独特公司治理机制对企业创新的影响——来自互联网公司双层股权制的全球证据

发布时间：2018-04-20 14:29

本文选题：双层股权结构 + 创新　；参考：《经济研究》2017年01期

【摘要】：双层股权制度在现代新兴高科技企业中的使用率持续上升。对这种新兴公司治理机制的研究,以往主要集中在它引发的委托代理问题上,而关于它对创新的影响的研究尚是一个缺口。本文通过引入短期业绩敏感性拓展了Chemmanur-Jiao模型,对此问题做出了理论分析,并以Bv D-Osiris全球上市公司数据库中2004—2013全球互联网上市公司为样本对模型分析的结果进行了实证检验。研究发现,在全球意义上,双股制对企业创新有显著的促进作用,这一作用在使用倾向得分匹配法及Heckman两阶段模型对样本选择问题进行处理后更为显著且影响更大。同时,双股制的创新促进作用还取决于外部投资者的短期业绩敏感性,这在新兴国家与发达国家有显著差异。在外部制衡机制不完善的新兴国家中,采用双股制而且创始人任CEO或董事长反而会减少创新投入。进一步的实验设计的证据表明,中国目前采用双层股权制度的条件还不成熟。
[Abstract]:The study on this new corporate governance mechanism is mainly focused on the principal-agent problem, and the research on its impact on innovation is still a gap. This paper extends the Chemmanur-Jiao model through the introduction of short-term performance sensitivity. Based on the theoretical analysis of this problem, the results of the model analysis are tested by the sample of 2004 to 2013 global Internet listed companies in the Bv D-Osiris global listed company database. The study finds that the double share system has a significant role in promoting enterprise innovation in the global sense. This role is matched by the use tendency score. The method and the Heckman two stage model are more significant and more influential after processing the sample selection problem. At the same time, the innovation promotion effect of the double share system is also dependent on the short-term performance sensitivity of the external investors, which has significant differences in the emerging and developed countries. In the emerging countries with imperfect external balance mechanism, the dual share system is adopted. In addition, the founder of CEO or chairman will reduce innovation investment. Further experimental design evidence suggests that the conditions for China's current double ownership system are not yet mature.

【作者单位】：中国人民大学财政金融学院中国财政金融政策研究中心;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(项目编号:71673281)的资助
【分类号】：F271;F273.1;F49

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