独立董事官员背景类型与上市公司违规研究

发布时间：2018-03-19 18:20

本文选题：独立董事　切入点：政府官员型　出处：《会计研究》2017年08期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：本文基于公司违规视角检验了两类官员型独立董事的监督功能。研究发现,聘任政府官员型独立董事的公司违规倾向更高,违规被稽查的概率更低;聘任高校官员型独立董事的公司违规倾向更低,违规被稽查的概率没有表现更低。进一步还发现,对公司过度投资发挥监督功能是官员型独董影响违规的重要传导路径;政府官员型独董背后的寻租能力是其监督失效的主要原因,而高校官员型独董则凭借其专业优势发挥了积极的监督作用。本文的经验证据表明,"18号文"的政策冲击导致的官员型独董的离职,一方面切断了公司通过聘任政府官员担任独立董事而建立政治关系的通道,有利于证券市场秩序的维护,但同时也将部分能够发挥积极监督作用的高校官员型独董排除在外。
[Abstract]:Based on the perspective of company violation, this paper examines the supervisory function of two types of official independent directors. The study shows that the company employing government official independent directors has a higher tendency to violate the regulations, and the probability of violations being checked is lower. The company employing independent directors of university officials has a lower tendency to violate regulations, and the probability of violations being checked is not lower. Furthermore, it is found that overinvestment and supervision is an important transmission path to influence the violation; The main reason for the failure of supervision is the rent-seeking ability behind the government officials' independent directors. The empirical evidence in this paper shows that the policy impact of "article 18" has led to the departure of the official independent director. On the one hand, it cuts off the channel of establishing political relations by employing government officials as independent directors, which is conducive to the maintenance of the order of the securities market, but also excludes some university officials who can play an active role in supervision.
【作者单位】：西南财经大学会计学院;西南财经大学工商管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71672149、71620107005、71273212) 教育部高等学校全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项资金资助项目(201493) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(JBK1407116)的资助
【分类号】：F271;F832.51

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