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多主体伙伴治理的旧城再生研究

发布时间:2018-04-25 01:29

  本文选题:旧城再生 + 伙伴关系 ; 参考:《重庆大学》2013年博士论文


【摘要】:房地产导向的传统旧城改造虽然对于重塑城市空间、改善硬件设施、提高土地利用率等方面效果显著,而且从某种程度上也能促进旧城的经济增长和竞争力提升。但与此同时,也造成对城市原有文脉、社会网络和经济多样性的破坏,使处于弱势的居民从地理、社会心理和利益分享上均遭到排斥和隔离,从而使得旧城改造成为现阶段各种社会矛盾的交汇点。对我国旧城改造现状的剖析,寻找更加合理和可持续的旧城改造机制成为一个迫切的问题。 旧城改造是一个复杂大系统。通过西方国家与我国旧城改造历程的对比研究发现,模式改进和制度建设是一个相互作用和不断修正的过程,应综合考虑二者以构建一种新的机制来解决我国的旧城改造问题。因此,基于多元民主、公共选择、新公共服务、治理和机制设计等理论基础和我国旧城改造的现实需求,本文一方面构建了多主体伙伴治理的旧城再生理论框架,利用合作博弈理论对伙伴关系的合作形成机理进行了探讨,设计了旧城再生综合评价ANP模型以解决项目方案的评价决策;另一方面,提出了多主体伙伴治理旧城再生的内部实现机制、多主体参与的制度保障和构建服务型政府等相关制度建议。 研究的主要创新点如下: ①提出了多主体伙伴治理的旧城再生理论框架。在对其利益相关者的利益诉求和角色定位剖析的基础上,对其必要性、本质和特点进行了深入探讨,提出了其组织实施的关键要素、组织架构和治理流程。 ②建立了多主体伙伴治理旧城再生的合作博弈模型以分析伙伴关系的合作形成机理。谈判集解分析认为谈判能力越强获利会越多,而获利越多则越有维持伙伴合作关系的动力,因此提出社区需要以组织而不是个人的形式参与旧城再生;应该有专业的非政府组织加入伙伴关系以帮助社区组织和协调各参与主体之间的关系;处于谈判强势的地方政府和开发商应该更加关注伙伴合作的维护,并付出一定的代价用于这种合作维护,以保障自身长远利益的获取;以及再生方案所体现出的潜在收益是促成各方合作的关键等四个合作形成条件。通过Shapley值分析,提出了理论利益分配模式,指出了现实利益分配的不合理之处,并对利益分配进行了风险修正。通过合作博弈的效用转移分析,,指出在利益分配中应遵循从合作中获益较多的一方应对在合作中获益较少的一方给予一定补偿的原则,以建立一个为各方所接受的利益平衡机制,从而促成参与各方的伙伴合作。 ③建立了旧城再生综合评价ANP模型,将可持续性、竞争力和文化传承作为三大准则纳入同一个评价体系之下,利用非线性规划、PS和DEMATEL法对传统的ANP法进行改进,并通过算例分析验证了方法的可行性。对比传统的以投资收益为首要决策因素的项目决策,可发现本模型具有以下优点:克服了单一决策指标的不足,使得优选的项目方案更能体现社会公平,有利于城市的可持续发展;模型考虑了旧城再生所包含要素之间的相互影响关系,使其更贴近现实;通过对传统ANP方法的改进,使模型更加科学合理,在操作上更为简便和条理清晰。
[Abstract]:The real estate oriented traditional old city reconstruction has a significant effect on the reconstruction of the urban space, the improvement of the hardware facilities and the increase of the land use rate. In some degree, it can also promote the economic growth and competitiveness of the old city. At the same time, it also causes the destruction of the original city's context, social network and economic diversity. The disadvantaged residents have been excluded and isolated from geography, social psychology and benefit sharing, which makes the old city transformation the intersection of various social contradictions at the present stage. It is an urgent problem to find a more reasonable and sustainable old city transformation mechanism to analyze the present situation of the old city transformation in China.
The reconstruction of the old city is a complex and large system. Through the comparative study of the history of the old city transformation between the western countries and our country, it is found that the model improvement and the system construction are a process of interaction and constant revision. The two should be taken into consideration to build a new mechanism to solve the problem of the old city transformation in our country. Therefore, the public selection is based on the pluralistic democracy. Selection, new public service, governance and mechanism design and other theoretical foundations and the actual needs of the old city transformation in China. On the one hand, this paper constructs a theoretical framework for the regeneration of the old city by the multi-agent management, discusses the cooperative formation mechanism of the partnership with the cooperative game theory, and sets up a comprehensive evaluation of the old city regeneration ANP model to solve the project. On the other hand, it puts forward the internal realization mechanism of the multi-agent partners to regenerate the old city, the system guarantee of multi subject participation and the construction of service type government.
The main innovations in the study are as follows:
On the basis of the analysis of the interest demands and role orientation of the stakeholders, the necessity, the essence and the characteristics of its stakeholders are deeply discussed, and the key elements, the organization structure and the management process of the organization are put forward.
Secondly, a cooperative game model of multi-agent partners to regenerate the old city regeneration is set up to analyze the cooperative formation mechanism of the partnership. The negotiation analysis shows that the stronger the negotiation ability is, the more profit will be, and the more profit is the motivation to maintain the partnership relationship. Therefore, it is proposed that the community need to participate in the old city in the form of organization, not individual. Students should have professional non-governmental organizations to join the partnership to help the community organize and coordinate the relationships among the participants; the local governments and developers who are in a strong negotiation should pay more attention to the maintenance of partnership cooperation and pay a certain price to safeguard their long-term interests; and The potential income of the regenerative scheme is the four forming conditions for the cooperation between the parties. Through the Shapley value analysis, the distribution model of theoretical interests is put forward, the irrational distribution of the real interests is pointed out, and the risk correction is corrected. The benefit score is pointed out through the utility transfer analysis of the combined game game. The party should follow the principle that a party benefiting more from the cooperation should give a certain compensation principle to a party who has less benefit in the cooperation in order to establish a mechanism of interest balance accepted by all parties, thus contributing to the partnership of the parties involved.
Thirdly, the ANP model of the comprehensive evaluation of the old city regeneration is set up. Under the same evaluation system, the three main criteria are sustainable, competitive and cultural inheritance, the traditional ANP method is improved by using nonlinear programming, PS and DEMATEL method, and the feasibility of the method is verified by an example analysis. It can be found that this model has the following advantages: overcoming the shortcomings of the single decision index, making the preferred project more able to reflect the social fairness and the sustainable development of the city. The model takes into account the interaction between the elements contained in the old city regeneration, and makes it closer to the reality; through the traditional A The improvement of NP method makes the model more scientific and reasonable, and is more simple and clear in operation.

【学位授予单位】:重庆大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:TU984.114

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