我国创业板高管薪酬与企业成长性关系的实证研究

发布时间：2018-03-29 08:13

本文选题：创业板　切入点：企业成长性　出处：《西北大学》2014年硕士论文

【摘要】：高管人员薪酬问题一直是学者和企业家们的关注的焦点,他们是企业的经营决策层,所做的决策关乎公司发展方向。对于我国股份公司“两权分离”而产生的问题,需要通过公司治理体系的不断完善以及合理的薪酬体系的建立来解决。由于美国次贷危机爆发引发的全球金融危机,高管薪酬问题再度成为公众关注的焦点。我国创业板作为主板的重要补充部分,给我国高科技、高成长性企业提供了良好的融资平台。这个新兴板块的高成长性作为其突出特点,高管薪酬激励的效果以及高管薪酬对创业板企业成长性的贡献程度,是我们值得探讨的一个问题。本文以企业成长为出发点,根据高管的薪酬结构将自变量高管薪酬分为货币薪酬、权益薪酬和股权激励强度,根据这种分类方法对高管薪酬进行理论分析,采用相关性分析法和线性回归分析法来观察与企业成长性之间的关系。本文得出以下主要结论：高管的权益薪酬与企业成长能力的相关性较高,与货币薪酬的激励相比,权益薪酬更能够提高高管工作的积极性；创业板高管股权激励强度对成长性的贡献是不显著的,由于创业板的特殊性,持股比例过高会产生“确定效应”,甚至可能抵消高管薪酬的股权激励效果。因此本文认为创业板上市公司高管薪酬的有效性,并不是在于高管股权激励的强度,而是重视高管货币薪酬的基础上提高高管的权益薪酬,避免股权激励程度过高产生的负面影响。在理论分析与实证分析的基础上,在本文最后提出了一些有针对性的建议。
[Abstract]:The issue of executive compensation has always been the focus of attention of scholars and entrepreneurs. They are the decision makers of enterprises, and the decisions they make are related to the development direction of the company. Need to be solved through the continuous improvement of the corporate governance system and the establishment of a reasonable compensation system. Because of the global financial crisis caused by the outbreak of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the United States, The issue of executive compensation has once again become the focus of public attention. As an important supplementary part of the main board, the gem gives our country high technology. High-growth enterprises provide a good financing platform. The high growth of this emerging plate as its outstanding characteristics, the effect of executive compensation incentive and the contribution of executive compensation to growth of gem, It is a problem worth discussing. In this paper, according to the structure of executive compensation, the independent variable executive compensation is divided into monetary compensation, equity compensation and equity incentive intensity. According to this classification method, the paper makes a theoretical analysis of executive compensation. The correlation analysis and linear regression analysis are used to observe the relationship between the growth and the growth of the firm. The main conclusions are as follows: the equity compensation of the executive is highly correlated with the growth ability of the enterprise, compared with the incentive of monetary compensation. Equity compensation can improve the enthusiasm of senior executives. The contribution of incentive intensity to growth is not significant, because of the particularity of gem. Excessive shareholdings can have a "deterministic effect" and may even offset the equity incentive effect of executive compensation. Therefore, this paper argues that the effectiveness of executive compensation in gem listed companies is not due to the intensity of executive equity incentive, but to improve the equity compensation of executives on the basis of monetary compensation. On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis, some specific suggestions are put forward at the end of this paper.
【学位授予单位】：西北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.51

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