我国上市公司选择异地独立董事的影响因素及其绩效研究

发布时间：2018-03-04 19:33

本文选题：异地独立董事　切入点：代理冲突　出处：《首都经济贸易大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：独立董事制度作为公司治理的重要组成部分,在我国设立的初衷是监督制衡控股股东和内部控制人,完善公司治理结构。尽管在实践过程中暴露出许多问题,但也在不断完善。独立董事的教育背景、专业水平、技能、社会关系等都在提升,监督职能和咨询作用同时发挥作用。理论界对于独立董事的研究也更加细化,更多的关注独立董事本身的背景和特征。随着地理经济学的迅猛发展,独立董事的任职地点逐渐进入研究视野,并且很多上市公司中存在异地独立董事,这为独立董事异地的研究提供了理论基础和现实依据。本文通过文献研究的方法,从上市公司选择异地独立董事的影响因素和绩效两个方面对独立董事存在的现象进行解读。公司内部存在着一系列的委托代理关系,各个利益主体的目标不完全相同,便会产生代理冲突。具有资源和权利优势的一方就有进行自利行为的动机,而独立董事的监督作用可能会妨碍这种自利行为,弱化独立董事的整体监督职能便成为管理层或股东的诉求。而地理距离和信息成本增加了异地独立董事监督的难度,影响监督效果,异地独立董事便很可能成为他们青睐的弱监督者。异地独立董事远离上市公司的社交网络,一方面,地理距离和信息成本可能会降低其监督效果,降低公司的经营绩效;另一方面,异地独立董事不囿于上市公司熟人网络及人情关系限制,能够更独立的进行监督,提升公司经营绩效。对于代理冲突如何影响异地独立董事的存在性及异地独立董事如何影响企业绩效,本文通过实证研究的方法进行了检验。结果表明:代理冲突越大,选聘异地独立董事的概率越大,异地独立董事很可能是管理层或大股东主动弱化监督的产物。异地独立董事对公司绩效的影响主要表现在成本、收益、补助三方面,异地独立董事的存在能够显著提高公司的代理成本和经营绩效,也能够显著降低获得政府补助的数量。并且上市公司地点不同,异地独立董事对经营绩效的影响也不同。可见,上市公司选择异地独立董事的绩效利弊不一,提高经营绩效的同时也会增加代理成本,降低政府补助。此外,本文也在文献分析和实证检验的基础上对上市公司选聘异地独立董事提出了建议,并作出相应的研究展望。
[Abstract]:As an important part of corporate governance, independent director system was established in our country to supervise and balance controlling shareholders and internal controllers, and to perfect the corporate governance structure. The independent director's educational background, professional level, skill, social relationship and so on are all improved, the supervisory function and the consultation function play a role at the same time. With the rapid development of geographical economics, the position of independent director has gradually entered the research field of vision, and many listed companies have independent directors. This provides a theoretical and practical basis for the study of independent directors. This paper interprets the phenomenon of independent directors from the two aspects of influencing factors and performance of choosing independent directors in different places of listed companies. There are a series of principal-agent relationships within the company, and the objectives of each interest body are not exactly the same. There is a conflict of agency. The party with the advantage of resources and rights has the motive of self-interest, and the supervisory role of the independent director may hinder such self-interest, Weakening the overall supervision function of independent directors becomes the demand of management or shareholders, and geographical distance and information cost increase the difficulty of independent directors' supervision in different places, and affect the effect of supervision. Remote independent directors may become their favorite weak supervisors. On the one hand, geographical distance and information cost may reduce the supervision effect and reduce the company's performance. On the other hand, independent directors in different places are not restricted by the network of acquaintances and human relations of listed companies, so they can supervise more independently. How agency conflicts affect the existence of independent directors in different places and how independent directors in different places affect the performance of enterprises are tested by empirical research. The results show that the greater the agency conflicts are, the greater the agency conflicts are. The greater the probability of recruiting independent directors is, the more likely independent directors are the product of active weakening of supervision by management or major shareholders. The influence of independent directors on corporate performance is mainly reflected in three aspects: cost, income and subsidies. The existence of independent directors in different places can significantly improve the agency cost and operating performance of the company, and can also significantly reduce the amount of government subsidies. The performance of listed companies choosing independent directors in different places is different. While improving operating performance, it will also increase agency costs and reduce government subsidies. On the basis of literature analysis and empirical test, this paper also puts forward some suggestions on the selection and appointment of independent directors in different places of listed companies, and makes a corresponding research prospect.
【学位授予单位】：首都经济贸易大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F271;F832.51

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