财务总监权力优势与盈余管理关系研究

发布时间：2018-05-01 00:34

本文选题：财务总监权力 + 机会主义盈余管理　；参考：《山东大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：财务总监制度是目前我国上市公司正在积极推进完善的一项公司治理机制,财务总监在上市公司组织结构中具有重要的地位,财务总监的职能已从传统的会计核算延伸到了战略决策、内部控制和信息管理等领域,因而财务总监在公司的会计政策选择上能够发挥更重要的监督作用,会显著影响上市公司的会计信息质量。那么,上市公司在财务总监权力优势影响下所选择的会计政策是会提高会计信息质量还是降低会计信息质量?本文选取盈余管理作为一个观察点来窥视财务总监权力优势对于上市公司会计信息质量的影响。为了解决该问题,本文以委托代理理论和公司治理理论为依据,梳理了国内外有关财务总监权力与盈余管理的相关文献,运用2007年—2014年沪深两市全部A股上市公司数据进行实证研究,研究发现,财务总监的权力优势能够产生抑制盈余管理的作用,并且在区分不同的盈余管理属性以及上市公司面临的不同的情境,财务总监的权力优势对上市公司盈余管理行为的影响作用也会存在差别。研究结果显示:第一,CFO的权力优势会显著抑制应计盈余管理。第二,CFO的权力优势对真实盈余管理也具有显著的抑制作用。其中,CFO的权力优势对于操纵性费用的抑制作用更显著,对于销售操控(通过改变信用政策来扩大销售)和生产操控(进行过度生产以降低单位销售成本)的抑制作用不显著。第三,区分盈余管理不同的属性,如果公司具有机会主义盈余管理动机,会弱化财务总监权利优势对应计盈余管理的抑制作用。第四,如果上市公司当年负责人发生变更,这使得财务总监在财务和会计领域的话语权进一步得到增强,所以公司负责人发生变更会强化财务总监权力优势对于盈余管理的抑制作用。依据相关理论分析和实证结果,本文提出了以下建议:(1)上市公司要积极完善CFO制度,以及科学合理的界定CFO在公司的权利;(2)上市公司要加强CFO职业能力培训与职业道德培训,提升CFO的财务专业能力和道德素质,有效保证上市公司披露的会计信息质量,进而维护内外部中小股东的利益,有助于我国资本市场健康的发展。(3)完善公司治理机制,确保外部约束机制和内部监督机制得到有效实施,发挥公司治理的规范作用,提高公司治理效率。
[Abstract]:The financial director system is a perfect corporate governance mechanism for listed companies in our country at present. The chief financial officer plays an important role in the organizational structure of listed companies. The function of CFO has been extended from traditional accounting to strategic decision-making, internal control and information management, so CFO can play a more important supervisory role in the choice of accounting policy. It will significantly affect the quality of accounting information of listed companies. So, will the listed companies choose accounting policies under the influence of the power advantage of the chief financial officer to improve the quality of accounting information or reduce the quality of accounting information? This paper selects earnings management as an observation point to look into the influence of financial director's power advantage on the accounting information quality of listed companies. In order to solve this problem, based on the principal-agent theory and the theory of corporate governance, this paper combs the relevant literature on the power of chief financial officer and earnings management at home and abroad. Using the data of all A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2014, the empirical study shows that the power advantage of CFO can restrain earnings management. And in the distinction of different earnings management attributes and different situations faced by listed companies, the influence of the power advantage of CFO on earnings management behavior of listed companies will also be different. The results show that: first, the power advantage of CFO significantly inhibits accrual earnings management. Second, the power advantage of CFO also has a significant inhibitory effect on real earnings management. The power advantage of CFO has a more significant inhibitory effect on manipulative costs than on sales manipulation (expanding sales by changing credit policy) and production manipulation (overproduction to reduce unit sales cost). Third, distinguish the different attributes of earnings management, if the company has opportunistic earnings management motivation, it will weaken the financial director's right advantage corresponding to the restraining effect of earnings management. Fourth, if the person in charge of the listed company changes in that year, this will further strengthen the voice of the chief financial officer in the field of finance and accounting. So the change of the head of the company will strengthen the power advantage of the chief financial officer to restrain the earnings management. Based on the relevant theoretical analysis and empirical results, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: 1) the listed companies should actively improve the CFO system, and scientifically and reasonably define the rights of CFO in the company. (2) the listed companies should strengthen the CFO vocational ability training and professional ethics training. To improve the financial professional ability and moral quality of CFO, to effectively guarantee the quality of accounting information disclosed by listed companies, and then to safeguard the interests of internal and external minority shareholders, is helpful to the healthy development of China's capital market. To ensure the effective implementation of external restraint mechanism and internal supervision mechanism, to give play to the normative role of corporate governance, and to improve the efficiency of corporate governance.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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