电信运营商价格歧视的经济效应研究

发布时间：2018-03-08 01:05

本文选题：价格歧视　切入点：拉姆齐定价　出处：《浙江财经大学》2015年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：电信行业是一个传统而新兴的行业，它伴随着技术进步而不断发展变化。垄断的市场格局已经无法满足现阶段的社会需求，各国电信行业在20世纪80年代开始逐步进行改革，我国电信行业也加入到了这股浪潮中。中国电信行业改革的关键环节就是逐步放开对电信价格的政府管制。政府管制放松使得电信运营商的价格自主权扩大，为了获得市场占有率和企业利润不断展开价格竞争。但是，在放松政府管制的同时也面临着问题，电信运营商通过价格歧视获取利润。本文将通过对电信下游零售市场三级价格歧视和上游批发市场接入价格歧视的分析，探讨其经济效应。在电信下游终端市场，，以移动通信业务为例，电信运营商采用了不同的方案实现价格歧视。中国移动一直以来都在移动通信业务领域占有主导地位，本文根据中国移动公司2000-2011年数据得到移动通信用户的平均需求价格弹性为-0.6136，表示移动通信的价格每下降10%，用户的使用量将增加6.136%。然后以此为依据假设了高、中、低收入人群的需求价格弹性分别为-0.5136、-0.6136、-0.7136的移动通信用户，根据运营商三级价格歧视的套餐设置得到相关价格和消费量数据，利用拉姆齐定价公式得到各个需求价格弹性下的拉姆齐价格，发现其普遍低于实际价格。但这种价格偏离存在现实原因，拉姆齐定价无法在电信终端市场实现。并且，电信下游零售市场的这种价格歧视与市场竞争程度存在正相关。在电信上游批发市场，拥有基础网络的主导运营商向非主导运营商出售电信批发业务，非主导运营商通过向其支付接入价格连接基础网络，从而进入电信市场。在电信市场中，主导运营商成为一个纵向一体化企业，它能够将上游批发市场的市场势力通过歧视性接入价格延伸至下游零售市场，影响下游市场竞争。因此，接入价格歧视对下游市场竞争的影响成为电信中间市场的研究重点。论文通过模型建立，对政府统一定价、主导运营商以利润最大化为目标的自由定价和政府以社会福利最大化为目标的管制定价三种电信接入价格定价模式对电信终端市场的影响进行分析，比较不同定价的竞争效应。得出存在歧视性的管制机构以社会福利最大化的管制定价最能促进下游终端市场的竞争，电信上游批发市场需要以歧视性接入价格进行适当的政府管制。根据对电信上下游市场的价格歧视分析，论文给出相关的反垄断和政府管制建议。根据两个市场的不同特点，在电信下游零售市场以实行反垄断政策为主，政府应当放松管制，促进市场的自由竞争。而在电信上游批发市场，主导运营商的寡头垄断格局很难打破，市场竞争性较弱，需要政府管制来完善市场。
[Abstract]:The telecommunication industry is a traditional and emerging industry, which has been developing and changing with the progress of technology. The monopoly market structure has been unable to meet the current social needs. In 1980s, the telecommunications industry of various countries began to reform gradually. China's telecommunications industry has also joined the wave. The key link in the reform of China's telecommunications industry is to gradually liberalize government controls on telecommunications prices. The deregulation of government regulation has expanded the price autonomy of telecom operators. In order to gain market share and enterprise profits, price competition continues to develop. However, while the government is loosening its regulations, it is also facing problems. Telecom operators make profits through price discrimination. This paper will discuss its economic effect by analyzing the three-level price discrimination in the downstream retail market and the access price discrimination in the upstream wholesale market. In the downstream terminal market of telecommunications, taking mobile communication service as an example, telecom operators have adopted different schemes to achieve price discrimination. China Mobile has always played a leading role in the field of mobile communication services. According to the data of China Mobile Company from 2000 to 2011, the average demand price elasticity of mobile communication users is -0.6136, which means that for every 10 decline in the price of mobile communication, the usage of users will increase 6.136. The demand price elasticity of low-income people is -0.5136U -0.6136U -0.7136, respectively. According to the set of three-level price discrimination set by operators, the relevant price and consumption data are obtained. Ramsay pricing formula is used to obtain Ramsay price under various demand price elasticity, and it is found that Ramsey price is generally lower than the actual price. However, there are realistic reasons for this price deviation. Ramsey pricing cannot be realized in the telecommunications terminal market. The price discrimination in the downstream retail market is positively related to the degree of market competition. In the upstream wholesale market of telecommunications, leading operators with basic networks sell wholesale services to non-dominant operators, which connect to the basic network by paying them access prices. Thus entering the telecommunications market. In the telecommunications market, the leading operator becomes a vertically integrated enterprise that can extend the market power of the upstream wholesale market to the downstream retail market through discriminatory access prices. Therefore, the impact of access price discrimination on downstream market competition has become the focus of research in telecommunications intermediate market. The influence of three telecom access pricing modes on telecom terminal market is analyzed, which is free pricing aiming at profit maximization and government regulation pricing aiming at social welfare maximization. Comparing the competitive effect of different pricing. It is concluded that the regulation pricing with the maximization of social welfare can promote the competition in the downstream end market. Upstream wholesale telecommunications markets need to be subject to appropriate government regulation at discriminatory access prices. Based on the analysis of price discrimination in the upstream and downstream markets of telecommunications, the paper gives some suggestions on antitrust and government regulation. According to the different characteristics of the two markets, antitrust policies are adopted in the downstream retail market. The government should deregulate and promote the free competition of the market, but in the wholesale market of telecom upstream, the oligopoly pattern of leading operators is difficult to break, the market competition is weak, and government regulation is needed to perfect the market.
【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：F626

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