经济适用房分配中的寻租研究

发布时间：2018-03-23 11:13

本文选题：经济适用房　切入点：分配　出处：《华中科技大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：作为一项带有强烈民生色彩的政策，经济适用房制度是解决中低收入阶层住房困难的福利政策。但是在分配环节中寻租猖獗，投机者借机敛财，中低收入家庭欲求一房而不得。近年来经济适用房一直是政府工作的重点，未来几年是我国经济适用房分配的高峰期。如何遏制经济适用房分配中寻租，保证公平分配是当前摆在我们面前的首要问题。本文运用经济学和博弈论分析了寻租者、设租者和监管者的行为选择，揭示了经济适用房分配中寻租行为的原因，提出抑制经济适用房分配中寻租的对策建议。本研究表明，寻租者以租售经济适用房获利为目的，其行为选择取决于预期收益大于预期成本。寻租收益、贿金、机会成本、惩罚强度和查处概率等是影响其行为选择的因素。寻租者参与经济适用房分配寻租的原因包括：经济适用房寻租获利大；寻租成本小；监督惩罚不严；保障对象界定使寻租有机可乘。设租者是掌握经济适用房分配权力的房管官员，影响其预期收益和预期成本的因素包括惩罚力度、查处概率和租金的多少等。设租者参与经济适用房分配寻租的原因包括：制度漏洞、惩罚不严、监管不力和委托代理失灵。监管者是影响寻租者和设租者采取寻租策略的外部主体。经济适用房分配中的寻租行为与监管强度有很大关系。监管者的行为选择与监管成本、稽查质量、查处后的惩罚系数、工资水平和寻租收益有关。根据研究结果笔者提出从制度设计、惩罚力度、查处概率、寻租收益等方面着手抑制经济适用房寻租的对策建议。首先完善制度设计，，严把准入关，使寻租者“不能”寻租；其次，严格控制经济适用房上市交易，弱化其投资功能，同时建立激励机制，使寻租者“不愿”寻租；第三，强化监督制约机制，加强社会监督，加大惩罚力度，使寻租者“不敢”寻租。三方面多管齐下，才能有效遏制经济适用房分配中寻租行为。
[Abstract]:As a policy with a strong flavor of people's livelihood, comfortable housing's system is a welfare policy to solve the housing difficulties of the low- and middle-income class. But rent-seeking is rampant in the distribution link, and speculators take advantage of the opportunity to accumulate money. Low- and middle-income families want one house instead of one. Comfortable housing has been the focus of the government's work in recent years, and the next few years will be the peak period for the allocation of comfortable housing in our country. How to curb the rent-seeking in the allocation of comfortable housing? To ensure fair distribution is the most important issue in front of us. This paper analyzes the behavior choices of rent-seekers, renters and regulators by using economics and game theory, and reveals the reasons for the rent-seeking behavior in comfortable housing's distribution. This paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to restrain the rent-seeking in the allocation of comfortable housing. This study shows that the rent-seeker 's behavior choice depends on that the expected income is greater than the expected cost, the rent-seeking income, the bribe money, the opportunity cost, the profit of rent-seeking, the profit of bribe, the opportunity cost. The intensity of punishment and probabilities of investigation and punishment are the factors that influence the choice of behavior. The reasons why rent-seekers participate in the allocation of rent-seeking by comfortable housing include: comfortable housing's rent-seeking profit is large, the cost of rent-seeking is small, the supervision and punishment is not strict; The definition of the object of security makes rent-seeking an opportunity. The renter is a housing management official who has the power to assign power to comfortable housing. The factors that affect his expected income and expected cost include the degree of punishment. The reasons for the lessee to participate in the allocation of rent by comfortable housing include: loopholes in the system and lax punishment. The supervisor is the external body that influences rent-seeking and rent-seeking strategy. The behavior of rent-seeking in comfortable housing's distribution has a lot to do with the intensity of supervision, and the behavior choice of supervisor is related to the cost of supervision. Check quality, penalty coefficient after investigation, wage level and rent-seeking income. According to the research result, the author puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions to restrain comfortable housing's rent-seeking from the aspects of system design, punishment intensity, investigation probability, rent-seeking income and so on. Secondly, we should strictly control comfortable housing's listed transactions, weaken its investment function, and establish an incentive mechanism to make rent-seekers "unwilling" to seek rent. Third, we should strengthen the mechanism of supervision and restriction, strengthen social supervision, and increase the degree of punishment. So that rent-seekers "dare not" rent-seeking. Three aspects of multi-pronged, can effectively curb comfortable housing in the distribution of rent-seeking behavior.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F299.23

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