上市公司实际控制人对现金股利政策影响研究

发布时间：2018-04-17 15:37

本文选题：实际控制人 + 现金股利　；参考：《山东财经大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：股利政策一直是学者们研究的焦点问题，半个世纪以来，西方的股利政策研究得到了极大地发展和完善。在我国投资者保护环境较弱，上市公司股权结构较为集中，控制方式比较复杂的背景下，上市公司的控股股东有能力和动机侵占上市公司和中小股东的利益获得私有收益。 La Porta等（1999）的研究表明：大部分上市公司都存在的控制性的股东即实际控制人，他们能够对上市公司的财务决策、生产经营有决定性作用。实际控制人对上市公司的控制方式比较复杂，这为实际控制人转移公司资产侵占中小股东的利益提供了便捷。所以，本文以实际控制人为视角，代理理论为基础，研究在我国独特的资本市场环境中，实际控制人的性质、控制权大小、及两权分离程度是如何影响上市公司的现金股利政策的。希望能够深化和完善实际控制人对于股利政策的相关理论的研究。本文通过对2010 2012年间在我国上交所和深交所A股上市的3423家公司的样本进行实证研究，最终得到的结论如下：第一，上市公司实际控制人的经济性质影响着现金股利支付倾向。实际控制人为国有性质的上市公司与实际控制人为非国有性质的上市公司相比，更倾向于发放现金股利。第二，实际控制人控制权比例越高，上市公司每股现金股利越高。现金股利是实际控制人从上市公司转移现金资产的一种重要手段，实际控制人的控制权越大，通过现金股利转移资金的倾向越强第三，实际控制人控制权与现金流权分离程度越高，上市公司每股现金股利越少。实际控制人两权分离程度越大，越倾向于利用控制权获得私有收益，而非现金股利这类共同受益。基于以上分析，最后，，本提出了解决的相关建议。
[Abstract]:Dividend policy has always been the focus of scholars. In the past half century, western dividend policy research has been greatly developed and improved.Under the background of weak investor protection environment, concentrated ownership structure and complex control mode of listed companies, the controlling shareholders of listed companies have the ability and motivation to seize the interests of listed companies and minority shareholders to obtain private returns.Research by La Porta et al. 1999 shows that most listed companies have controlling shareholders, that is, actual controllers, who can play a decisive role in the financial decision, production and management of listed companies.The actual control mode of listed company is more complex, which provides convenience for the actual controller to transfer the assets of the company and encroach on the interests of the minority shareholders.Therefore, based on the theory of agency, this paper studies the nature and control rights of actual controllers in our country's unique capital market environment.And how the degree of separation of the two rights affects the cash dividend policy of listed companies.The author hopes to deepen and perfect the theory of dividend policy.This paper makes an empirical study on the samples of 3423 companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2012. The final conclusions are as follows:First, the economic nature of the actual controller of the listed company affects the tendency of cash dividend payment.Compared with non-state-owned listed companies, the listed companies with actual control are more inclined to issue cash dividends.Second, the higher the control ratio of actual controller, the higher the cash dividend per share of listed companies.Cash dividend is an important means for actual controller to transfer cash assets from listed company. The greater the control right of actual controller, the stronger the tendency of transferring funds through cash dividend.Third, the higher the degree of separation between the actual controlling right and cash flow right, the less cash dividend per share of listed companies.The greater the degree of separation between the two rights of the actual controller, the more inclined to use the control right to obtain private income, rather than the cash dividend.Based on the above analysis, finally, this paper puts forward some suggestions to solve the problem.
【学位授予单位】：山东财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F276.6;F275

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