on local financial security, and examines whether the media supervision mechanism can mitigate this impact. The results show that there is a significant negative correlation between the promotion incentive and the financial security of the local government. The greater the promotion incentive is, the lower the local financial security level is. The media supervision mechanism has a moderating effect on this kind of influence, and the media supervision can alleviate the adverse effect of local government officials' promotion incentive on the financial security. The research shows that the central government should optimize the promotion incentive mechanism to avoid the adverse impact of the promotion incentive mechanism. At the same time, the role of external supervision mechanism such as media supervision should be effectively brought into play to ensure that officials' decisions and actions are in line with the goals and intentions of the central government.
【作者单位】：南京财经大学会计学院;
【分类号】：D630.3;F812

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