银行负债、制度环境与控股股东代理成本

发布时间：2018-07-10 16:39

本文选题：银行负债 + 控股股东　；参考：《技术经济与管理研究》2014年08期

【摘要】：债权人对控股股东的制衡力量在学术界一直鲜有人关注。文章就企业的银行负债对控股股东代理成本的影响进行了理论分析与实证检验,在此基础上进一步检验了产权性质对二者关系的调节作用,以及内部治理机制和法律环境与银行负债的交互作用。利用中国A股房地产上市公司2003-2011年的面板数据,研究表明:企业的银行负债显著降低了控股股东代理成本;产权性质对二者关系具有调节作用,公司内部治理机制、法律环境与银行负债存在交互作用。文章所得出的研究结论既丰富了委托代理、资本结构等相关理论,又对银行与国有企业产权改革以及企业融资决策具有较强启示意义。
[Abstract]:The balance power of creditor to controlling shareholder has been paid little attention to in academic circles. This paper makes a theoretical analysis and an empirical test on the influence of bank liabilities on the agency cost of controlling shareholders. On this basis, it further tests the effect of the property right nature on the relationship between the two. And the interaction between internal governance mechanism and legal environment and bank liabilities. Based on the panel data of China A-share real estate listed companies from 2003 to 2011, the research shows that the bank liabilities of enterprises have significantly reduced the agency costs of controlling shareholders, the nature of property rights has a moderating effect on the relationship between the two, and the internal governance mechanism of the companies. There is interaction between legal environment and bank liabilities. The conclusion not only enriches the theories of principal-agent and capital structure, but also enlightens the reform of property rights of banks and state-owned enterprises as well as the financing decisions of enterprises.
【作者单位】：宁波市现代物流规划研究院;浙江大学管理学院;浙江工业大学经贸管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金项目(12BGL036) 浙江省自然科学基金项目(Y6110082) 宁波市自然基金项目(2012A610155) 宁波市哲学社会科学学科带头人培养资助项目(2012-2014年)
【分类号】：F275;F271

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