通信业宽带普遍服务补偿机制研究

发布时间：2018-05-09 09:28

本文选题：宽带普遍服务补偿机制 + 交叉补贴效率　；参考：《北京邮电大学》2013年博士论文

【摘要】：随着通信业,尤其是宽带产业的迅速发展,全世界都感受到了“数字鸿沟”向“宽带鸿沟”的变化,以及这种变化对国家经济发展产生的影响。通过研究发现,不论是发达国家还是发展中国家,不论其经济实力如何,他们都不约而同的将“大力发展宽带普遍服务”提升到国家战略高度,其重视程度不言而喻。对于中国来说,宽带发展是也是大的趋势。但是中国有着和其他国家不一样的基本国情,诸如中国普遍服务机制与宽带发展的情况无法完全相互适应配合,加之地域复杂,人口众多,电信法律法规体制不完善,普遍服务保障机制不健全等,使得中国的宽带发展面临种种困扰。通过实证分析和文献研究,本文认为针对中国刚刚起步的宽带普遍服务补偿机制的研究来看,其理论方面存在三个急需弥补的理论空白：第一个理论空白,包含两个层次：第一个层次,宽带普遍服务的发展中已经逐渐涉及到移动宽带的普及问题,因此需要针对宽带及其组合类型和特点来研究宽带产业；第二个层次,宽带产业的特点会影响补偿机制的发展,就国内目前的科研情况和现实需求来看,针对中国特有的交叉补贴宽带普遍服务补偿机制的研究较为欠缺,需要通过成本投入与产出(宽带投入“产出”社会经济效益)之间关系的研究,从定量角度确定中国宽带交叉补贴的效率高低及其与宽带发展的匹配性问题。第二个理论空白,没有较为合理和完善的成本核算的原则、理论方法以及相对应的实证研究。第三个理论空白,目前很多应用博弈论研究普遍服务的文献,大多是以静态视角或者理论推导的方式,还没有人从动态角度,通过演化博弈及复制系统对宽带产业发展中的纳什均衡问题进行分析和研究,更不用说进一步研究宽带普遍服务了对于这三个理论空白的选择,本文也考虑到了逻辑上的连贯性和递进关系,概括如下：首先宽带产业的特点会对普遍服务的补偿机制产生影响,如果中国现有“交叉补贴+分片包干”的补偿机制无法与宽带发展相配合,那么这种影响就会最为直观的体现在宽带投入与产出(社会经济效益)的低效率性上,也就是说补偿机制无法满足宽带发展的需要。得到效率评价之后,按照本文的理论分析,政府补贴应该介入并作为辅助补偿模式,对中国现有补偿模式进行完善和增补,同时本文认为补贴应该按照成本法进行发放,因此,接下来的问题就是运营商的成本应该如何估算,这也是本文认定的第二个理论空白。在效率和成本的研究之后,我们需要考虑的是政府补贴介入后,会对宽带普遍服务的市场产生何种影响,对运营商的合作与否产生何种影响,市场是否稳定。这就需要我们从实证、动态的角度结合假设,定性定量分析政府补贴的地位及重要性,这刚好与文章前端部分的理论分析互相呼应,进一步加强了文章的整体性。综上,本论文设计了几个逐步递进的研究内容,力争在上述三个理论空白上予以突破。最终得到了以下结论： 1.在应用相关数学工具分析宽带产业特点的基础上,以数据包络分析法的CCR模型为基础,构建了投入(运营商村通宽带发展及成本投入)与产出(社会经济效益)之间的效率评价指标体系,从实证角度结合理论计算,分析和证明了现阶段中国宽带交叉补贴下的村通宽带发展及成本投入与社会经济效益产出之间的低效率性,通过我们的计算,三大运营商平均投入产出效率为56.97%,高效率(相对效率超过70%)省份数占村通任务总数的比例为41.07%,整体效率偏低。通过对结论的分析,本文认为政府补贴的介入对于中国宽带普遍服务市场的发展而言,是一种见效快,效果好的辅助补偿模式,它不仅促进了宽带的发展,而且直接带动了农村地区社会经济效益的增加,是对整个投入产出的双向强化。 2.提出了通过统计指标估算成本的新思路和新方法：“滚动式混合成本补贴测算法”。基于这种新思路和方法,进一步从统计学的视角研究并得到了“就中国而言,运营商在村通宽带工程普遍服务中投入的成本与其宽带任务量及普及率的乘积存在显著性相关”这一重要结论,并通过指数回归、线性回归等方法量化了这种关系。这种新思路和新方法以及对应的成本预估结论,对日后预估运营商村通宽带普遍服务成本有着重要的指导作用,同时还能够帮助政府制定补贴预算,对补贴额度进行预估。 3.以村通宽带普遍服务任务分配表中存在的特殊情况(同一省市地区存在两家运营商或者三家运营商共同承担村通宽带普遍服务义务,虽然没有相关资料显示是否存在合作或者行政村基础设施共建共享等情况,但并不排除未来运营商之间进行合作的可能性)和相关统计变量为基础,通过构建“政府(决策包括补贴或者不补贴两种)、运营商(决策包括与其他运营商合作或者不合作两种,同时本文认为,对于普遍服务这一高成本低收益市场而言,不合作就意味着不承担义务不进入其他运营商的普遍服务市场,即运营商只会负责工信部给予自己的普遍服务任务,不会出现一般市场“不合作就竞争”的情况。)”之间的宽带普遍服务补偿机制演化博弈动态复制系统(2×2×2双策略成本博弈),得到了“政府给予补贴是该系统在重复博弈过程中达到渐进稳定纳什均衡的必要条件之一,且稳定均衡中运营商之间不存在合作关系”这个重要结论,一方面从理论层面强调了政府补贴对于中国村通宽带普遍服务发展的重要性,另一方面也弥补了“用动态发展的视角和方法结合实证,研究宽带普遍服务补偿机制”的理论空白。
[Abstract]:With the rapid development of the communications industry, especially the broadband industry, the world has experienced the changes in the "digital divide" to the "broadband gap" and the impact of this change on the development of the country's economy. Through research, it is found that both developed and developing countries, regardless of their economic strength, will be identical. For China, the development of broadband is also a big trend. But China has a big trend in broadband development. But China has the basic national conditions that are different from other countries, such as the situation of the general service mechanism and the development of broadband in China, which can not be fully adapted to each other. The development of broadband in China is beset with many problems, such as complex territory, large population, imperfect telecommunications laws and regulations, and imperfect service guarantee mechanism.
Through the empirical analysis and literature research, this paper believes that there are three theoretical gaps in the theory of broadband universal service compensation mechanism in China: the first theory blank, including two levels: the first level, the development of broadband universal service has been gradually involved in mobile broadband It is necessary to study the wide band industry for the wide band and its combination types and characteristics; second levels, the characteristics of the broadband industry will affect the development of the compensation mechanism. In view of the current scientific research and practical needs of the country, the research on the universal service compensation mechanism of China's special cross subsidies is short. Through the study of the relationship between cost input and output (broadband input "output" social and economic benefits), the efficiency of China's broadband cross subsidy and its matching with the development of broadband are determined from a quantitative point of view. Second theoretical gaps are blank, and there is no more reasonable and perfect cost accounting principle, theoretical method and corresponding response. There are third theoretical gaps. There are many literature on universal service using game theory at present. Most of them are in the way of static or theoretical derivation. No one has analyzed and studied the Nash equilibrium problem in the development of broadband industry by evolutionary game and replication system from a dynamic point of view, not to mention further research. A wide range of broadband services
As for the selection of the three theoretical gaps, this paper also takes into account the logical consistency and progressive relationship. It is summarized as follows: first, the characteristics of the broadband industry will affect the compensation mechanism of universal services. If the existing compensation mechanism of "cross subsidy + pieceproof" in China does not cooperate with the development of broadband, the effect will be It is most intuitively reflected in the low efficiency of broadband input and output (social and economic benefit), that is, the compensation mechanism can not meet the needs of broadband development. After the efficiency evaluation, according to the theoretical analysis of this paper, the government subsidies should be involved and as a supplementary compensation model to improve and supplement the existing compensation mode in China, At the same time, this paper believes that subsidies should be distributed according to the cost method, so the next question is how to estimate the cost of the operators. This is the second theoretical gap identified in this article. After the study of efficiency and cost, what we need to consider is what the government subsidies will bring to the market of broadband universal service. It is necessary for us to analyze the status and importance of government subsidies qualitatively and quantitatively, which coincides with the theoretical analysis of the front part of the article and strengthens the integrity of the article.
In summary, this paper designs several progressively progressive research contents and strives to break through the above three theoretical blanks.
1. based on the analysis of the characteristics of the broadband industry with relevant mathematical tools, based on the CCR model of data envelopment analysis (DEA), the efficiency evaluation index system of input (the broadband development and cost input) and output (social and economic benefits) is constructed. It is analyzed and proved in the present stage from the point of view and the theoretical calculation. Through our calculation, the average input-output efficiency of the three major operators is 56.97% and the high efficiency (relative efficiency is more than 70%) is 41.07% and the overall efficiency is low. Analysis, this article holds that the intervention of government subsidies is a kind of fast and effective auxiliary compensation model for the development of China's broadband universal service market. It not only promotes the development of broadband, but also directly promotes the increase of social and economic benefits in rural areas, and is a two-way strengthening of the whole input and output.
2. a new idea and a new method of estimating cost through statistical indicators are proposed: "the rolling hybrid cost subsidy calculation method". Based on this new idea and method, this new idea and method is further studied and obtained from the statistical point of view. "In terms of China, the cost of the operator in the universal service of the village communication broadband project and its broadband task volume and popularization are obtained." This new idea and method, as well as the corresponding cost prediction conclusions, have an important guiding role in predicting the universal service cost of the broadband operator in the future, and can also help the government to make up a supplement. Budget and estimate the amount of the subsidy.
3. the special situation in the distribution table of the universal service mission in the village of village Tong (the two operators or three operators in the same provinces and regions jointly undertake the universal service obligations of the village Tong, although there is no relevant information about the existence of cooperation or the common construction and sharing of the administrative village infrastructure, but it does not exclude future operators. " The possibility of cooperation between them and the related statistical variables is based on the construction of the "government" (two kinds of decisions, including subsidies or non subsidies), and the operators (decision-making includes two kinds of cooperation or non cooperation with other operators, and this article holds that for the high cost and low yield market of universal service, no cooperation means that it is not undertaken. " The obligation does not enter the universal service market of other operators, that is, the operators will only be responsible for the general service task given by the Ministry of industry and credit, and will not appear in the general market "the situation of non cooperation and competition". "The evolution game dynamic replication system of the broadband universal service compensation mechanism (2 x 2 x 2 dual strategy cost game), and the government has got the" government " Subsidies are one of the necessary conditions for the system to achieve progressive stable Nash equilibrium in the process of repeated games, and the important conclusion is that there is no cooperation between operators in a stable equilibrium. On the one hand, the importance of government subsidies to the development of broadband universal service in China's village is emphasized on the one hand, and on the other hand it is made up. In the light of the dynamic development perspective and method combined with empirical research, the theoretical blank of the broadband universal service compensation mechanism is studied.

【学位授予单位】：北京邮电大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F626

【参考文献】