我国土地出让市场的博弈分析

发布时间：2018-04-19 17:26

本文选题：土地出让市场 + 博弈　；参考：《陕西师范大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：土地出让市场作为土地市场的源头和国家经济体系的重要组成部分,其运行状况影响整个国民经济的发展。随着我国土地出让制度改革的深入和土地管理体系的日渐完善,土地出让市场的交易规则已在全国普遍建立。然而回顾我国土地出让市场这二十多年的探索与实践,制度的合理性一直存在异议。尤其是近几年,土地出让市场中各利益集团的矛盾和不规范行为日益严重,当国家加大对房地产市场宏观调控的同时,有关土地出让市场的问题与矛盾也成了讨论的焦点。因此,针对目前我国土地出让市场存在的问题进行分析,探讨这些问题产生的根源并给出相关的政策建议,有利于推动土地出让市场的可持续发展,实现土地出让行为的公平公正,优化土地资源配置,最终促进整个社会经济的健康有序发展。本文主要运用博弈论分析土地出让市场中房地产开发商、地方政府和中央政府的行为策略,通过博弈论的应用以及博弈模型的构建,针对目前我国土地出让市场中地价过高、寻租和串谋现象严重、土地过度开发利用、中央政府宏观调控不利等问题进行深入分析,并利用上述分析结果对完善我国的土地出让制度、实现我国土地出让市场的健康稳定发展给出相应的政策建议。纵观全文,共包括五部分内容：第一部分,绪论,介绍了本文的研究背景与意义,国内外的相关研究成果,并说明了本文的研究内容与技术路线,研究方法及可能存在的创新点。第二部分,相关理论基础,介绍了我国土地出让市场的内涵、特征以及历史沿革；博弈论的基本概念及分类,以及运用博弈论分析我国土地出让市场的可行性,为之后的研究做了理论铺垫。第三部分,分析了土地出让过程中地方政府和房地产开发商之间的博弈,通过协议、招标、挂牌、拍卖这四种不同土地出让方式的博弈分析,得出了协议出让方式下地方政府可能会产生寻租,而市场化手段出让国有土地使用权又会导致房地产开发商集体陷入囚徒困境因而选择合作和串谋,并具体分析了串谋可以得逞的条件并为规避串谋行为给出政策建议。第四部分,分析了政府之间的博弈,首先通过“公共地悲剧”模型的应用说明了地方政府之间存在的非合作博弈导致我国土地资源的浪费和过度开发,其次分析了中央政府和地方政府的博弈,二者在土地出让市场的博弈主要表现土地政策调控和规避寻租行为两方面,通分别构建非合作博弈模型试图得出博弈的均衡解以给出相关政策建议。第五部分,结论与展望,通过对土地出让市场中各参与者的博弈行为加以总结,给出相关的政策建议,并对本文的研究前景进行展望。
[Abstract]:As the source of the land market and an important part of the national economic system, the land transfer market affects the development of the whole national economy.With the deepening of the reform of the land transfer system and the improvement of the land management system, the transaction rules of the land transfer market have been established in the whole country.However, after more than 20 years of exploration and practice, the rationality of the system has always been disputed.Especially in recent years, the contradiction and nonstandard behavior of various interest groups in the land transfer market is becoming more and more serious. When the state strengthens the macro regulation and control of the real estate market, the problems and contradictions concerning the land transfer market have also become the focus of discussion.Therefore, in view of the problems existing in the land transfer market of our country at present, the root causes of these problems are discussed and relevant policy suggestions are given, which will help to promote the sustainable development of the land transfer market.To realize the fairness and justice of land transfer, to optimize the allocation of land resources, and finally to promote the healthy and orderly development of the whole society and economy.This paper mainly uses game theory to analyze the behavior strategies of real estate developers, local governments and central government in the land transfer market. Through the application of the game theory and the construction of the game model, the paper aims at the excessive land price in the land transfer market of our country.The phenomenon of rent-seeking and collusion is serious, the land is overdeveloped and utilized, and the central government's macro-control is unfavorable, and the above analysis results are used to perfect the land transfer system of our country.To realize the healthy and stable development of the land transfer market in China, the corresponding policy suggestions are given.Throughout the paper, there are five parts:The first part, introduction, introduces the research background and significance of this paper, the related research results at home and abroad, and explains the research content, technical route, research methods and possible innovation points of this paper.The second part, the related theoretical basis, introduces the connotation, characteristics and historical evolution of China's land transfer market, the basic concept and classification of game theory, and the feasibility of using game theory to analyze the land transfer market in China.For the subsequent research to do the theoretical groundwork.The third part analyzes the game between local governments and real estate developers in the process of land transfer.It is concluded that the local government may generate rent-seeking under the mode of agreement transfer, and the market-oriented means of transferring the right to use state-owned land will lead the real estate developers to fall into the prisoner's dilemma, so they choose to cooperate and collude.The conditions under which collusion can be obtained are analyzed in detail, and some policy suggestions are given for circumventing collusion.In the fourth part, the game between governments is analyzed. Firstly, through the application of the "tragedy of public land" model, the author explains that the non-cooperative game between local governments leads to the waste and over-exploitation of land resources in China.Secondly, the game between central government and local government is analyzed. The game between central government and local government mainly shows land policy regulation and rent-seeking behavior.The non-cooperative game model is constructed separately to obtain the equilibrium solution of the game and give some policy suggestions.The fifth part, conclusions and prospects, through the land transfer market participants in the game behavior to sum up, give the relevant policy recommendations, and the prospect of this paper is prospected.
【学位授予单位】：陕西师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F301.3;F224.32

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