考虑私人不同风险投资行为的PPP项目补偿契约研究

发布时间：2018-06-18 01:18

本文选题：PPP项目 + 单期补偿　；参考：《运筹与管理》2016年04期

【摘要】：针对PPP项目的准公共物品属性,以及未来收益的不确定性,首先通过引入项目运营收益的相对补偿指数,设计一种单期补偿契约;然后基于私人投资决策存在不同风险偏好行为,借助"均值-方差"模型,建立私人投资的期望效用函数,并运用主从对策博弈分析私人投资策略与政府补偿情景,从而通过情景建模来研究政府补偿契约的最优设计及应对策略。研究表明:尽管私人投资项目的积极性与其风险规避度负相关,但政府最优补偿契约将使私人对项目的初始投资与其风险规避度正相关。最后,还通过数值分析进一步说明,虽然政府不希望给与风险规避度高的投资者较多补偿,但可通过契约参数的最优设计来激励私人增加初始投资、减少期望利润、提高项目最佳社会效益。
[Abstract]:In view of the quasi-public goods attribute of PPP project and the uncertainty of future income, a single-period compensation contract is designed by introducing the relative compensation index of project operating income. Then, based on the different risk preference behavior in private investment decision, the expected utility function of private investment is established by means of "mean-variance" model, and the game between principal and subordinate game is used to analyze the situation of private investment strategy and government compensation. The optimal design and coping strategy of government compensation contract are studied through situational modeling. The research shows that, although the enthusiasm of private investment projects is negatively correlated with their risk aversion, the government's optimal compensation contract will positively correlate the initial investment of private investment projects with their risk aversion. Finally, through numerical analysis, it is further demonstrated that although the government does not want to give more compensation to investors with high risk aversion, the optimal design of contract parameters can be used to encourage private individuals to increase their initial investment and reduce the expected profit. Improve the best social benefits of the project.
【作者单位】：南京财经大学会计学院;南京大学工程管理学院;埃克塞特大学商学院;南京工业大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重大项目(71390521);国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70831002);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71571099,71471084,71271112) 中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2012M521053) 江苏省教育厅%高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目(2012SJB630029)
【分类号】：F283

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