中国商业银行信贷扩张与风险研究

发布时间：2018-03-30 04:36

本文选题：商业银行　切入点：信贷风险　出处：《东北财经大学》2014年博士论文

【摘要】：商业银行是经营存贷款业务的高风险企业,其经营风险具有很强的传导性和破坏性,因此应始终坚持稳健的经营理念。然而自上世纪八十年代以来,国外银行业多次爆发危机,许多商业银行在危机中破产倒闭。这些经营失败的银行普遍存在不稳健的经营行为。本文经分析认为,中国商业银行存在强烈的信贷扩张冲动。信贷扩张冲动的根源在于商业银行高管,尤其是行长,在政治激励和内部人控制下倾向于制定激进的业务发展计划,并通过不合理的考核体系转化为各级分支机构的信贷扩张冲动。中国商业银行的风险管理体系尚未完全实现垂直管理,难以保证风险管理决策的独立性,因而无法抑制分支机构的信贷扩张冲动。同时,银行风险管理部门的内部人控制导致信贷投放结构失衡,向房地产、地方政府融资平台等较高风险领域过多投放了贷款。本文按照“发现问题—分析问题——解决问题”的逻辑思路展开。通过对文献的总结和对委托代理理论的分析,发现商业银行存在信贷过度扩张和冒险经营倾向。本文通过分析指出中国商业银行存在强烈的的信贷扩张冲动,其根源在于商业银行总行高管层(尤其是行长)的内部人控制。信贷扩张冲动导致中国商业银行向产能过剩行业、房地产、地方政府融资平台等领域过多投放了贷款。为了防范化解中国商业银行的信贷系统性风险,本文分别从业务操作层面和公司治理(含风险管理架构)层面提出了对策建议。本文包括四个部分,共九章。第一部分,包括第一章和第二章。第一章为导论,介绍论文研究背景、研究目的及意义、研究框架等内容。第二章为文献综述。本章利用前人的研究成果从银行股东道德风险、信贷投放亲周期、公司治理结构不完善等角度分析银行信贷过度扩张和冒险经营的原因。第二部分,包括第三章和第四章。其中,第三章利用委托代理理论分析了银行的“内部人控制”问题和道德风险行为,指出中国商业银行委托代理关系的特殊性。第四章通过分析中国商业银行的信贷投放总量、增速和结构等情况,指出中国商业银行存在强烈的信贷扩张冲动。中国商业银行偏好信贷规模扩张的主要原因是银行高管层倾向于制订激进的年度业务发展计划,并通过一整套考核指标体系下达给分行。由于考核以年度为单位,考核奖励年底兑现,而贷款几乎是完成各项指标(如利润、存款、中间业务等)的最关键手段。因此,这种考核体制直接导致了分支机构的信贷扩张冲动。同时,银行风险管理部门和市场部门也存在“内部人控制”问题,风险管理部门的内部人控制会导致信贷投放结构失衡,市场部门的内部人控制会导致信贷资产质量不实等问题。第三部分,包括第五、第六、第七和第八章,为专题分析部分。本部分对中国银行业当前信用风险最突出的四个领域(产能过剩行业贷款、房地产行业贷款、地方政府融资平台贷款和理财业务)的发展动因和风险进行了较为全面深入的分析,揭示了商业银行开展上述业务的原因,以及上述业务面临的主要风险,并从商业银行的角度提出了风险化解对策。第四部分,包括第九章。从防范重点领域的信贷系统性风险、解决委托代理问题(内部人控制问题)角度提出了政策建议。
[Abstract]:Commercial bank is a business enterprise of high risk deposit and loan business, the operating risk of conductivity and very destructive, therefore should always adhere to sound business philosophy. However, since the last century since 80s, foreign banking crisis erupted repeatedly, many commercial bank failures in the crisis. There are generally not robust business behavior these failing banks. The author holds that commercial banks Chinese have strong credit expansion impulse. Credit expansion impulse is the root cause of commercial bank executives, especially the president, in the political incentive and internal control tend to develop aggressive business development plan, and the unreasonable appraisal system into various branches the commercial bank credit expansion impulse. China risk management system is not yet fully implemented vertical management, it is difficult to ensure the independence of risk management decision, because It is unable to restrain the credit expansion impulse of branches. At the same time, the internal control of bank risk management departments leads to the imbalance of credit delivery structure, and has put more loans to real estate, local government financing platforms and other high risk areas.
According to the "discovery logic thinking: problems analyzing problems solving problems". Through the literature summary and analysis of the principal-agent theory, commercial banks have found excessive credit expansion and risk management tendency. The thesis points out that the commercial bank Chinese in strong credit expansion, its root lies in the Commercial Bank Senior Executives (especially president) of the internal control of commercial bank credit expansion. Chinese impulses lead to industry overcapacity, real estate, local government financing platform in areas such as too much put loans. To prevent and resolve the credit risk of commercial banks China system, this paper from the operational level and corporate governance (including risk management architecture) level and put forward countermeasures and suggestions.
This paper consists of four parts, a total of nine chapters. The first part includes the first chapter and the second chapter. The first chapter is the introduction, introduces the research background, research purpose and significance, research framework and contents. The second chapter is literature review. This chapter uses the previous research results from bank shareholders moral hazard, credit Pro cyclical. The angle of imperfect corporate governance of bank credit excessive expansion and risk management.
The second part includes the third chapter and the fourth chapter. The third chapter uses the principal-agent theory to analyze the banks "internal control" problem and moral hazard behavior, points out the particularity of commercial banks Chinese principal-agent relationship. The fourth chapter through the analysis of commercial bank China the credit amount, growth rate and structure, pointed out the commercial bank China exists strong credit expansion impulse. The main reason of commercial bank credit expansion China preference is the bank executives tend to make the annual business development plan of the radical and issued to the branch through a set of evaluation index system. Due to the assessment of the year for the units, reward the end of his loan is almost complete index (such as profits, deposits, and other intermediary business) the most important means. Therefore, this evaluation system led directly to the branches of the credit expansion. At the same time, Bank risk management department and market department also have the problem of insider control. The insider control of risk management department will lead to the imbalance of credit delivery structure, and the internal control of market department will lead to the problem of unreliable credit assets and so on.
The third part, including fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth chapter, for the thematic analysis part. This part of the four areas Chinese banking current credit risk (the most prominent industry overcapacity loans, loans, real estate loans to local government financing platform and financial services) the development and risks of a more in-depth analysis and reveals the reasons of the commercial banks to carry out these operations, as well as the main risks facing the business risk, and puts forward some countermeasures from the perspective of commercial banks.
The fourth part, including the ninth chapter, puts forward policy recommendations from the perspective of preventing credit systemic risks in the key areas and solving the problem of principal agent (insider control).

【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F832.4

【参考文献】