财务困境、超额薪酬与薪酬业绩敏感性——基于政府补贴的调节效应

发布时间：2019-03-31 15:57

【摘要】：以我国上市公司2006-2012年的财务困境和非财务困境公司的数据为样本,通过考察财务困境与超额薪酬及薪酬业绩敏感性之间的关系,验证政府补贴对财务困境与超额薪酬及薪酬业绩敏感性间的调节效应。结果发现,政府补贴正向调节了财务困境与超额薪酬及薪酬业绩敏感性之间的关系,政府补贴是管理者攫取超额薪酬的途径之一,并改变了财务困境上市公司薪酬与业绩之间的敏感性。研究显示,政府补贴会改变财务困境对超额薪酬的抑制作用机制,降低薪酬契约的激励效应,这为我国进一步完善薪酬契约和合理配置政府补贴提供了新的经验证据。
[Abstract]:Taking the data of financial distress and non-financial distress companies of listed companies in China from 2006 to 2012 as a sample, this paper examines the relationship between financial distress and excess compensation and sensitivity to compensation and performance by examining the relationship between financial distress and excess compensation and sensitivity to compensation performance. To verify the moderating effect of government subsidies on financial distress, excess compensation and sensitivity to compensation performance. The results show that government subsidy positively regulates the relationship between financial distress and excess compensation and sensitivity to compensation performance. Government subsidy is one of the ways for managers to grab excess compensation. And changed the financial distress of listed companies between compensation and performance sensitivity. The research shows that government subsidy can change the mechanism of restraining financial distress on excess salary and reduce the incentive effect of salary contract, which provides new empirical evidence for the further improvement of salary contract and reasonable allocation of government subsidy in China.
【作者单位】：华东师范大学商学院;安徽建筑大学发展规划处;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目“公平偏好;参照点效应与国企高管薪酬研究”(15YJC630087) 安徽省人文社会科学研究项目重点课题“外部治理;参照点效应与高管薪酬研究——来自行为经济学的研究”(Sk2015A300)
【分类号】：F275;F272.92;F812.45

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