博弈视角下的浙江中小企业银行融资问题分析

发布时间：2018-11-22 09:57

【摘要】：改革开放三十多年来,我国中小企业有了长足发展,己成为推动经济增长的主力军。浙江的发展实践证明,中小企业在增加就业、推进结构转型、促进城镇化以及增加农民收入等方面具有大型企业无可比拟的优势。然而近年以来,受经济危机及会融体制等诸多因素影响,浙江中小企业的经营和生存状况受到极大冲击,因资会链断裂而发生的一系列悲剧性事件愈演愈烈。由于实体经济放缓、房地产市场降温,且正规银行贷款持续收紧,一些企业无法履行债务,导致愈演愈烈的企业融资困境与问题。中小企业的融资过程从根本上来说是非对称信息条件下商业银行与中小企业双方的博弈过程。信息不对称使中小企业融资遭遇银行信贷配给,因此研究银行与中小企业的融资关系具有重要现实意义。本文从信息不对称的角度出发,基于博弈视角分析中小企业与银行之间的博弈,然后基于博弈结果提出相关解决措施,以谋求资源配置的帕累托最优。首先,本文以中小企业融资难为出发点,在明确中小企业界定的基础上,分析了浙江省中小企业的发展现状,并结合其实际特点,全面系统地分析了中小企业融资中存在的问题,深入探讨了中小企业融资难的原因。其次,本文对国内外相关的信贷融资理论作了简要的介绍,并按照信息是否完全分别建立博弈模型。通过对中小企业和银行的融资博弈分析,指出造成中小企业融资困难的根本原因是抵押、担保等社会惩罚约束机制不完善以及信息的非对称性。再次,通过对浙江LJ集团GK银行的融资案例分析,将真实的企业财务数据代入前文建立的博弈分析,得出的分析结果验证了本文博弈模型的适用性。最后,本文通过理论和博弈分析,结合当前浙江省的经济发展趋势,分别从提高中小企业素质、完善融资体系和加大政府支持力度三个方面尝试提出了缓解中小企业融资困境的途径和方法。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening up more than 30 years ago, the small and medium-sized enterprises of our country have made great progress and become the main force to promote economic growth. Zhejiang's development practice has proved that small and medium-sized enterprises have unparalleled advantages in increasing employment, promoting structural transformation, promoting urbanization and increasing farmers' income. However, in recent years, under the influence of economic crisis and financial system, the operation and survival of small and medium-sized enterprises in Zhejiang have been greatly impacted, and a series of tragic events have occurred because of the chain breakage of the investment committee. As the real economy slows, the real estate market cools, and formal bank loans continue to tighten, some companies are unable to meet their debts, leading to growing corporate financing difficulties and problems. The financing process of SMEs is fundamentally the game process between commercial banks and SMEs under the condition of asymmetric information. Asymmetric information makes SME financing encounter bank credit rationing, so it is of great practical significance to study the financing relationship between banks and SMEs. From the angle of information asymmetry, this paper analyzes the game between small and medium-sized enterprises and banks from the perspective of game theory, and then puts forward some relevant solutions based on the result of game, in order to seek the Pareto optimal allocation of resources. First of all, based on the definition of SMEs, this paper analyzes the current situation of SMEs in Zhejiang Province, and combines the characteristics of SMEs. This paper analyzes the problems existing in the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises, and probes into the reasons for the difficulties in financing of small and medium-sized enterprises. Secondly, this paper gives a brief introduction to the domestic and foreign credit financing theories, and establishes the game model according to whether the information is complete or not. By analyzing the financing game between small and medium-sized enterprises and banks, it is pointed out that the fundamental causes of SMEs' financing difficulties are the imperfection of social punishment and restraint mechanism, such as mortgage, guarantee and information asymmetry. Thirdly, through the financing case analysis of GK Bank of Zhejiang LJ Group, the true enterprise financial data is substituted into the game analysis established earlier, and the result of the analysis proves the applicability of the game model in this paper. Finally, through the theory and game analysis, combining the current economic development trend of Zhejiang Province, respectively, from improving the quality of small and medium-sized enterprises, Improving the financing system and increasing the government support try to improve the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：广西师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F224.32;F276.3

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