二手房交易的“跳单”纠纷研究

发布时间：2018-02-16 11:13

本文关键词： 跳单居间合同委托合同混合合同独家委托条款　出处：《华南理工大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：鉴于中国是一个人口大国，土地资源有限，且中国人一直有“买房养老”的传统观念，面对房地产市场“供需不平衡”之现状，购房已成为大部分中国人的人生奋斗目标。此外，市场经济的迅猛发展更是为房地产市场的繁荣发展奠定了坚实的经济基础。然而，在整个房地产交易过程中，二手房交易已成为一种趋势，伴随而来的就是二手房交易过程中普遍存在的“跳单”现象。纵观房地产交易实务，不难发现，“跳单”问题不仅是困扰二手房市场的一大难题，，而且成为各个中介公司的一块“心病”。能否合理、妥善地解决“跳单”问题关系市场经济的健康、可持续发展，也关乎和谐社会之构建。因此，本文尝试对房地产交易“跳单”现象进行分析和探讨，从而寻求合理、有效的路径以更好的处理“跳单”纠纷。 2011年12月20日最高人民法院发布的指导性案例为《房地产求购确认书》关于“跳单”责任的确定，在司法实践方面指明了道路。本文以此案为背景，基于合同法的基本原则及法律规定，对“跳单”责任进行分析，努力提高对实践的指导意义。本文主要从房地产交易实务中的典型案例入手，着重分析“跳单”现象，对其进行学理的相关分析，在结合《合同法》的相关内容中，更好的协调购房者尤其是小业主、房屋中介、售房者的三方利益，以更好的规范房地产交易市场。笔者认为，将《房地产求购确认书》定性为兼有委托和居间属性的混合合同，在适用《合同法》总则之外无详细规定的情形下参照适用委托合同和居间合同的相关规定，解决其法律适用上的问题。在不同阶段的中介活动中出现“跳单”现象的是最初的委托阶段，在这个阶段笔者认为委托人应享有任意解除权，这个权利使用的前提是委托人不能以恶意行使之，合理的“跳单”应是允许的，合理的“跳单”即是委托人合法使用任意解除权的情形，我们应该予以规制的是恶意“跳单”行为，只有允许合理“跳单”，规制恶意“跳单”才能促使房产中介市场进行良性竞争。
[Abstract]:In view of the fact that China is a large country with a large population and limited land resources, and that the Chinese people have always had the traditional concept of "buying houses and providing for the aged", they are faced with the "imbalance between supply and demand" in the real estate market. Housing purchase has become the life goal of most Chinese people. In addition, the rapid development of the market economy has laid a solid economic foundation for the prosperity of the real estate market. However, in the whole process of real estate transactions, Second-hand housing transaction has become a trend, accompanied by a common second-hand housing transactions in the process of "jump order" phenomenon. Looking at the real estate transaction practice, it is not difficult to find that the "jump order" problem is not only a problem puzzling the second-hand housing market. Moreover, it has become a "heart concern" of various intermediary companies. Whether we can reasonably and properly solve the problem of "jumping orders" is related to the healthy and sustainable development of the market economy, and also to the construction of a harmonious society. This paper attempts to analyze and discuss the phenomenon of "jump order" in real estate transaction, so as to find a reasonable and effective way to deal with the dispute of "jump order" better. In December 20th 2011, the guiding case issued by the Supreme people's Court was the determination of the responsibility of "jump order" in the "Real Estate purchase confirmation letter", which pointed out the way in judicial practice. This paper takes this case as the background. Based on the basic principles and legal provisions of the contract law, this paper analyzes the liability of "order jumping" and tries to improve the guiding significance of the practice. This paper mainly starts with the typical cases in the practice of real estate transactions, and focuses on the analysis of the phenomenon of "skipping orders". In combination with the relevant contents of contract Law, we can better coordinate the tripartite interests of buyers, especially small owners, housing agents and sellers, in order to better regulate the real estate transaction market. The author believes that the confirmation of purchase of Real Estate is defined as a mixed contract with both entrustment and intermediation, and the relevant provisions of the entrustment contract and the intermediary contract are applied in the case of no detailed provisions outside the general rules of the contract Law. In different stages of intermediary activities, the phenomenon of "jumping orders" appears in the initial entrustment stage, in which the author thinks that the principal should enjoy the right of arbitrary dissolution. The premise of the use of this right is that the trustor cannot exercise it maliciously, a reasonable "jump order" should be allowed, and a reasonable "jump order" is a situation in which the trustor legally uses the right of arbitrary discharge. What we should regulate is malicious "jump order" behavior. Only by allowing reasonable "jump order" and regulating malicious "jump order" can we urge the real estate intermediary market to conduct healthy competition.
【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：D923.6

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