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房地产销售代理合约研究

发布时间:2019-03-11 08:59
【摘要】:发达国家的房地产市场经过几百年的发展,经历工业化和城市化以后,早在20世纪50年代就已进入成熟期。目前,在发达国家,房地产市场以二手房交易为主,一手房买卖只占总交易量的很小比例。但在我国却不一样,目前我国还处在快速工业化和城市化进程中,每年新房交易超过二手房交易量。并且,随着社会分工的发展,新房销售时很多开发商选择销售代理的模式。因而,销售代理在我国房地产市场中占有重要地位,协调好房地产销售代理双方的关系,对于房地产业及社会经济的发展具有重要意义。 但是,从我国目前的房地产销售代理市场的运作情况来看,销售代理商未受到较好激励、积极性未充分发挥,导致销售代理活动效率不高,开发商对销售代理商的工作不满意。 为协调好房地产销售代理双方的关系,论文从供应链的角度对房地产销售代理进行研究。在介绍我国房地产及销售代理业的发展历程,以及房地产销售代理业存在的问题的基础上,对现有研究成果和文献进行了梳理和综述。 作为房地产销售代理活动的源头,房地产开发商要作出销售工作是否外包的决策。从业务外包的理论基础和动因出发,指出房地产销售外包的动因是开发商专注于核心业务,提高项目的售价及销售速度,提升项目的盈利能力。开发商销售外包决策,主要看是自行组织销售的收益更高还是销售外包所带来的收益更高。以此为开始,分析了房地产销售代理的委托代理关系与契约理论中委托-代理问题的异同;在此基础上,对房地产销售代理活动进行基础分析,研究房地产销售代理活动中双方各自的决策和行为。 为协调好房地产销售供应链上下游企业之间的关系,须在开发商和销售代理商之间进行合理的利益分配。由于房地产销售代理过程中,房地产的所有权在代理双方之间并不发生转移,这与一般的销售供应链存在根本区别。为此,分析了房地产的销售价格构成,以及在不同价格区段销售代理商对于价格上升的贡献,指出根据不同价格区段实施分级分成利益分配合约,可以更好地激励销售代理商,调动其积极性,促进房地产销售供应链运作效率的提高。 除了提高售价,增加项目总利润外,项目阶段性销售目标的实现对于开发商而言具有重要的意义。因此,将回馈和惩罚机制引入房地产销售代理,研究房地产销售代理承诺合约。作为研究基点,首先分析了普通佣金模式下销售代理商的工作努力程度以及整个销售供应链和委托代理双方各自的收益。随后,对销售数量承诺销售代理合约进行研究,在承诺合约模型中,引入单价奖惩加固定金额奖惩的综合奖惩措施,通过模型构建和优化分析,得出销售代理商的决策策略和收益。并对两种模式下销售代理商的努力程度和各方收益进行了对比分析。在考虑一般回馈和惩罚措施的基础上,综合奖惩措施可以迫使销售代理商选择较高的努力程度,避免道德风险行为的出现,保证其承诺的实现,从而保证房地产开发商预定目标的实现。 分级分成利益分配合约和承诺合约的研究均是针对静态的收益,但现实经济生活中,事物是动态发展的,资金是有时间价值的。为使研究更接近实际,考虑资金时间价值对房地产销售代理双方的影响。分别分析了不考虑和考虑资金时间价值两种情况下销售代理商的行为和各方收益,结果表明,考虑资金时间价值情况下比不考虑资金时间价值情况下,销售代理商工作更努力,房地产项目能在前期实现更多的销售,各方收益更高。 最后,以相关实际数据为基础,进行了案例研究。数据分析结果表明,房地产销售外包不能带来成本的降低,但能促进项目产品售价的提升,且售价的提升幅度超过成本的增加幅度,进而提高项目的投资收益率。
[Abstract]:After hundreds of years of development, the real estate market in the developed countries has gone through industrialization and urbanization, and has entered the mature stage in the early 1950s. At present, in the developed countries, the real estate market mainly deals with the second-hand house transaction, and the purchase and sale of one-hand house accounts for only a small proportion of the total trading volume. But in our country, however, our country is still in the process of rapid industrialization and urbanization, and the new house transactions exceed the trading volume of the second-hand house each year. In addition, with the development of the social division of labor, many developers in the new house select the mode of the sales agent. Therefore, the sales agent plays an important role in the real estate market of our country, and coordinates the relationship between the two sides of the real estate sales agent, which is of great significance to the development of the real estate industry and the social economy. However, from the current operation of the real estate sales agent market in our country, the sales agent has not been well motivated, the enthusiasm is not fully exerted, the sales agent activity is not high, and the developer is not satisfied with the sales agent's work. In order to coordinate the relationship between the real estate sales agent, the paper proceeds from the view of supply chain to the real estate sales agent. On the basis of introducing the development of the real estate and the sales agent industry in China, and the problems existing in the real estate sales agent industry, the existing research results and the literature are sorted out. and review. As the source of the real estate sales agent activity, the real estate developer should make a sales work The decision of outsourcing is based on the theoretical basis and the motivation of the outsourcing of the business. It is pointed out that the motivation of the outsourcing of real estate is the focus of the developer on the core business, the price of the project and the sales speed, and the promotion of the project. The profit ability of the developer. The developer sells the outsourcing decision, mainly see whether the self-organized sales income is higher or the sales outsourcing In order to start, the principal-agent relationship of the real estate sales agent and the principal-agent problem in the contract theory are analyzed. On the basis of this, the real estate sales agent's activities are analyzed and the real estate sales agent activities are studied. Decision and behavior. To coordinate the relationship between the upstream and downstream enterprises of the real estate sales supply chain, it is necessary to carry out the relationship between the developer and the sales agent Reasonable interest distribution. As a result of the real estate sales agent, the ownership of the real estate is not transferred between the agents, which is similar to the general sales supply There is a fundamental difference in the chain. For this reason, the composition of the selling price of the real estate and the contribution of the sales agent in different price sections to the price increase are analyzed, and it is pointed out that the sales agent can be better driven according to the implementation of the grading into the benefit distribution contract according to the implementation of the different price sections. to mobilize its enthusiasm and to promote the supply chain of real estate The improvement of the operation efficiency. In addition to improving the selling price and increasing the total profit of the project, the implementation of the project stage sales target is for the developer It is of great significance to introduce a feedback and punishment mechanism into the real estate sales agent to study the premises As a base point of the study, the sales agent's degree of work and the whole sales supply chain and commission of the sales agent in the normal commission mode are analyzed first. The respective proceeds from both parties. Subsequently, the sales agent contract is researched on the sales quantity promise. In the commitment contract model, the comprehensive reward and punishment measures of the unit price and the reward and punishment plus the fixed amount are introduced, and the sales agent is obtained through the model construction and the optimization analysis. The decision-making strategy and benefits of the business, and the degree of effort and the parties involved in the sales of agents in both modes On the basis of consideration of general feedback and punishment measures, the comprehensive reward and punishment measures can force the sales agent to select a higher degree of effort, avoid the occurrence of moral hazard, and guarantee the realization of the promise, so as to guarantee the opening of the real estate. The achievement of the intended target of the issuer. The research on the classification of the distribution contract and the commitment contract is for the static income, but in the real economic life, the thing is the dynamic development In order to make the study more close to reality, consider the value of the capital time to the house. The effect of the two parties on the real estate sales agent is analyzed. The behavior of the sales agent and the income of the parties under the two conditions of not considering and considering the time value of the capital are respectively analyzed. The results show that, in the case of considering the time value of the capital, the value of the time value of the fund is not taken into account. And the sales agent works harder, and the real estate project can be realized in the early stage. More sales, and the benefits of the parties are higher. Finally, with the relevant actual Based on the data, the case study is carried out. The data analysis results show that the real estate sales outsourcing can not bring the cost reduction, but can promote the increase of the price of the project product, and the increase of the selling price exceeds the cost increase.
【学位授予单位】:西南交通大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F299.233.52

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